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Abstract 
 
Kevin Brennan 
 
A History of the Absence (and Emergent Presence) of Independent Public 
Universities in Mombasa, Kenya 
 
(Under the direction of George Noblit and Julius Nyang‟oro) 
  
 
While there is a great deal of literature available about schooling in Kenya 
and a good deal of writing about the establishment of Kenya‟s public university 
system there is a significant gap in the literature when it comes to describing and 
analyzing why certain areas of the country had long been removed from any on-site 
development of independent university opportunities. This study is an attempt to 
offer a history of an educational institution – an independent public university at the 
coast in Kenya – that does not yet exist. This longstanding absence took several 
significant steps toward transforming to a presence in 2007, when several university 
colleges were created at the coast. This transformation from absence to presence is 
a central theme in this work. 
The research for this project, broadly defined, took place over a seventeen 
year period and is rooted in both the author‟s professional experience as an 
educator working in Kenya in the early 1990s as well as his academic interests in 
comparative and international higher education. More narrowly, core data for the 
study was gathered in a series of open-ended interviews conducted during a series 
iv 
 
of trips to Kenya made between 2005 and 2007. Additional data were collected from 
newspaper sources and other published materials available in Kenya. 
The data were analyzed using a blend of grounded theory, dialectical and 
discourse analysis frameworks, in which the author‟s long, pre-doctoral study, 
professional engagement with Kenya fed the symbiosis of data collection and the 
theory development that is a central element of grounded theory. Dialectics provided 
a framework of major chord discourses (marginalization; a responsive discourse of 
alternatives; and „a university of our own‟) within each of which a Fairclough-ian 
understanding of discourse is used to reveal the minor chord complexities of each 
major chord discourse. 
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SECTION ONE 
 
Chapter One: Introduction to the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation constitutes a focused analysis of the circumstances and 
meanings taken from, or ascribed to, the longstanding absence of an independent 
public university at the coast of Kenya. It is also focused upon the recent realization 
of two public university college campuses at the coast (one in Mombasa, one in 
Kilifi),1 as well as a satellite campus of another Nairobi-based university2 in 
Mombasa. My interest in these circumstances and meanings did not originate as a 
research question, but rather as a matter that impacted my professional engagement 
as an educator working in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. I 
have retained my interest in the central issue explored in this work for the more than 
fifteen years since it first entered my world. Only recently has it been redefined as 
the question upon which I would focus my research. And only since the second half 
of 2007 has the focus shifted from that of the absence of such an independent, new 
public university to the presence of the subsidiary university colleges. 
In order then to best present the circumstances and meanings of this shift, I 
will begin with my own engagement – in Africa, in Kenya, in university-level 
education. I make no claim of authority in the matters discussed in this work. Rather, 
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 Neither freestanding universities, each subsidiary to an existing, Nairobi-based institution. 
 
2
 Kenyatta University opened a satellite campus in Mombasa in May 2007. 
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I see this effort as my personal pursuit of a long-term interest, one engaged upon in 
hopes of gaining a deeper understanding of the ways and means and place that 
formal education holds in Kenya. Specifically, this interest is focused upon access to 
university education within Kenya‟s formal education system. 
I first arrived in Africa in late 1984, working in Lesotho as a volunteer with the 
United States Peace Corps. I lived and worked on the grounds of a small high 
school in the northern part of the country, just a few miles from Lesotho‟s border with 
South Africa. For two years, I taught high school-level biology, chemistry, 
mathematics, and physics. It was an expressed desire of many of my students to try 
and gain good results on their high school-leaving exams so as to leverage 
admission to either the National Teacher Training College or the National University 
of Lesotho, the country‟s only university. It was also a (faint) hope of the teaching 
staff that one or more of the students at the new school might succeed at gaining 
entry to the university. Such hopes were rarely met by Lesotho‟s new schools, which 
would often struggle for years before having their first successful entrant to 
university. Given this, I sought to learn what the university and the teacher training 
college required of its applicants, and how my school might fare in its efforts to 
prepare its students for further schooling. 
While a handful of my students would eventually gain entry to the teacher 
training college, only one, to my knowledge, ended up at the university3. The 
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 I do not know if some of the lower level secondary school students I taught reached the university. 
At the time, secondary school and high school were distinct levels, with a national exams process 
sorting out who finished after secondary school (the lower level) and who continued to high school 
(the upper level). I also occasionally heard it referred to as upper secondary. It was possible that I 
taught some students at the secondary level who then went on to attend a separate high school – and 
perhaps from there went to university. 
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pyramidal structure of Lesotho‟s education system – copious numbers of primary 
schools, a far smaller number of secondary and high schools, and only a single 
teacher training college and single university – augured poorly for any great number 
of university entrants from any given secondary school. As I mentioned before, when 
it came to schools that were new to educating high school students, those on the 
cusp of applying to university, there was understood to be little chance to gain 
admittance for our students. At that time, in Lesotho‟s education system, new, small 
high schools typically did not attract the best students, and thus did not advance 
many of their students to the next level, at least not until they had built the kind of 
track record that by definition turned them into not-new schools. 
After returning to the United States later in 1987, I would eventually take up 
work with the education-focused programs of the United Nations Centre Against 
Apartheid (UNCAA) and the African-American Institute (AAI) in the late 1980s. In 
these positions, I worked with individuals from South Africa and Namibia who were 
pursuing undergraduate and/or graduate higher education while living in exile from 
their home countries. The political engagement of the sponsored students brought to 
me an added view of the value ascribed by these exiled students to university 
education, one that continues to inform my views on higher education. 
In 1991 I moved to Kenya to begin work as Director of the School for 
International Training‟s (SIT) semester-length undergraduate study abroad program 
based in Nairobi. The program with which I worked was focused on issues of culture 
and development, with most lectures delivered by faculty from the either the 
University of Nairobi or Kenyatta University. The SIT also operated a second Kenya-
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based program, one that though focused on coastal Kenyan cultures spent a 
significant portion of the semester based in Nairobi. When I asked people connected 
with this program that focused on coastal cultures and peoples why it spent as much 
time as it did in Nairobi, 300 miles from the coast, I was told it was because there 
was not a university on Kenya‟s coast with which the program could affiliate. 
At that time, there was, in fact, not a public university campus in Kenya within 
300 miles of the coast. There were distance and open learning programs operated 
by Nairobi-based universities, but these did not have faculty based at the coast4. I 
was told that the decision to offer the substantive academic lectures for this “Coastal 
Studies” program in Nairobi was also, in part, based on perceptions held by US-
based institutions that enrolled their students in SIT programs. The belief was that 
these US-based institutions would view a study abroad program that was not closely 
affiliated with a university as less than academically rigorous. So, the “Coastal 
Studies” program maintained its affiliation with faculty members of the University of 
Nairobi, which meant that most of its lectures were held 300 miles away from the 
coast. I am not, in any way, disparaging the study abroad program, its Directors, the 
lecturers, or SIT here. I believe that the program - then and now - is one of 
significant quality. However, I would, in the time I remained in Kenya, continue to 
see and believe that what the program‟s stated focus on coastal issues was at a 
serious disjuncture with where the program lectures occurred. 
In subsequent years, I would visit various urban and rural locations on the 
coast and elsewhere in Kenya and East Africa. I learned a good deal about the role 
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 Administrative staff managed, for example, the Extramural Centre of the University of Nairobi, 
located in an otherwise non-descript office building, amid many other non-education related 
businesses. 
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that schooling plays in the lives of people throughout the region. I spent some time 
discussing with parents, older school children, university students, academics, 
community leaders and others what schools and universities, and access to these, 
provided to the members of a given community, how they experienced curricula, 
teaching, administration, etc. 
I found out that national issues such as the curricula and language of 
instruction are seen as fundamental elements of schooling, ones that help determine 
how school is engaged in by students, parents, community leaders, et al. This 
engagement would include resisting some aspects of the schooling experience (for 
example, in a country as linguistically diverse as Kenya, medium of instruction 
issues retain a long-lived contentiousness, and are fodder for resistance platforms). 
Nevertheless, schooling, up to and including that provided at the university level, is 
described by many people as a primary means to a “better” life. 
The early 1990s in Kenya was also the time during which the impacts were 
first felt of the government‟s mid-1980s decision to shift the structure of the public 
education system from a 7-4-2-3 system to an 8-4-4 system.5 This structural shift 
caused a seismic change in how students came to view the opportunities available 
to them as they succeeded at each level of schooling. By virtue of the reduction in 
the number of levels of schooling, and the attendant changes to each level of 
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  The 7-4-2-3 system meant seven years of primary school, followed for a minority of primary school 
leavers by four years of secondary school, followed for a minority of secondary school leavers by two 
years of higher secondary school (often glossed as “A-levels”), and followed for a minority of higher 
secondary school leavers by three years of university schooling. The 8-4-4 system is eight years of 
primary school, four years of secondary school, and four years of tertiary education, with a minority of 
successful school leavers finding space at each next higher level. It would not be until the early part 
of the current decade that Kenya‟s education officials could report that most successful primary 
school leavers would find space to continue their studies at the secondary school level. 
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schooling vis-à-vis educational focus, one entire level of education was redefined out 
of the system. In an educational system as pyramidal in shape as Kenya‟s remains, 
with far more schools at each lower level than the level above, this led to increased 
competition for limited positions at all post-primary levels. 
This redefinition of Kenya‟s education system coincided with the expansion of 
public higher education opportunities. The same 1984 government report6 that 
broached the changes from 7-4-2-3 to 8-4-4 simultaneously supported the creation 
of the country‟s second public university. By 1991, five public universities existed. In 
addition to the growth in public university capacity in the mid-to-late 1980s, the 
redefinition of Kenya‟s education system at this time would also lead to the creation 
of private markets for higher education. By 2006, Kenya had sixteen private 
universities7, and had added two more public universities (making a total, by 
December 2006, of seven public universities). For all of this growth, however, the 
closest university campus to Kenya‟s coast remained the University of Nairobi, 
located some 300 miles away from Mombasa. 
In January 1996, I began work as the SIT‟s Director of African Programs, 
assuming responsibility for supervising the full portfolio of study abroad programs in 
east and southern Africa. In 1998, I began discussing with the Director of the 
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 The Mackay Report, further discussed in Chapters Two and Three. 
 
7
 While still in Kenya in the early 1990s, I was asked if I would be interested in helping with an effort to 
create a private Christian university outside of Nairobi. Though I was not in a position to contribute to 
this latter effort, the offer itself furthered a broad, ongoing interest as to how universities – public and 
private - established themselves in Kenya. I would later be asked by an academic colleague at an 
institution in southern Tanzania which sponsored an SIT study abroad program if I could help an 
effort in which he was engaged to establish a private university in Tanzania.  Again, I was unable to 
engage the offer. 
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“Coastal Studies” program in Kenya8 how we might shift the program‟s focus and 
location to be more fully integrated into the communities – academic, cultural, social 
– along the Kenyan coast. We discussed whether we could identify enough 
academically qualified researchers living and working near the coast. We debated 
whether the members of this scholarly community would be sufficiently interested in 
offering lectures for our program such that the program could re-locate to the coast, 
and reduce the amount of time spent in Nairobi, or elsewhere “upcountry.” Through 
these efforts and the program Director‟s contacts throughout the coast, we were able 
to justify to ourselves, as well as to those US-based institutions that enrolled 
students in our program, the presence of the program on the coast even though 
there continued to be no university located there. By late 1998, the program was 
fully shifted, again even though the nearest university campus remained 300 miles 
away9. 
In subsequent years, I came to learn more about the vibrancy of the research 
community based on the Kenyan coast. Although I left the SIT in 2000, I have 
maintained my interests in the role played in Kenya by its universities. I have 
traveled to East Africa numerous times since 2000, connecting with friends and 
colleagues in Nairobi, Mombasa, and elsewhere. I have deepened my interest in the 
way policy, politics, religion, culture, history, and other societal forces have shaped 
higher education in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa. 
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 Who is from Mombasa. 
 
9
 The University of Nairobi would eventually begin to offer certain programs at Bandari College in 
Mombasa. But faculty for these courses were taken from the university‟s main campus in Nairobi, 
brought to Mombasa for a week or two, and then returned to Nairobi. They developed neither 
permanent faculty nor permanent structures in Mombasa. This remains true today. 
 
8 
 
Amid all of this, I remain particularly interested in why Mombasa, Kenya‟s 
second most populous city and one of its primary economic centers, has not yet 
obtained an independent public university, and only in August 2007 saw one of its 
local tertiary (non-university) institutions elevated to subsidiary university college 
status10. Mombasa is Kenya‟s oldest city. Its establishment as a city-state and its 
history of trade with Arabia and elsewhere along the Indian Ocean littoral date back 
one thousand years or more, possibly as far back as the time of Ptolemy‟s 
Geographia. The city sits beside a natural harbor, which led to Mombasa being the 
principal trading center and port in East Africa for centuries. This history has 
contributed to Mombasa‟s becoming a significant population center. In fact, 
Mombasa continues to be the most populous city in Africa that is without a full public 
university in its metropolitan boundaries. 
This work then is focused on an institution – the independent public university 
- that is en route to, but not yet present in the day-to-day lives of the people of the 
Kenyan coast. The subsidiary forms – university colleges - arrived in 2007. So while 
presence is that yet achieved, absence is giving way. 
This long-term absence and the emerging subsidiary presence constitute 
significant aspects of how certain people on Kenya‟s coast have constructed their 
understanding of university education. The absence points to requirements to travel, 
to be away from one‟s family, friends, and familiar ways. The ramifications of this 
absence, of this lack of close access to the kind of cultural, social, economic, and 
political capital and status that being the site of major universities has brought to 
                                                 
10
 Two other coast-based tertiary institutions were elevated at the same time, each also as a 
subsidiary campus to an existing public university. 
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Nairobi and the many university centers throughout Africa (Mama 2004) is central to 
the research described here. The emerging subsidiary presence raises issues of 
independence, what societal elements or forces the university colleges (and the 
independent universities that are eventually elevated from the university college 
status) will exist to serve. The emerging presence will also raise issues of how high 
the quality will be of the university colleges and eventual independent universities, 
how this quality is measured, by whom and for what purposes. Finally, the emerging 
presence sparks questions about how national and transnational forces in university 
education will impact the new institutions‟ ability to be responsive to the local 
community. 
I have spoken over the years with many people who are engaged with the 
issue of higher education in Kenya – and lack thereof in Mombasa – e.g. 
policymakers, academics, politicians, community leaders, and parents. Many of 
these people have experienced the issue from multiple perspectives. I have 
interviewed more than thirty of these people, and have asked them all to speak, in 
an open-ended format, about what the absence of a university in Mombasa has 
meant, and what the emerging institutions presence might mean. Some have taken 
a historical tack and reviewed the history of the engagement by coastal residents 
with higher education from the colonial period to the present. Others have picked up 
on how the absence of an independent coastal university has long impacted who 
attends university in Nairobi (or beyond), and how this may change as the new 
institutions emerge. 
10 
 
This work is divided into two sections, with this Introduction comprising the 
beginning of Section One. In the next chapter, I present a short general history of 
education in Kenya, from the pre-colonial era, to the colonial era, and on to the 
present day. The history begins with forms of schooling seen among local 
communities from the onset of extant settlement along Kenya‟s coast more than one 
thousand years ago, through Portuguese mercantile and imperial efforts from the 
16th century, Christian missionary activity from the 1840s onward, and British 
colonial efforts from the late 19th century. This view is then expanded to focus on 
efforts elsewhere in the Kenya Colony and independent Kenya through the 20th 
century. The chapter utilizes primarily the works of prominent Kenyan education 
scholars. I present what is essentially a dominant discourse, schooling as human 
development story. At the chapter‟s end, I come back to the coast, and begin to 
describe a discourse of distinction, of cultural and religious difference that percolates 
throughout the remainder of this work. 
Chapter Three focuses more directly upon the development of university 
education in East Africa. The history and development of the University of Nairobi 
will take center stage here. The creation of Kenya‟s other public universities will be 
placed in a policy and political context as well. So, too, briefly, will the private 
universities that have opened their doors in significant numbers in Kenya over the 
past 20 years. I will bring into the discussion some perspective on the role played by 
Western (often US-based) philanthropic foundations in supporting, and through their 
financial and managerial support, largely defining the way in which university 
education would develop in East Africa. As in Chapter Two, I will be utilizing 
11 
 
primarily the work of Kenyan scholars of education, and offering a dominant 
discourse perspective that sees universities as sites of national development. The 
longstanding absence of independent public university efforts at the coast will be 
briefly counterposed against the model of university expansion seen in Kenya in the 
1980s and since. The establishment of several university colleges at the coast in 
mid-2007 will be dealt with briefly here, and expanded upon in later chapters. 
In Section Two (Chapters Four through Eight), I begin the analysis of material 
generated during the interviews I conducted in Kenya during my visits there. This 
section begins with an introduction chapter, Chapter Four, which offers a synopsis of 
the subsequent chapters. As such, I will not offer the synopses here. The final 
chapter, Chapter Nine, is focused on key conclusions and limitations determined 
from this study.  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two: A History of “Formal” Education in Kenya 
Introduction 
There is an archipelago just off the Kenyan mainland, perhaps sixty miles to 
the south of Mombasa. The archipelago sits in the Pemba Channel and is currently a 
globally popular sports-fishing location. I imagine that many of the people who visit 
the archipelago for the fishing will never make the short hop from the fishing spots 
and tourist hotels to Wasini, a small island found one mile or so off the mainland, 
across the water from the mainland village of Shimoni. 
I visited Wasini in 1993, and learned that it has its own prominence. In 
addition to being the home to fascinating standing coral formations, Wasini is the 
home of a small mosque thought to be one of the oldest continuously operated 
mosques to be found in East Africa. Items found in or near the mosque have been 
dated to the early 14th century. 
Other mosques and archaeological ruins along the coast11 point to the 
influence played by Islam in the history of East Africa. The presence of such sites 
lends credence to the notion that Koranic schools were in evidence along the East 
Africa coast at least as long as Shimoni‟s mosque has been there. Sifuna (1992) 
                                                 
11
 Gedi, located on the Kenyan mainland north of Mombasa, as well as Vanga, Kilwa, Faza, Takwa 
and other locations further north, in the Lamu Archipelago, stand as sites the archaeologists of the 
National Museums of Kenya have tried to preserve. Otiende (1990) notes that Koranic schools were 
also found along trade routes into the “hinterland.” 
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asserts that these schools had, as their purpose, the education of the children of 
traders of Arab and African heritage. Bogonko (1992a) tells us that  
Indigenous African education developed character building, physical 
aptitudes, moral qualities and social knowledge in the individual, all of which 
were necessary for an active role in society. Education was environment-
centered, localized and omnipresent. Its complexity increased with age. In all 
these respects, it was not different from other educational systems the world 
over. As for its achievements, usefulness of every member to his group was 
of paramount importance. Participation in the economy was emphasized 
rather than education for its own sake. The practical nature, the learning by 
doing aspect was a value of indigenous education. (9) 
 
For Bogonko, this education held as its core pursuit the establishment of 
cohesive communities that held on to their understanding of themselves through 
educating children and elders about expected cultural and social practices and 
behaviors at all stages of one‟s life. In other words, education in such settings was 
seen as a means of creating reproducible, normative standards. Bogonko compares 
these local forms to Koranic, or Islamic, forms of education, long practiced along the 
East African coast, 
There were many resemblances between Koranic education and customary 
African education. First, in both systems education was/is an (un)ending 
process in which an individual can remain a learner till death. Second, both 
systems promoted the creation of unity, cohesion, equality and common 
identity among learners and the community . . . Third, the education systems 
were normative in the sense that they were concerned with the development 
of standard beliefs and patterns of behavior through learning. Fourth, in 
Koranic education certificates are not emphasized as is the case with 
Western education. Here, again Islamic education is nearer to indigenous 
education in which paper qualifications are absent. For this reason both 
systems discouraged individualism and competitiveness, preferring instead 
communal loyalty to a group. Fifth, the mastering of the Koran is done in 
stages and at the end of each stage is a ceremony to mark its completion. 
The indigenous education did not do less. (17) 
  
By the mid-16th century, with Portuguese exploration extending to the creation 
of land settlements near Mombasa harbor, Augustinian friars had established a 
14 
 
monastery. And so the Islamic presence of many centuries was joined to a newer 
Christian presence in coastal East Africa. The Augustinians would eventually travel 
as far north as the Lamu Archipelago, interacting with local communities long 
familiar with Islam, but doing so in a manner more supportive of the mercantile and 
imperial pursuits of the Portuguese than of proselytizing the heavily Moslem 
communities12. 
Over the period from the mid-16th century to the early 18th century, 
Portuguese influence over its Indian Ocean holdings would wane. Omani, Dutch, 
and eventually British forces would come into play, with each maintaining its relative 
focus upon mercantile and imperial interests. It would not be until the mid-1840s that 
the Christian missionary presence along the East African coast would bring a 
change in focus to the education of the children of the coast, because it was only 
then that the intention to explore the interior of the region took root. It was only then 
that a sense that the European presence there could be permanent was perceived. 
An education system then needed to be constructed that could meet this perception. 
As Sifuna (1980) puts it, 
Nineteenth century . . . educational practice provided missionaries with rather 
an explicit model of the kind of schooling that the upper classes felt to be 
suitable for the social inferior. The educational „needs‟ of the working class or 
more generally the poor were thought to consist of writing, sometimes 
arithmetic, but above all, religion. Complimentary to this was industrial or 
technical education. . . .  education for the working classes was designed to 
expedite or, at least, not to impede their primary function in society, namely, 
working. (5) 
 
                                                 
12
 Prestholdt (2001:386) describes this, “Islam was the first conceptual category into which 
Portuguese authors placed Swahili-speakers. . . . Yet it was not religion that Portuguese authors most 
frequently referred to when they discussed the towns of the Swahili coast.  Instead, material culture, 
the economy, and wealth were the aspects of Swahili life that most occupied Portuguese attention.” 
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I have chosen to begin this chapter with a description of Wasini and 
Portuguese efforts along the coast north of Mombasa because this perspective 
produces an opening to both the history of what would become the colony of Kenya, 
and an examination of how certain aspects of the early period of European colonial 
expansion regarding schooling in East Africa were, at once, analogous to long-
recognized practices, and a harbinger of an enforced future. I am using “schooling” 
in this context in line with how Ntarangwi‟s (2003) uses it. He makes a distinction 
between schooling, education, and development: 
Schooling as a concept is used here to refer to the intended process of 
perpetuating and maintaining a society‟s existing power relations and the 
institutional structures that support those arrangements. . . .  Education is the 
process through which values, aesthetics, spiritual beliefs, and all the parts of 
a people‟s unique cultural orientation are transmitted from generation to the 
next. . . . Development as a concept is taken to refer to a process through 
which a community, by using its knowledge and other resources, is able to 
confront and maintain its world and environment for its own existence. (222) 
 
By the 19th century, Islam had long been inculcated in local practices, including 
schooling. Christianity was on the cusp of beginning a similar project. 
If one wants to describe the history of schooling in East Africa, one must 
return, repeatedly, to the coast. And one must engage the role played by religious 
practice, for it is at the coast where the European, colonial engagement made its 
first, lasting marks upon the idea of education in East Africa. And it is through 
Christian missionary activity at the coast that policies and practices first implemented 
there, in partial response to Islamic and non-Islamic indigenous forms of education, 
would come to characterize the policies of an independent Kenya. 
As noted earlier, the Portuguese established monasteries at a number of sites 
along the East African coast. However, they would be at constant odds with Arab, 
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Indian, and African traders operating in the region. Little effort was made by the 
Portuguese to push into the interior. This would remain the case for centuries, until 
the Church Missionary Society (CMS) of Britain established its first mission at Rabai 
Mpia, ten miles to the northwest of Mombasa harbor, in 1846. The German 
missionaries of the CMS, Ludwig Krapf and Johannes Rebmann, would use the 
mission at Rabai, and the school that was eventually established there, as the point 
from which to proselytize the people of the East African interior. It would be part of 
their proselytizing mission to establish Christian schools to counter whatever 
indigenous educational practices they found. 
It would not be until after publication of Krapf‟s descriptions of his missionary 
activities in the 1860s that an expansion of such activities was seen. As Sifuna 
describes it, on reading about Krapf‟s life in East Africa, other European missionary 
societies began to send representatives to proselytize and to establish schools. In 
the period from 1880 to 1895, the Catholic Holy Ghost Fathers, the United Methodist 
Free Church, and the Italian Consolata Fathers all built mission schools, some as far 
inland as Nairobi, the then-tiny settlement located more than 300 miles inland, and 
site of the British East Africa Company's (BEAC)13 inland supply station. As the 
BEAC pushed further inland in its efforts to build a railroad from the coast to 
Uganda,14 western areas of what would come to be called „Kenya‟ opened to 
missionary expansion. 
                                                 
13
 BEAC was, by contract, the Charter Company empowered by the British Crown to develop and 
manage commercial and other resources in British East Africa. Their political administration of the 
territory bore the full imprimatur of the British government. 
 
14
 Uganda was for decades the presumed jewel in the East African colonial crown. The British had 
known for decades that the Nile River spilled out of Lake Victoria near the town of Jinja in what is now 
Uganda. Given British interests in Sudan and Egypt in the latter decades of the 19
th
, and well into the 
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Meanwhile, efforts continued to establish other kinds of secular schools at the 
coast, ones not so immediately connected with the Christian missionary effort as 
those found in elsewhere in British East Africa. As Salim (1973), in his work on the 
peoples of the east African coast, notes, 
As early as 1895, Sir Ali bin Salim [longtime Liwali15 of coast] had realized the 
importance of secular education and planned to build a school at Mambrui 
[not far from present day Mombasa] and to import teachers at his own 
expense . . . he was behind the agitation for the first Arab school to be built in 
Mombasa in 1912, where he supported several pupils at a time; and he 
certainly was the founder of the Malindi School which was named after him. 
(203) 
 
Pouwels (1981) details the efforts of Sheikh Al-amin bin Ali Mazrui in 
the late nineteenth century to create Muslim academies that recognized the 
role that Arabic and Islamic societies had had in developing scientific and 
technological concepts (e.g. algebra, geography, and astronomy, for 
example). For Pouwels, Sheikh Al-amin bin Ali Mazrui was working to 
recapture a Muslim epistemological understanding and connection to these 
subjects, and thus not accept Western, capitalist interpretations of these, but 
resituated conceptions of these linked back to original ideas in Islam. 
Such efforts at the coast - the secular as noted by Salim, and the Islamic as 
noted by Pouwels - occurred alongside continued expansion of both the Christian 
mission schools. Sperling (1993) tells us that  
Though established in the coastal towns, the religion of Islam had almost no 
impact on the Mijikenda peoples of the rural coastal hinterland north and 
south of Mombasa until the last decades of the nineteenth century. . . .Thus, 
at the end of the nineteenth century Islam was unevenly spread; the urban 
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th,
 century, Britain did not want to see the Nile‟s water diverted for use by any other European 
power. 
 
15
 A chief administrative position in colonial-era coastal governance. 
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centres of the Kenya coast were Muslim, while the rural hinterland was largely 
non-Muslim. A few Swahili resided in rural areas, and some Mijikenda lived in 
urban centres. . . . cultural and religious differences distinguished the urban 
Swahili from the rural Mijikenda. (198-199) 
 
Sperling writes of the importation of western schooling and its impact upon 
the coast, noting the tendency of British colonial authorities to focus upon the Muslim 
population living nearer the coast, rather than the non-Muslims living only a few 
miles further inland. He notes that it would not be until 1921 that 
The colonial government opened the Coast Technical Institute . . . at Wa, 
south of Mombasa, its declared purpose [being] to “educate young Africans in 
crafts and trade.”(200) 
 
Throughout the remaining decades of the British hegemony in East Africa, 
even as specific examples of the type cited by Salim and Pouwels are noted, 
colonial efforts to expand schooling at the coast would continue to lag. Sperling 
explains that 
At the time of independence in (1963), there was only one government 
school, and no missionary schools (primary or secondary) among the Digo 
south of Mombasa. (202) 
 
It would not be until after independence that any efforts to expand secular 
schooling beyond the coastal urban areas would take root. In partial response to the 
spread of government-run secular schools16 at the coast, Sperling explains that the 
Muslim community, rural and urban alike, revisited the concepts Pouwels ascribed to 
Sheikh Al-amin bin Ali Mazrui, meaning that 
Muslim parents began to feel that their children needed a deeper, more 
comprehensive training in Islam to counteract the secularizing Christian 
influence of government schools. (203) 
 
                                                 
16
 Where, Sperling notes, the absence of western-trained Muslim teachers meant that most children 
attending these government schools were being taught by “Christian Africans” from elsewhere in the 
country. 
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Thus, as other communities within the newly independent Kenya were accepting of 
the expansion of the state-run school system, at the same time, coastal communities 
were engaged in protecting what they saw as a threatened social and cultural 
heritage. 
Away from the Coast 
I want to move away from the coast and focus on the inland schooling efforts 
by colonial and Christian missionary efforts over the next decades that would 
eventually evolve into the public school system as presently constituted in Kenya. 
For it is this public system that continues to hold hegemonic control over perceptions 
of schooling in Kenya, and it is out of this system that Kenya‟s higher education 
opportunities evolved. 
Even as Sir Ali bin Salim and Sheikh Al-amin Ali Mazrui were engaged in their 
distinct pursuits to improve schooling opportunities for coast students, the British 
East Africa Company and various mission societies were focusing further inland. In 
their speed to establish schools and missions, the degree to which the missionary 
efforts disregarded local schooling practices reads as a significant omission of 
history. As Eshiwani (1993) notes, 
Neither the missionaries nor the colonial administration made any real 
attempt to link African education to African problems and the African cultural 
heritage. Initially, the missionaries were only interested in making converts 
and regarded African culture as an obstacle to Christianity. The colonial 
administration wanted . . . [to make sure that] Africans were educated to form 
a largely laboring and clerical class. The government‟s policy of „trusteeship‟ 
and „indirect rule‟ seemed in accord with the settlers‟ paternalistic attitude 
towards the Africans, and both settlers and officials were in agreement with 
the policy of rapid advance for the European and gradual advance for the 
African in education. (15) 
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This colonial take on the value of educating locals was met with resistance 
elsewhere in the colony, similar to the resistance offered by Salim and Mazrui at the 
coast. In 1910, among the Luo community, centered on the shores of Lake Victoria, 
some 500 miles from the coast, John Owalo founded the organization, Nomiya 
Luo17, after being told in a dream that God wanted him to do this work. Owalo sought 
to use Nomiya Luo as a means to utilize his own mission-based teacher training to 
establish schools where mission societies and the colonial government had opted 
not to go. In this regard, Nomiya Luo may be seen as an example of what Haugerud 
(1995) points to when she notes that,  
The “moral economy” for which Kenyan citizens hold the state accountable is 
not that of an idealized unchanging village life. The rhetoric of governing elites 
– both colonial and post-colonial – implied protection of a rising subsistence 
standard, rather than a stable one. “Fire and light, lamps, oil, matches” were 
material improvements Africans should expect under colonial rule, in the 
words of a district official‟s 1925 welcoming speech to the Embu Local Native 
Council. . . . farmers are likely to resent the state . . . because it constrains . . . 
(their) ability to accumulate and to diversify their activities, rather than 
because it threatens to disrupt the stability and autonomy of village life. (10)  
 
Owalo feared that too many children would be left behind simply because 
they lived too far out of the way. Nomiya Luo schools and staff were supported and 
controlled locally. Some of these schools would operate up to the cusp of 
independence before being subsumed into the authority of the central government. 
Eshiwani (1993) details how the ideas of Nomiya Luo – and more broadly, the 
African Schools movement – would spread to other areas in British East Africa18. 
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 Sifuna translates this as “the Luo Mission that was given to me”.  The Luo are people living in what 
is now western Kenya, along the shores of Lake Victoria. 
 
18
 The African Schools movement, in particular, was highly influential in Kikuyu areas of Kenya‟s 
central highlands. Eisemon (2000) points out that Luo, Kikuyu and other “upcountry” communities 
made significant financial sacrifices, while “ . . . the coast [Local Native] councils opened few new 
schools, preferring to provide supplementary funding to the missionary schools.” (253) 
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Whether at the coast or upcountry (where local communities faced heavier 
pressure and experienced greater degrees of alienation from the land), demands 
within the African community for access to higher levels of education were denied, 
as it was posed that this would lead to an exodus from rural areas to urban areas by 
educated youth seeking “white collar” jobs. Essentially, colonial and missionary 
authorities saw the efforts by Owalo, Salim, Mazrui, and others to be a means to 
bleed away some of the tension created in such a restrictive atmosphere. It would 
not be until decades later that independent schools would be seen as a substantial, 
problematic, and anti-colonial element in local communities. 
Anderson (1970), in a work that focused in part on local – especially Kikuyu – 
efforts to educate children outside of the network of missionary and colonial schools, 
points out that the independent schools movement of the Luo, and eventually the 
Kikuyu, arose not because the Luo, Kikuyu, and other groups wanted more 
education, but because they saw education differently than did the settlers and 
missionaries. He writes, 
Missionaries, officials and settlers, tended to concentrate on the school's 
capacity to socialize, assuming that this would enable them, by manipulating 
the content and level of teaching, to influence the development of the African 
peoples' skills and values. The Africans, on the other hand, focusing mainly 
on the school's function of mobility, hoped that through formal education they 
would gain an increasing share of the positions of wealth and authority being 
created around them. (5) 
 
Where Anderson is writing of the alienated upcountry communities, Eisemon 
(2000), however, speaks of the coast and notes that, 
Unlike the African societies of the interior, coastal societies “had long been in 
contact with alien cultures and a proselytizing religion . . . their familiarity with 
other cultures made their own more resilient (Spear 1978: 140). Confronted 
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with Christianity and the European plantation economy, Mijikenda19 remained 
peasant proprietors and many became Muslims. What is important to 
emphasize is that these Mijikenda had a choice to make. Although they were 
subject to land alienation, the Mijikenda were not displaced or coerced into 
participating in the colonial government‟s plans . . . The attractiveness of 
western schooling had not increased despite various attempts to divorce 
Christianity from secular instruction and to give secular schooling an Islamic, 
practical orientation. (253) 
 
The reaction to efforts to implement western schooling met differing forms of 
resistance at the coast than elsewhere in colonial East Africa. 
In 1926, the first secondary school for African students was opened in the 
region. Alliance Secondary School was named in recognition of the agreement 
between prominent Protestant mission groups - Church Missionary Society, the 
African Inland Missions, the United Methodists and the Church of Scotland - to 
establish a medical college for the training of native personnel from throughout East 
Africa. This effort was enmeshed in bureaucratic efforts to control dissemination of 
various forms of knowledge, spearheaded by an administrative Medical Officer who 
objected to the idea of native medical training. After some negotiations, Alliance 
would become (and remains) one of the premier secondary schools in Kenya. The 
period from the mid-1920s to the mid 1940s would be characterized by such fights 
over curriculum matters. Local schools continued to provide one means by which 
communities maintained influence over how and what their children learned. 
By the time Britain began to recover from damages suffered in the second 
World War, they were faced with an increasingly globally aware subject population in 
Kenya. Many soldiers who served Britain during the war had been conscripted from 
East Africa. On their return, these soldiers brought home ideas about what they had 
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 The most populous ethnic community at the Kenyan coast. 
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been fighting on behalf of, that is, the overthrow of expansionist, expressly racialist 
Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Thousands of African soldiers would also fight in the 
war‟s Asian theater against Japanese racialist expansionism. It would become 
increasingly difficult for British colonial authorities to maintain pre-war conditions 
regarding education of its Kenyan subjects. The noted Kenyan author, Ngugi wa 
Thiong‟o (2004) describes his own schooling in the period immediately after the war, 
I first went to Kamandura primary, a missionary set-up, in 1947. But we must 
have been caught up by the new nationalist awareness, because there were 
rumors that missionary schools were deliberately denying us children real 
education (Guthimira ciana ugi). Such schools were alleged not to be 
teaching Africans enough English, and some of us were pulled out of the 
missionary school and relocated to Manguu, a nationalist school where the 
emphasis was on the history and culture of Africans. In religion, some of the 
nationalist schools, which called themselves independent, aligned themselves 
with the orthodox church, thus linking themselves to the unbroken Christian 
tradition of Egypt and Ethiopia, way back in the first and fourth centuries of 
the Christian era.” (13) 
 
In 1949, in an attempt to beat back such independent schools as Ngugi is 
referencing, the colonial government published the "Beecher Committee Report on 
African Education." The report recommended increased central government control 
of all schools throughout the colony and the protectorate. It also trumpeted "practical 
education" (i.e. agricultural training and industrial training), and proposed setting up 
a three-tiered system - four years primary; four years intermediate; four years 
secondary - in anticipation of the need to expand educational opportunity to a larger 
proportion of the population. This proposal held within it the notion that with such an 
expansion, colonial authorities would extend the period during which they effectively 
controlled education in the colony. The Beecher Commission further prepared the 
way to execute the colonial government‟s Ten Year Plan for the Development of 
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African Education. The plan focused on the social and economic development of the 
African community through schooling, while maintaining race-based differences 
between what education would be made available to whom20. It also became the 
precursor to post-colonial, independent government efforts to control schooling and 
education policies and practices by promoting a discourse of education as nation-
building. 
The Postcolonial Period 
The period of the immediate run-up to Kenyan independence in 1963 was 
filled with political activity designed to shape public education in the new country. 
The leading political party, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), had gained 
effective home rule by 1961, at which time they commissioned a wealth of studies on 
schooling and education. While these reports were in part a rebuke to colonial 
policies of the maintenance of separate education systems for each „race‟ (White, 
Asian, African), and in part a call for indigenizing the curriculum and teaching staff, 
they also were a means through which the new government established the 
discourse of education and schooling as nation-building. 
The 1964 Ominde Report can be read as the newly independent 
government‟s first attempt to invoke in government practice the idea that schools 
would build the new nation. The discourse of schooling as nation-building was 
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 The Beecher Commission report would also be one of the first publications to incorporate an 
analysis of „wastage‟ in the education system. Fifty-eight years after the Beecher Commission report 
was first promulgated, the concept of „wastage‟ continues to hold a place in an education system that 
remains sharply pyramidal, with far fewer spots available at each higher level of schooling than the 
lower levels graduate students for. This raises the question as to the degree to which dropouts (that 
is, „wastage‟) are produced in such a system at least in part by planning and policy decisions, as 
much as they result from children not wishing to continue in school. 
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grounded in the Ominde Report‟s support for universal access to primary education. 
This support came despite the authors‟ awareness that the economic development 
needs of the country could not sustain investment in this level of education, 
especially as the mass of primary school leavers looked to pursue further education. 
The Ominde Report went beyond universal primary education, though, as it 
developed the discourse of schooling as nation-building.  Otiende (1990) provides 
that the Ominde Commission understood its task to be,  
to survey the existing educational resources of Kenya and to advise the 
Government on the formulation and implementation of national policies for 
education which: 
 
1) appropriately express the aspirations and cultural values of an 
independent African country; 
2) take account of the need for trained manpower for economic 
development and for other activities in the life of the nation; 
3) take advantage of the initiative and service of regional and local 
authorities and voluntary bodies; 
4) contribute to the unity of Kenya; 
5) respect the educational needs and capacities of children; 
6) have due regard for the resources, both in money and in personnel, that 
are likely to become available for educational services; and, 
7) provide for the principal educational requirements of adults. (79) 
 
While local authorities are recognized in this list (item #3), they are subsumed into 
the over-arching statement of creation of national policies. Local initiative and 
service also get listed after the idea that aspirations and cultural values of the new 
nation need find expression. 
At the coast, the effort to create a national school system after independence 
encountered the longstanding resistance to colonial forms of education. I have 
previously cited Salim (1973), Pouwels (1981), Sperling (1993), and Eisemon (2000) 
on this point. As one expression of the degree to which these non-government 
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schools held sway at the coast, Eisemon notes that at one point during the late 
colonial period, out of 17,000 school-age children in Mombasa, less than 2,500 were 
attending school, and of this number, nearly 70% were in Koranic schools rather 
than colonial government-sponsored schools. This resistance at the coast to 
government schools continued into the post-colonial period. 
In subsequent years, these issues of the local counter-posed to the national 
would be tracked through numerous other commissions and reports21. But it would 
not be until 1976, when the Gachathi Report22 was published that a seminal review 
of education in post-colonial Kenya is considered to have occurred. The Gachathi 
Commission served as an investigation of the need to restructure the educational 
system, in light of the Ominde Commission report and the subsequent first twelve 
years of post-colonial experience. From Eshiwani (1993), the objectives of the 
Gachathi Report were to: 
(1) foster national unity; remove social and regional inequalities; create a 
national consciousness; be adaptable; be relevant to the real-life 
situation of the Kenya environment; 
(2) foster cooperative effort and responsibility through self-help projects; 
make each member of society to contribute according to his ability; 
(3) foster social values by fostering traditional practices that are conducive 
to national unity; 
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 The Ndegwa Report (1971) focused on the education system and the fostering of social equality, 
the meeting of social obligations and responsibilities, and respect for Kenya‟s cultural diversity within 
this social network. The Bessey Report (1972) focused more closely on primary education, 
broadening it, making it more accessible to those living in rural areas through cost reduction (even 
free primary school), and through the expanded provision of agriculture courses. Regarding these, 
Eshiwani (1993) points out the irony-over-time that is shown in how Kenyans in the early colonial 
period fought against a system of education that was vocational, technical, and agricultural in focus 
because they saw it as shepherding them to second-class lives in a colonial environment, while in the 
post-colonial world, Kenyan educational planners came to see a need to train students vocationally, 
technically, and agriculturally to better serve the needs of the country. Similar formula, different time 
frame, different people in charge – and still a ground upon which local and national interests fought. 
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 The Gachathi Report is formally referred to as “The Report of the National Committee of 
Educational Objectives and Policies.” 
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(4) promote cultural values by fostering traditional practices  that are 
conducive to national unity; 
(5) inculcate economic values (attitudes to work and incentives) among 
the youths; eradicate negative attitudes towards work, specially 
manual work. (28) 
 
As these objectives show, the discourse continued to be about building the 
nation of Kenya. Even as the Gachathi Report was being debated, major change 
was abounding in Kenya. Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya‟s first President, died in August 
1978, leaving Vice-President Daniel arap Moi as the country‟s new leader. Moi had 
been a teacher and political activist in pre-independence days. But unlike Kenyatta, 
who was a longtime, high profile leader of Kenya‟s most populous ethnic group, Moi 
was from a minority ethnic group and was not able, immediately, to influence the 
major actors in Kenya‟s political and commercial playing fields23. Moi would, 
however, eventually manage the transition and maintain his Presidency through 
some serious political machinations, including the imposition of de jure one-party 
rule in Kenya in mid-1982. Not long after this, Moi faced an Air Force-led coup, 
which was quickly put down and seemingly never in a position to have truly 
threatened Moi‟s control. 
Moi used the specific tool of government national commissions to consolidate 
his power over the discourse of education. This is most expressly viewed through 
how he utilized the Mackay Report, published in 1981. While this Report was 
ostensibly focused on assessing the need for Kenya‟s second national university, it 
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 Kenyatta had ruled as a patron, someone above his (nominal) political party, KANU, such that 
KANU grew weak as a political entity even as the chance for any other party to form was severely 
limited. In such situations, succession could neither presume to come with the patron role locked in, 
nor could the weakened party structure any longer serve as a guarantee of only token opposition, 
whether from inside or outside of the party. 
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eventually morphed into a far fuller mandate for change. The report called for an 
eight year, compulsory primary school program, to be followed for those who 
qualified by four years of secondary school, followed again for those qualified by four 
years of university. The new schooling structure, dubbed “8-4-4,” in compacting the 
former system‟s four tiers into three, essentially removed a long-established post-
secondary, pre-university, stage from students‟ prospective choices. In other words, 
the option of taking a two-year post-secondary offering to gain further credentials 
was weeded out of the system. Students leaving secondary school now faced the 
stark choice of pursuing university education or going directly into a tight 
employment market. One immediate impact of this is that applications to university 
skyrocketed, and universities increased enrollments by an additional 80% of the 
expanded 1987 levels. 
From certain perspectives, the shift to 8-4-4 and expanded offerings at the 
university level could be viewed as expanding access to higher education with 
attendant downstream influences on how younger students perceived their chances 
at getting into secondary school, and eventually university. But concurrent with the 
shift, the Kenyan government – in attempting to meet the strictures of multinational 
loan and development assistance programs - created cost-sharing structures that 
undermined the ability of many to move through the school system. And, still, 
questions about the equity and equality of educational opportunity, and the 
appropriateness of the curricula existed. Ngau (1990) noted that, 
Although there have been several steps to integrate the entire school 
system by passing and implementing egalitarian policies of access, in 
reality, the school system is still highly differentiated in terms of quality, 
and stratified in terms of life chances conferred to those who attend the 
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different public schools -- national, provincial, and district/local, with 
further differentiation in quality within each group. The students in the 
different schools are comparable to a race in which some of the 
competitors have gone through a rigorous course of training under 
highly qualified coaches, while some have just been warned of the 
coming event. At the end of each cycle [in the 8-4-4 system], all 
students sit for highly competitive national examinations. In this race 
for certificates, some of the students will be as good as non-starters. 
(18). 
 
The Kenyan government has undertaken numerous studies in the years since 
implementing the shift to the current 8-4-4 system. In line with broader social 
implications brought about by Kenya‟s use of international loans to bolster elements 
of its national economy, arguments of efficiency in government spending on 
education have taken hold. Debates continuously arise concerning how best to 
invest the country‟s limited financial resources in the full range of educational levels 
on offer from pre-primary to university. The shift to the 8-4-4 system, though it 
removed a training level that students had long used to gain work credentials, 
continued to be centered within a discourse that defines schooling as a national 
effort designed to build the country. 
King (2006) describes a policy shift by Kenyan education planners that 
occurred in 1998, with the release of the Master Plan on Education and Training 
1997-2010. In lieu of discussing education as a pathway to employment, the Master 
Plan originated a discourse of schooling as a means by which students can move 
themselves, and their families, out of poverty. King writes that in turning the 
discourse toward poverty reduction, 
. . . there was a whole series of measures to reduce the burden of user 
charges on parents, as well as expanding provision of bursaries, subsidies 
and school feeding programmes. While all of these are an important 
indication of what might be required, the long-running Moi Government was 
30 
 
now just a year away from falling, and there was [sic] doubtless other political 
preoccupations than making for free primary education. (27) 
 
Basically, the Moi government, on the cusp of falling out of power, was attempting to 
use the levers of government to orchestrate a political revival. It did not work, and 
Moi left office in late 2002. 
Amutabi (2003) writes about the ways in which national commissions have 
long been used as “. . . responses to certain pressures and crises to wade off public 
concern.” (141) Amutabi is highly critical of this practice, especially as used by then-
President Moi to justify his government‟s educational policies. Referring specifically 
to conclusions found in the „Koech Report24‟ of 1999, Amutabi notes that  
Many observers in education have criticized the 8-4-4 system of education 
pointing out various mistakes especially those to do with implementation. 
However President Moi identifies with it as his legacy and it appears he is 
prepared to keep it at all costs. To talk of the failure of the 8-4-4 system 
increasingly has come to mean talking of the failure of President Moi. The 
continued insistence on the system by the political establishment despite its 
many problems is seen by many as a political face-saving gimmick more than 
a realistic gesture. . . . Many feel that the system was rushed and should have 
waited until the setting up of the necessary infrastructure. (136) 
 
Amutabi goes on to note that President Moi would publicly rebuke the Koech 
Report‟s conclusions in a political speech in 2000. This is not surprising, given that 
the Report essentially trashes the 8-4-4 system. As Amutabi notes, 
To push [the 8-4-4- system] aside after about fifteen years of an 
admissible chain of errors was to say that Moi had made a mistake, 
and he would take none of it. . . . One can conclude that the political 
will has either derailed or “hijacked” the education system in Kenya. 
Despite all the damages their decisions have caused in the education 
sector, politicians are still determined to continue „calling the shots‟. 
(141) 
 
                                                 
24
 The report is the work of the Kenya Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya: 
Totally Integrated Quality Education and Training, TIQET. Davey Koech was the Chair of this 
Commission. 
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How politicians influence or otherwise control the discourse on education and 
schooling in Kenya is at the center of later chapters in which I focus on what I 
connote to be the thesis discourse of marginalization, the antithesis reactive 
discourse of strategizing, and the synthesis discourse of the concept of a „university 
of our own.‟ 
 
Conclusion 
I want now to return to a focus on the coast, and the ways in which schooling 
has developed there in the post-colonial period. Eisemon (2000) points out that  
The coast remains one of the least educationally developed regions in the 
country. Gross enrolment rates reported in 1993 obtained from household 
surveys reveal that Mombasa, whose population has grown through 
immigration from upcountry, is comparable to major urban centres in primary 
school participation. However, the rural coastal districts continue to lag behind 
other regions. (257) 
 
Alwy and Schech (2004) update Eisemon and bring the discussion to post-
secondary levels of schooling, explaining that 
The GER [Gross Enrolment Rate] by province for 1997 shows that there are 
fewer school-aged children in [government] schools in the ethnic communities 
in the Coast Province, as compared with other Provinces. Even though lack of 
disaggregated data by ethnic groups and other relevant information, make it 
difficult to know the exact nature and extent of the problem, it is reasonable to 
assume that students of the ethnic groups in this Coast Province are at a 
disadvantage, as compared to other ethnic communities in other Provinces. 
(271) 
 
Alwy and Schech then make the connection between access to and use of 
government schools at the primary and secondary levels, and the marginalization of 
higher education at the coast, 
 These ethnoregional inequalities are further compounded in secondary 
schooling and post-school education. The Secondary and Higher schooling 
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gross enrolment for the Coast Province indicates a high dropout rate with a 
low proportion proceeding to higher levels of education (Government 
Polytechnics and Universities). This shows that students living in the Rift 
Valley Province have a higher likelihood of reaching secondary or a higher 
level of education, and thus have an advantage over students in the Coast 
Province. (271) 
 
Eisemon points out that this lack of access to higher education opportunities 
then rebounds back to perceptions and uses of primary and secondary school 
opportunities at the coast, 
Lack of educational opportunities at the secondary and tertiary levels limits 
access and quality in primary education. In 1992, there were less than 150 
[government] secondary schools in Coast Province . . . Educational 
opportunities at the tertiary level are similarly limited. The tertiary sector 
comprises Mombasa Polytechnic and teacher training colleges, including two 
established to train Koranic teachers that were recently registered by the 
government. Despite its long history of western education, the coast still does 
not have a college or university.” (258) 
 
In this chapter I have outlined the ways in which Kenya‟s education policies 
have been developed over the course of decades of colonial control. I have further 
outlined the ways in which the government of an independent Kenya has 
constructed the discourse of education and schooling as being about nation-building. 
The ways in which the people and communities at the coast have continued to resist 
the government‟s policies can be seen in the continuing presence of Koranic schools 
throughout Coast Province. This resistance may also be detected in the analysis of 
enrollment data as offered by both Alwy and Schech and Eisemon. 
There is also, as the last quote from Eisemon points out, a degree to which 
local resistance to the government discourse on schooling can occasionally expand 
that discourse. The government has recently registered Islamic teacher training 
institutes at the coast. It appears that the government is acknowledging that Islam is 
not going to be pushed away from the coast. Eisemon concludes that, 
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Improving the educational indicators for Coast Province will . . . require 
special measures, including more local autonomy in determining the 
organization and content of schooling; schemes to reallocate funding from 
rich to poor communities; and expansion of opportunities at the secondary 
and tertiary levels. (260) 
 
In subsequent chapters, following on the points made by Eisemon and Alwy 
and Schech, I explore the ways in which this resistance to the dominating 
government discourse has led to the construction of a discourse of marginalization 
that is used to explain the current position of educational opportunities at the coast. I 
also explore recent moves made by the Kenyan government to expand higher 
education offerings at the coast, and how this set of moves by the government is 
discursively engaged by the people there. I see the marginalization as a foundational 
discourse against which the people with whom I have spoken create counter-
discourses in a dialectic that plays into change. I see this change as being 
significantly broader than the government registering of the Islamic training colleges 
that Eisemon cites. The recent changes are more inclusive of the full range of 
educational possibility at the tertiary level within the communities of the coast. 
 In order to make the points described in later chapters, I follow this chapter 
with one that is focused upon the development of public university education in 
Kenya. The combination of these two opening chapters will be the ground upon 
which I then develop the discursive themes which are the focus of the later chapters. 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter Three: A History of University Education in Kenya 
A Brief History of Higher Education in Africa 
As with the centuries-old indigenous and Koranic forms of learning briefly 
discussed in the preceding chapter, there have been iterations of higher education in 
Africa for millennia. Most prominently, and first, among those left to history, is the 
Library at Alexandria, Egypt, where thousands of scholars are said to have gathered, 
and hundreds of thousands of volumes stored. Zeleza (2006) notes that, though the 
Library gradually declined as buildings were destroyed by fire, its holdings 
looted in times of warfare, and scholars left due to political instability in the 
twilight years of the Roman empire, [the Library at] Alexandria left a rich 
legacy of scholarship covering a wide range of fields from mathematics and 
the sciences to philosophy and religion. (1) 
 
As Zeleza and Kiluba Nkulu (2006) each describe, catechetical schools 
existed throughout Egypt in the first centuries of the Common Era (C.E.). Ethiopia 
would become an additional site in Africa for such contemplative efforts at further, 
higher education as early as the 4th century C.E. Over the centuries, numerous 
institutions would come to exist that focused on educating nobles, clergy, and other 
elites.   
Islamic institutions of higher education have similarly existed for centuries. Al-
Azhar University was founded in Egypt in the late 10th century C.E. as a means to 
educate the people of the region about Fatimid Islam. With time, Al-Azhar, which 
began as a mosque, expanded its offerings beyond religion, transforming into a 
center of scholarly engagement in cultural and intellectual matters important to the 
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Muslim world. Leo Africanus, writing in the 13th century, described an Islamic center 
of higher learning in Fez, Morocco, where Arabs, Berbers, Jews, and Christians 
could all be found. Ibn Rushd, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Khaldun, famed travelers, writers, 
and historians, are said to have lived and worked in Fez, at Karawiyyin University25, 
between the 12th and 14th centuries. 
Sankore University (the University of Timbuktu), noted as the oldest center of 
higher learning south of the Sahara, was founded at the nexus of multiple trade 
routes, in a location known to Berbers, Soninke, Songhai, Arabs, Malinke, Fulani, 
Tuareg, and other populations. Founded, per some estimates, as early as 1100 
C.E., the university was sponsored by Mansa Musa and other leaders of Ancient 
Mali with major infusions of capital. Nkulu notes, 
records [indicate] that “theology, Islamic law, history, grammar, logic, rhetoric, 
ethics, and astrology” were the basic disciplines taught at Sankore.  Saad and 
Ajayi mention geography. The interpretation of the Koran, mathematics, 
medicine, science, and traditions are other subjects that were also taught. 
The nature of the subject matter reflects what may have been an emphasis 
on the pursuit of liberal education. (40) 
 
Nkulu describes the university at Timbuktu as a kind of Islamic version of the 
medieval European “studium generale,” attracting students from throughout the 
Islamic world. The focus at the university was on educating leaders to take up 
positions in societies throughout West Africa. As for why these Islamic institutions 
are not as well known in the West as they perhaps merit being, Halstead (2004) 
speaks to the history of Islam and higher education and asks “So why the apparent 
reluctance to develop a distinctive philosophy of education?” (517). 
                                                 
25
 Alternative iterations of this name include Zeleza‟s al-Qarawiyyin mosque university. 
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Nkulu ascribes the reluctance and the Islamic university‟s failure to more fully 
expand into other parts of West Africa to a focus on instruction in Arabic and a lack 
of interest in incorporating indigenous practice and cultural values into its curricula 
and pedagogy. This he contrasts to indigenous practices that were responsive to 
local interests, and which educated for practical application, rather than for 
leadership. 
Zeleza points out that a number of the institutions created in the period from 
the 10th through the 14th centuries continue to exist, though in much changed ways, 
most particularly in their introduction of more secular and professional fields of study. 
Zeleza makes the further point that the early part of the period during which rise of 
Islamic universities in northern Africa is first seen actually precedes the founding of 
the University of Bologna, and the development of other universities in medieval 
Europe. In making this point, Zeleza is turning on its head the notion that today‟s 
universities in Africa are fully the creation of European Enlightenment thinking: 
Europeans inherited from the Muslims a huge corpus of knowledge, 
rationalism and the investigative approach to knowledge, an elaborate 
disciplinary architecture of knowledge, the notions of individual scholarship, 
and the idea of the college, all of which became central features of the 
European university exported to the rest of the world with the rise of 
European imperialism. (2) 
The “European University” in Africa 
Ndeti (1992) ties the development of sub-Saharan Africa‟s present 
universities to the creation of a “new” kind of university26 in Europe in the early 19th 
                                                 
26
 Mazrui (1978) takes as his example of this “new” kind of university the 1820s‟ efforts by Jeremy 
Bentham to establish University College, London. Mazrui uses this example in his discussion of 
academic freedom, the contrast between academic democracy and academic freedom, and the role 
to be played by the state in the provision of higher education. I will say more about this in the next 
chapter which deals with the role defined for Kenya‟s universities in the process of nation-building. 
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century. Ndeti looks to the example of Wilhelm von Humboldt‟s University of Berlin, 
created, so he writes, with a focus on the pursuit of pure knowledge, rational inquiry, 
and a focus on research as well as teaching. Humboldt‟s idea was that research 
should take up a primary place in university activities, for research would be what 
permits the professorate to maintain their awareness, knowledge and understanding 
of ideas they were charged with teaching. 
Ndeti cites T.H. Huxley, speaking to the Cowper Commission of 1882 and 
saying that “the primary business of the University is with pure knowledge and pure 
art – independent of all applications to practice; with the progress in culture not 
increase in wealth.” (12). This notion of higher education would come to characterize 
universities in Africa, as slow as the development of these institutions would be. 
Ndeti is making the argument that this pursuit of so-called “pure knowledge” 
unfailingly referred to European Enlightenment ideas about what constituted 
knowledge. This left the knowledge arising out of the African experience without a 
home in such institutions27. How then would African tradition, broadly characterized 
as seeing value in teaching everyone because everyone is seen as a learner, fit with 
such elitist notions of education? 
Higher education of a form more closely tied to the Humboldt-ian model would 
eventually arise in West Africa with the advent of missionary activity. Fourah Bay 
                                                 
27
 For that matter, African education had little home once missionary activity really got moving in the 
first decades of the 19
th
 century. The German philosopher Georg Hegel, writing in the 1830s, would 
have this to say about Africa and the people who lived there: “Africa is not a historical continent; it 
shows neither change nor development”, and its black peoples “are capable of neither development 
nor education. As we see them today so they have always been.” In the face of such sentiment, 
untouched by actual lived experience of Africa, and given the traction that Hegel‟s ideas would gain, it 
should not be surprising that other “learned people” of the day would take Africa to have little need of 
“pure knowledge.” 
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College was established in Sierra Leone in 1827, by the Church Missionary Society 
(CMS) of Britain. The purpose of Fourah Bay College (FBC), in the minds of its 
creators was to educate Africans from the region as a means to gain their help in the 
missionary effort in West Africa. 
The CMS effort did not find immediate support from the British colonial 
authorities, who habitually saw Africans as incapable of being thoroughly 
educated28. But the College persisted, eventually becoming an affiliate college of the 
University of Durham in Britain, in 1876. FBC was joined by Liberia College 
(established in 1862), Stellenbosch Gymnasium (established in 1866 for Afrikaner 
settlers in South Africa), the University of the Cape of Good Hope (established in 
South Africa in 1873, and renamed the University of South Africa in 1916), Gordon 
Memorial College (established in Sudan in 1898), and other institutions29 opened in 
British colonial Africa to educate a small African elite to work in service to British 
authorities.30 In 1916, in South Africa, the Inter-State Native College was founded. 
                                                 
28
 Carroll and Samoff note (2004) that certain early graduates of Fourah Bay College (FBC), including 
Edward Blyden and Africanus Horton, sought from early in FBC‟s history to bring to FBC a model of 
education that would more closely pertain the interests of potential local students. Neither the Church 
Missionary Society nor British colonial authorities ceded much to this perspective, and FBC would 
remain a fully church-supported institution until its affiliation with the University of Durham in 1876. 
 
29
 These institutions would collectively come to be known as “Asquith Colleges,” in the post-WWII, 
British effort to permit a small number of colonies to open higher education institutions to admit small 
numbers of students. These Asquith Colleges - named after the Asquith Commission – included: 
Gordon College (Sudan); University College, Ibadan (Nigeria); Makerere College (Uganda), 
University College of the Gold Coast; and the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.  All of 
these institutions were affiliated to the University of London. The University of London set curricula, 
determined pedagogy, approved faculty, and otherwise held tight rein over these affiliates. 
 
30
 Zeleza (2006) mentions French efforts to establish a School of Medicine in Algeria in 1859. This 
would be expanded in 1879 to include other faculties – law, letters, etc. In Madagascar (Malagasy), a 
medical training academy would be opened in 1896. France would otherwise not begin a big push to 
open higher education institutions in its colonies in Africa until somewhat later, though there was 
limited space in such institutions in France itself in which African colonial subjects could enroll. Nkulu 
(2005) cites French examples that seem to define a circumstance where the colonial power saw 
independence on the horizon, and began to create higher learning institutions as both a means for 
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As Zeleza points out, this institution, to be renamed the University College of Fort 
Hare in 1951, would be the place at which a number of nationalist leaders from 
across southern Africa received their education. These would include the first 
leaders of independent Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (Seretse Khama, 
Nelson Mandela, and Robert Mugabe, respectively).  
In the post-WWII era, independence movements throughout Africa were 
spurred on by the view that Britain‟s conscription and use of African soldiers to fight 
its war against the racialism and nationalism of Germany and Italy was hypocritical 
in light of British policies in their colonies. While various reports had been 
commissioned by British authorities prior to the Second World War31, the 1945 
Asquith Commission Report integrated many of the previously expressed ideas. The 
report sought to ensure that the state maintained hegemony over higher education in 
British colonial Africa - not via coercion of force, but rather via mobilization of 
knowledge, information, and ideas to advance a particular political mindset, and 
offset counter-mindsets. This would be done by establishing institutions sufficient in 
number to offer opportunities in Africa to a limited group of colonial subjects, yet few 
enough in number such that no home-grown educated elite would have an easy time 
forming in their own colony/country. As per the Asquith Report, the University of 
                                                                                                                                                       
the soon-to-be independent colonies to educate their own citizens, as well as a means of installing 
French pedagogy and curricula in these institutions, thereby maintaining a hegemonic influence over 
what was deemed important enough to learn in the former colonies. Belgium and Portugal, each with 
far fewer colonies in Africa than either the British or the French, would eventually create universities 
in Africa, but each well after WWII. 
 
31
 Nkulu (2005) cites several examples, including the Currie Report (1933) which requested that 
several colleges be upgraded to University College status as a possible precursor to becoming 
universities (see endnote IV above). In 1943, the Channon Report proposed the broadening out of 
higher education institutions in the British colonies, with the new institutions to be tied to existing 
British institutions such that these British institutions actually gave out the degrees.  
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London would be the lead institution for these new university colleges. It would 
control syllabi, curricula, testing, and staffing such that the new institutions saw little 
or no effective local management of what they offered. An elite would be educated, 
but intellectual hegemony would remain with the British (and American32) educators. 
Within a year of the release of the Asquith report, British universities would 
establish the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas. Sifuna (1992) 
notes that the Council had the following original purposes: 
 strengthen cooperation between the universities of the United Kingdom 
and universities in the colonial territories; 
 foster the development of higher colleges in the colonies, and their 
advance to university status; and, 
 take such other action as appropriate for the promotion of higher 
education, learning and research in the colonies (145) 
 
In the period just after WWII, as Berman (1980a & b), Arnove (1980), Carrol 
and Samoff (2004), and others note, the prevailing colonial notions of educating 
Africans toward a circumstance of “segregated betterment” was no longer politically 
viable. Instead, Western governments (with the help of the major philanthropic 
organizations) began to concentrate on bringing Africa‟s potential leaders into their 
orbit. The ascendancy of the United States in the post-war period, combined with 
                                                 
32
 Inderjeet (2002) goes on to describe the intellectual hegemony of American pursuits in Africa in the 
period after the war, the overall effect of which was that a new educated elite arose in Africa that was 
dialed in, from its inception, to American ideas and interests: 
 
The US-based international networks operated across international boundaries to achieve 
their objective of fostering and consolidating US hegemony.  They did this by: financing the 
creation of new educational and research institutions with a view to generating knowledge, 
ideas, and trained manpower, favoring particular kinds of economic development; 
consolidating existing institutions to the same end; sponsoring research programs and 
projects that favored particular lines of inquiry at the expense of others, thereby setting the 
agenda of research; establishing scholarships at elite US universities to educate and train 
students from the Third World; [and,] bringing together academics and practitioners, from the 
USA and overseas through conferences and seminars, to create networks that would act 
further to strengthen US hegemony. (14) 
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increased resistance to colonialism in Africa, led the major foundations to take up a 
near-parastatal role in maintaining western control of major functions in colonial 
territories, especially around education. There came to be, at the beginning of the 
Cold War period, a burgeoning network of joined government and foundation 
interests that promoted programs the purpose of which was to steer African (Asian, 
Latin American, et al) “development” in directions that favored American (and more 
broadly, Western) economic and strategic interests.  As Berman (1980b) explains, 
Since 1945, the trustees and officials of the Carnegie Corporation and the 
Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have shared with Washington 
policymakers and corporate and financial leaders the belief that the future of 
the American economic and political system required a strong American 
presence in the nations of the developing world . . . Indeed, the boards of 
trustees of the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations represent, 
according to Nielsen, a “microcosm of what has variously been called the 
Establishment, the power elite, or the American ruling class. (204) 
 
By 1951, the Fund for the Advancement of Education would be established 
with initial support from the Ford Foundation to assist Black education in the United 
States and Africa. By 1957, the Fund had provided as much as $40 million in grants. 
From the mid-1950s onward, foundation support for Africa focused on managing the 
transition from colonialism to what came after. As independence movements picked 
up steam, and the realization arose that overt colonial forms would soon see their 
final days, the foundations sought the rational management of social change in the 
Third World through: 
(1) creation of lead universities located in areas considered of geo-
strategic and/or economic importance to the United States; 
(2) emphasis within these institutions on social science research and 
related manpower planning programs; 
(3) programs to train public administrators; 
(4) teaching training and curriculum development projects; 
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(5) [bringing potential leaders to] the United States for advanced training 
and return[ing] them home to assume positions of leadership within 
local universities, teacher training institutions, or ministries of 
education. (Berman, 1980a:208) 
 
As Arnove (1980a) puts it, 
American philanthropists . . . pursued new policies in education which would 
link the emergent indigenous leadership to U.S. values, modus operandi, and 
institutions. These policies were designed to ensure that U.S. vested 
economic and strategic interests were not threatened. (11) 
 
This idea of social change through rational management was basically a 
policy of co-optation. Sir Francis Bacon is credited with being the first to put the 
words “knowledge is power” together. The Rockefeller Foundation would include 
Bacon‟s aphorism in a 1957 report, following it with „power which cannot escape the 
calculus of political rivalry‟.  Inderjeet (2002) continues, saying that the Rockefeller 
Foundation‟s 
support of US foreign policy objectives and of the ideology of liberal 
internationalism, during and before the Cold War, cannot legitimately be 
considered non-political or non-ideological. Neither can the fact that they 
exported „the American way of life‟ and ideas about the role of education in 
development, be considered non-ideological. The political, intellectual, and 
ideological effects in Indonesia and Africa, for example, are also very clear. 
(25). 
 
The “Development” of Kenya‟s Public Universities 
As the brief history of the university in Africa shows, the institution arrives with 
a strong ideological framework in place. Both the British colonial and the 
philanthropic neo-colonial perspectives were heavily weighted to addressing the 
interests of those in power. The British desire to maintain hegemony over higher 
education in the late colonial period, alongside the American attempt, via 
government programs and foundation support, to manage „rational” social change 
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found purchase in 1956, with the establishment of the Royal Technical College 
(RTC) in Nairobi. RTC was founded as an affiliate college of the University of 
London,33 and as with other affiliated colleges of the era, London maintained 
external control of pedagogy, curricula, and other policies. 
Any critical analysis of this development would need to consider whether 
institutions that developed out of such a situation were ever expected to become the 
equal of their progenitor, whether that progenitor was the former colonial power, 
Britain, or the newly ascendant global power, the United States. Achola (1992), 
writing about foundation influence on the decision to establish a University College in 
Nairobi, puts it this way, 
One strategy used . . . was the creation of lead universities in African 
countries regarded as strategic to the United States. In line with this strategy, 
foundation personnel identified viable existing institutions with some 
competent local staff and with government support and elevated them to the 
status of universities. Foundation personnel in the field offices and in the 
United States became heavily involved in the overall planning and 
implementation of university policies. (125) 
 
In 1962, a UNESCO-sponsored conference was held in Tananarive, 
Madagascar, with a focus on higher education matters in post-colonial Africa. As 
Carrol and Samoff (2004) note,  
The Tananarive participants – African academics and government officials, 
observers from other United Nations member states, and representatives of 
                                                 
33 Although the history I have included here speaks to universities as public institutions, Eisemon 
(1992) notes,  
In 1947, the Asian community petitioned colonial authorities to charter a college as a 
memorial to Gandhi offering training in commerce and technical subjects. Although the 
initiative was rejected, it led to the founding of [what would become] the Royal Technical 
College of Nairobi in 1952. (158) 
 
With the effort to open the Gandhi Memorial Academy put aside, colonial authorities began to 
investigate more public means to expand tertiary education in Kenya. By the early 1950s, a Royal 
Charter established the Royal Technical College (RTC) in Nairobi. It would, however, take until 1956 
for RTC to open its doors and admit its first students. 
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the U.N. - concluded that in addition to providing a space for teaching and 
research and maintaining international standards of academic quality, 
institutions of higher education were to contribute to the social, cultural, and 
economic development of resources to meet new “manpower” demands 
(UNESCO and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 1963:19). 
This conference thus reflected a broader sense of mission for African 
universities, focusing on their role in national development and marking the 
rise of the notion of the “developmental university” in Africa. (8) 
 
This was in line with what the major foundations had already begun pursuing.  
Kingsbury (1966), writing in his position as “Director, Middle East and Africa” for the 
Ford Foundation, explains that from 1958 to 1966, the Ford Foundation had given 
more than $34 million in funding in Africa for support of education. The Ford 
Foundation‟s expressed interest was on development of manpower resources – 
especially teacher training – so as to provide teachers and scholars for existing 
institutions throughout the countries and regions with which the Foundation dealt. 
Kenya was a chief recipient of Ford Foundation largesse. 
A few years prior to this, the major foundations had supported the 
establishment of the US-based African Studies Association, at least implicitly to 
corral some of the efforts of academics focused on Africa, and bring them into the 
orbit of foundation interests34. During this time, and in keeping with the support of 
manpower development, major foundations, along with the U.S. government, 
expanded nascent scholarship support programs that brought African students to the 
United States for undergraduate and graduate education. Programs such as ASPAU 
(African Scholarship Program in American Universities), AFGRAD (African Graduate 
                                                 
34
 Joel Samoff (2004), co-writing with Bidemi Carroll, describes a “financial-intellectual complex” in 
which academics utilize foundation funding to conduct research that belongs to the foundations, thus 
blurring whatever notions of intellectual independence might survive. Consulting, a financially 
lucrative engagement for thousands of “development specialists” is a primary variant on this idea. 
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Fellowship Program), and ATLAS (Advanced Training for Leadership and Skills) 
were developed35. 
These programs brought students to the United States with the expectation 
that they would return to their homes and assume positions of leadership in their 
fields. Program administrators pointed out that these programs met this expectation, 
and thousands of scholarship recipients did return home and assume significant 
roles in their countries‟ development. What went largely unsaid was that these 
participants did so having been inculcated into western notions of methodology, 
western ideas about the place and value of intellectual pursuits, western forms of 
political engagement, etc. And they were enveloped in a formal network of 
scholarship recipients that continues to be actively worked and managed by those 
sponsoring the work of such programs36. 
An early variant on this example, one specific to Kenya, can be seen in the 
way in which Tom Mboya was received during his 1959 visit to the United States. 
Mboya, a Kenyan labor leader and political figure, was seeking support for what 
would come to be called the “Kennedy Airlift.” The Kennedy Foundation played a key 
role in seeking funding to transport hundreds of Kenyans who had been promised 
scholarships to enroll in American universities. Other major U.S.-based foundations 
similarly engaged Mboya‟s efforts, as did the U.S. Department of State. 
                                                 
35
 I offer these particular examples because each was administered by the African-American Institute 
(AAI), for which I worked from 1990-1991 on yet another such program, the South African Training 
Program. I would be paid for this work, initially as a consultant, and eventually as a staff member, 
from a Ford Foundation grant. 
 
36
 I would be remiss if I did not mention that similar programs existed in the Soviet Union during the 
period from 1960 through the early part of the 1990s. For example, the governments of Congo, 
Ghana, and Guinea engaged Soviet support in the 1960s, as did Ethiopia‟s government in the late 
1970s. 
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This example defines the close working relationship between government and 
foundations. Sawyerr (2004) offers a succinct explanation of the situation when he 
writes that 
Though the African universities opened up to the wider world after 
independence – bringing in experience from the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba – the British, French and Belgian 
influence persisted for a long time, especially in what might be called the “first 
generation” of universities. This ensured substantial continuity in the 
qualifications, values, and attitudes of staff as well as the curriculum and 
pedagogy at the new African universities. (15) 
 
By 1963, RTC had been renamed University College of Nairobi and was on 
the cusp of becoming a constituent college of the emerging University of East Africa 
(UEA). Between 1963 and 1973, the Rockefeller Foundation provided $10 million in 
funding to University College of Nairobi. Regarding the influence, power and control 
this afforded the Foundation, Inderjeet points out that, 
Some 66 percent of all [University of East Africa] faculty had held either 
Rockefeller scholarships or special lectureships; 8 percent of UEA‟s full 
professors and deans had held such Rockefeller Foundation awards . . .[and] 
the presence of Rockefeller-funded Americans also played a key role in 
institutional and curricular development, most notably at the Institute of 
Development Studies in Nairobi, under the directorship of James S. Coleman. 
(23) 
 
The eventual disintegration of the UEA put great pressures on the University 
of Nairobi. Over the course of the 1960s, it had become clear that the post-colonial 
directions taken by the governments of the three East African Community countries 
were sufficiently at odds37 such that each government eventually began to move to 
                                                 
37
 Ali Mazrui (1978) offers a two paragraph example of this, describing how “[o]n October 20, 1972, 
Kenya should have been celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the „official‟ outbreak of the Mau 
Mau insurrection.” (117). Mazrui points out that Kenya‟s leader, Jomo Kenyatta, had been arrested, 
convicted, and jailed for years by British colonial authorities for purportedly leading the insurrection. 
Uganda‟s then-President, Idi Amin, had been in the King‟s African Rifles, and played an active role in 
fighting for the British against the insurrection, and thus ostensibly against what Kenyatta was said to 
espouse. Finally, Mazrui describes Julius Nyerere, Tanzania‟s President, as one who “shrank in 
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create ever more independent “constituent colleges”.38 It is these colleges that 
eventually became the flagship universities in each country. Mazrui (1978) describes 
any disappointment in the eventual disintegration of the federated university as 
missing the point – the surprise was rather how long such “a hard-headed and 
realistic experiment in regional technical cooperation, as well as a dream in the 
traditions of Pan-East-Africanism” was permitted to live. (240) 
As the impact of the disintegration of the University of East Africa changed 
how the Kenyan government dealt with higher education, the role played by external 
agents in support of universities also shifted. Karioki (1990) describes how the 
Kenyan government saw its development task. He notes that the government 
pursued a neo-liberal policy in which its public stance was that the economy was to 
be Africanized, meaning that Kenyans would systematically and purposefully be 
placed in positions of ever-increasing influence and control so as to become “equal 
actors” in economic efforts. Also in the plan was that the Kenyan economy would be 
“mixed” (i.e. free market mixed with some manner of state control), and that public 
and private efforts would each be pursued. Finally, he describes how the 
government would encourage foreign economic participation and investment, both 
                                                                                                                                                       
horror from the violence of both sides in the 1950s, and who decided to encourage a nationalist 
movement based on non-violence and moderation in contrast to the rebellion in Kenya.” (117). By 
1977, the East African Community, a three-country customs union, was defunct. By the next year, 
Kenyatta would be dead, while Amin would have the Ugandan Army invade Tanzania, sparking a 
response by Nyerere that saw the Tanzanian army push all the way to Kampala, leading to Amin‟s 
ouster. 
 
38
 Originally, each of the constituent colleges – Makerere, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam – maintained 
distinct degree offerings in line with the colonial idea that there did not exist sufficient need for three 
full-faculty universities in East Africa. Shortly after independence, each government saw benefits to 
expanding what was on offer to its own citizens in their own country. Given the political differences 
between Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, and Milton Obote – described at length in any number of 
academic works – it seems inevitable that the UEA would be pulled apart sooner or later. 
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bilateral and multilateral, such that Kenya would fully engage in international trade. 
For all of this, the University of Nairobi, as the new apex of the formal education 
system, was to be a full participant in this development. 
Mazrui (1978) takes this point about the role to be played by universities in 
national development, and notes further complexity in how this is to be 
accomplished. Mazrui is connecting not only the difficulty in utilizing African 
universities to build African nations, but the paradox of the western university‟s 
nature as “rational” as well as focused on individual scholars undertaking a 
universalist effort – the “pursuit of knowledge”.  How can all of this be done in a 
single institution? Mazrui writes that 
 The nationalist task consists in indigenizing what is imported and giving it 
greater congruence with the realities of its environment. But indigenizing the 
educational institutions of Africa is in some ways more straightforward than 
de-rationalizing them. That other problem of the western educational ethos 
being too rationalist poses greater challenges than its foreignness. . . . 
Academic freedom is sometimes defended in the liberal terms of individual 
autonomy and sometimes in neo-scientific postulates of universal objectivity. 
On one side is the individual scholar and on the other the universe of 
international scholarship. What is often missing is the intermediate category 
of the particular society within which the scholar operates. The university is 
therefore either sub-social in its commitment or supra-social – but seldom 
adequately social. The process of university education is also itself partly a 
process of individualization and partly a process of universalization. (210-211) 
 
I take as part, or perhaps an extension, of Mazrui‟s point that it matters where 
a university was asked to do its work. In Kenya, Nairobi was the location where the 
university would be and all other sites were secondary to it. The university, being 
focused on nation-building, brought Kenyans to it, and would only eventually extend 
itself to bring its programs (distance and open learning, satellite campuses, etc.) to 
the broader nation. Ogot (1999) touches upon several aspects of this issue in his 
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collection of essays, Building on the Indigenous: Selected Essays, 1981-1998. In 
one essay, his topic is the indigenization of universities, that effort in Kenya that 
sought to bring a more Kenyan face to higher education, through development of a 
local scholarly community that would take on the role of faculty at Kenya‟s various 
tertiary institutions. Ogot notes that as the first several decades of independence 
wore on, the various national economic development projects came and went. He 
notes that there seemed to be never as much to show for the efforts as had been 
promised. He concludes that an 
[E]xpanded consciousness led to a critique of Western positivist social 
sciences for their ethnocentrism, their exaggerated claim to universality, their 
focus on causes of under-development through factors internal to these 
societies without adequate weight given to the role of colonialism. They were 
accused of serving the political and economic interest of the West and thus 
perpetuating intellectual colonialism and dependence. There were calls for 
intellectual decolonization, liberation and self-reliance, adaptation rather than 
wholesale thoughtless adoption of Western social sciences; and finally there 
were loud calls for indigenization. (152) 
 
For Ogot, this points to an overtly economistic perspective of university 
development, that denies the broader potential he sees for university education and 
its purpose in society. 
We are more than the mere sum of our current economic needs; we are 
participants in a social and political enterprise which vindicated itself in terms 
of the values which it has progressively generated during our history. And the 
purpose of education – particularly university education – is to equip us to 
confront those values from time to time, to question their contemporary 
manifestations and to modify their application without destroying their 
relevance to our capacity for self-development as human beings. (177. 
Emphasis added) 
 
This is the interplay, the conflict between the role of the university as a site for 
economic development, and the role of the university in teaching people not what 
but how to think, to accept the system into which they are being socialized, or to 
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question this system. Add to this the layer of the colonial, post-colonial, and neo-
colonial connections between Kenya‟s history and the ways in which Kenya‟s 
universities are developed and supported today, and the complexity raised in 
Mazrui‟s comments from 1978 about the purpose of university is married to Ogot‟s 
thoughts two decades later as to how to realize the university‟s purpose. 
By the mid-1970s, the Kenyan government had begun looking into whether 
the University of Nairobi and its constituent college, Kenyatta University College, 
were sufficient to meet the educational and development needs of the country. By 
the early 1980s, the government convened a Presidential Working Party39 to study 
whether Kenya should establish a full second university. The Working Party 
concluded that a second university was needed as a concession to a level of 
demand for university education that would not be met by the university the report 
proposed to open. In what would turn out to be a decision that continues to spark 
strong reaction, President Moi opted to name the university after himself, and locate 
it in his home area, near the town of Eldoret. 
Oketch (2004) notes how  
The establishment of Moi University broke from the tradition in Africa in which 
universities were an elevation of an existing institution such as a teachers 
college or a technical institute. (120) 
 
                                                 
39
 This is the Mackay Commission described in the previous chapter. Its report was the document that 
first espoused changing Kenya‟s education system from a four-tiered (7-4-2-3) system into a three-
tiered (8-4-4) system. Mutula (2002) notes that the old 7-4-2-3 system did an effective job of 
screening university level admissions, with the two year period being upper secondary (or, perhaps, 
A-level) work.  One of the primary criticisms of the 8-4-4 system is that it leaves a direct pipeline 
between secondary and university, with no A-level filter to bleed off some of the admissions crunch. 
The present government in Kenya is re-examining the value of the 8-4-4 system, with serious 
consideration being given to reinstating a fourth level between secondary school and university. 
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Moi University was established in 1984, with a focus on graduating students in 
technical and environmental fields. The following year, in a reversion to form, 
Kenyatta University College was elevated to full university status. In 1987, Egerton 
College, another of the constituent colleges of the University of Nairobi, with a focus 
on agriculture, was elevated to become Kenya‟s fourth university. 
This pattern of public university development highlights one of the bedrock 
driving forces behind the discourses on public higher education I found at the 
Kenyan coast. Each of these newly created or elevated public universities is located 
at a further distance from Mombasa and the Kenyan coast than is the University of 
Nairobi. None of the decisions taken during this time led to a university being built in 
or near Mombasa, the country‟s second largest city. Rather, as Oketch notes 
specifically about Moi University, Kenya saw itself with “. . . a university in the middle 
of nowhere,” the grounds upon which it was built having previously been a forest that 
was cut down to create the university, located more than 400 miles from the coast. 
(120). 
This avoidance of the coastal region continued as Kenya developed more of 
its public university constituent colleges into full universities. Jomo Kenyatta 
University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT), located near Nairobi and formed 
as a constituent college to Kenyatta University in 1988, was elevated to full 
university status in 1994. Maseno University,40 located near Lake Victoria and 
founded as a constituent college of Moi University in 1990 with a focus on teacher 
training, was elevated to full university status in 2000. 
                                                 
40
 Originally the site of a mission centre of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in the early years of 
the 20
th
 century. It later became Siriba Teacher Training College. 
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The latest institution to make the step up to full university status in Kenya is 
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). MMUST, which 
began as the unaccredited Western College in the early 1970s, grew eventually to 
become a constituent college of Moi University, from which it was elevated, in 
December 2006, to full university status. As its previous name, Western College, 
implies, MMUST is located in western Kenya, in the town of Kakamega. 
Alternative Forms of Public Higher Education 
While the coast has long been a site of absence in regard to an independent 
public university, the region has been home to a high profile post-secondary 
institution for nearly six decades. In the course of my research for this work, I have 
come upon numerous tellings (in written work as well as through interviews) of the 
history of what began as the Mombasa Institute of Muslim Education (MIOME). 
MIOME stands as a ready example of how local, national, and even international 
forces have influenced post-secondary education at the coast. MIOME would 
eventually morph into the Mombasa Polytechnic, one of several national 
polytechnics in Kenya. In August 2007, it was elevated to the status of university 
college of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT). It is 
now known as Mombasa Polytechnic University College. 
This „morphing‟ is a central theme in the discourse on „a university of our own‟ 
that I analyze in Chapter Seven. Here, I offer several snapshots of MIOME‟s history. 
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I will start with a set of quotations from Salim41 (1973), as a means of laying out one 
version of the history, against which the others may be placed and compared: 
For some time, [Governor Philip] Mitchell had been studying the needs of 
these [coastal] communities. Governmental investigations coincided with 
others along similar lines which were being conducted by the Aga Khan in 
which the Sultan of Zanzibar, Seyyid Khalifa, had shown keen interest. The 
three dovetailed their plans and the result was the launching, in June 1948, of 
a £250,000 scheme to build the Mombasa Institute of Muslim Education 
(MIOME) . . . the Institute was to lay emphasis on technical and vocational 
training, a prominent feature of the curriculum being marine and electrical 
engineering, navigation, seamanship, and courses in agriculture, veterinary 
studies, carpentry, and masonry. Muslim religion and culture were also to be 
studied.” (209-210) 
 
Salim continues his history, shifting from the establishing impetus to the 
specific communities and groups the institution was expected to serve. Salim 
introduces a by then-longstanding distinction in the ethnic and racial composition of 
coastal Muslims. These distinctions – between „Arabs42,‟ and „African‟ Muslims, and 
„Indian‟ Muslims were not new constructs. The distinctions were due, in part, to 
global patterns of distinct threads within the practice of Islam. They were due, in 
part, to the influence of more than half a century of colonial racializing policies that 
saw as different from Africans, as different from Arabs, as different from Indians, etc. 
And they were due, in part, to local iterations and practices around these, as well as 
around wealth and class distinctions. 
                                                 
41
 Ahmad Idha Salim is a former member of the History faculty at the University of Nairobi. He served 
as Kenya‟s Ambassador to Sweden in the 1990s. He was, as of mid-2007, a member of the Advisory 
Board of Mombasa Islamic University. 
 
42
 Those holding historical and familial connections  more with Oman and other parts of the Arabian 
peninsula than with the African hinterland. An alternate take might see this distinction as being made 
in the breach , where „African‟ is a label based on skin color and a likelihood of being from a 
hinterland community, and „Arab‟ is a label applied to those who are of the littoral, and who do not 
„look African.‟ In either case, it also has long possessed economic and social distinctions in lived 
practice. 
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As Salim describes it, MIOME was to have something of a quota system, an 
enrollment metric wherein certain local communities were to be privileged as one 
means of restoring something of what had been taken from them. He says, 
About half of the places in MIOME were to be reserved for the Arabs and the 
coastal people, no doubt in recognition of the fact that in the past they had 
suffered more than others in the educational field. (210) 
 
This enrollment metric did not, in the end, get realized. Salim discusses the 
important turn the institute undertook even as its doors opened. He tells us,  
It was [on] 9 May 1951, that MIOME proper opened with 108 boys – fifty-
seven from Kenya, sixteen from Tanganyika, three from Uganda, thirty from 
Zanzibar and two from Somalia. The fact that there were only three Arabs 
among the Kenyans (the rest were Indians) and twelve among the Zanzibaris 
(the others were fourteen Africans and four Indians) reflected the subsequent 
intake in the Institute. (210-211) 
 
Salim is describing an institution that was trumpeted as a means to educate 
Muslim boys, trumpeted such that an expectation was raised that local communities 
would be central to the Institute‟s planning. However, before too long, a different 
perspective emerged. As Salim describes it, 
There is no doubt that the Institute fell lamentably short of the high hopes of 
its sponsors. Gradually these misty ideals evaporated in the harsh light of 
reality and circumstances. The Institute came to be referred to as a „pink [its 
colour] elephant‟ by cynics who regarded the scheme as too grandiose – its 
buildings more impressive than their content. (211) 
 
I spoke with several people during my interviewing period who were 
conversant in the history of MIOME (and the iterations of the Institute that were to 
follow). Respondent, ER, offers a partial explanation/clarification of the final point I 
made via Salim. He contextualizes some of the local reaction to how MIOME would 
be distanced over time from the community it had ostensibly be created to support. 
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You probably know the history of Mombasa Polytechnic, I think it is a good 
starting point to understand the dynamics of higher education at the coast. 
Because here you have a Muslim initiated project, MIOME, I mean it is the 
Mombasa Institute of Muslim Education . . . This is an initiative coming out of 
the Aga Khan group, the Ismailis, indeed finances coming out of the Ismailis. 
So, in a sense, it is not a Mombasa indigenous effort, where the population is 
by and large Sunni, and possibly less oriented toward secular education than 
the Aga Khan group. But then in 1964, immediately after independence, what 
happens is the new Kenya government nationalizes this institute. Now that 
incident, I think, can give us a little bit to reflect on in the whole question of 
higher education at the coast. (ER, September 15, 2007) 
 
Where Salim is speaking to the differentiated, complex Muslim population attending 
MIOME, and distinguishing these differentiated groups using some scale of 
indigenousness (referring to Arabs and Swahilis and Indians), ER makes specific 
reference to the Ismailis (quite likely Salim‟s “Indians”) to tell a history of an outside, 
non-indigenous group with a large representation at MIOME even in its earliest days. 
In this way, it seems that even MIOME was challenged as to the extent to which it 
would an institution “for the coast.” 
Ali Mazrui, who was employed at MIOME in its first days,43 offers further detail 
about the establishment of MIOME: 
The idea of a technical institute for East African Muslims originated in a 
discussion between the Aga Khan and Kenya‟s British governor at the time, 
Sir Philip Mitchell. The Aga Khan had been quoted as favouring the 
establishment of a Muslim university at the Kenya coast for the whole of 
Eastern Africa. Sir Philip Mitchell reacted by contacting the Aga Khan and 
recommending a technical institute for Muslims rather than a university. 
Mitchell argued that Muslims were being left behind in science and 
technology, and needed help to catch up. The Aga Khan contributed 
generously to the initial budget, as did the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Fund, and the Bohora Community (Indian Shia 
Muslims). A Mombasa Arab (Sheikh Khamis) contributed the land on which 
the institute was built. After Kenya‟s independence the Institute ceased to be 
reserved for Muslim students, and has now become the Mombasa 
Polytechnic. (18) 
 
                                                 
43
 Mazrui writes about this in his annual Mazrui Newsletter for 2005. 
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In a separate forum44, Mazrui offers an additional perspective on the purpose 
of MIOME, and the cross-characteristics of its staff and students: 
In the early years all the academic staff of MIOME were Europeans (primarily 
Christians). All the students were Muslims (Africans, Indians, and Arabs of 
East Africa). The mission was to produce technologically skilled East African 
Muslims. The whole concept was rooted in Africa‟s triple heritage--
indigenous, Islamic and Western considerations. But the educational goals 
were technological rather than legal. (10) 
 
Here Mazrui offers a differentiated sense of the student population of MIOME at its 
beginnings, one akin to Salim‟s. MIOME was seen as an institution that served the 
Muslim population, but a place where the Muslim population was “East African” more 
than simply coastal. There was broader geographic accounting being done in the 
service to Muslim students than simply helping those from nearby areas. I return to 
Mazrui‟s perspective on MIOME (and Mombasa Polytechnic) in later chapters, as he 
continues to play an integral role in the changes that have been wrought in the 
provision of university education at the coast, and specifically at Mombasa 
Polytechnic. 
At this point, however, I want simply to mention that Mombasa Polytechnic 
has offered a range of technical certificates and diplomas over the decades, the 
oldest programs of which are found in the Applied Sciences, electrical and 
electronics engineering, mechanical engineering, and building sciences. Mombasa 
Polytechnic has also long offered a non-degree program in Business Studies. In 
more recent times, Mombasa Polytechnic began offering a program in computer and 
information technology. Even more recently, programs in media design, medical 
engineering, and enterprise development have been added. 
                                                 
 
44
 Mazrui Newsletter for 2002. 
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For all that MIOME and Mombasa Polytechnic offered a wide range of post-
secondary options, the national guidelines under which polytechnics operated for 
many years made transferring credits (or full certificates or diplomas) from the 
polytechnics to the public universities nearly impossible. As a result, the polytechnics 
served as a fully separated option for students seeking post-secondary 
opportunities. The story of Mombasa Polytechnic has taken a significant recent turn, 
however, one I touch upon briefly later in this chapter, as well as more deeply 
contextualize in Chapter Seven. 
In addition to the high profile Mombasa Polytechnic, there are a wide range of 
other, generally unaccredited institutes and colleges at the coast toward which 
students leaving secondary school turn for opportunity. Many of these students have 
not achieved results on the school leaving exam that are good enough to get them 
into the public universities. Many of these institutes and colleges also cater to an 
older community of returning students, people in tight economic circumstances who 
see a credential as a potential stepping stone to a better life. The institutes and 
colleges are a response to the kind of belief expressed by Rakodi, et al (2000) 
writing about poverty and conflict in Mombasa and describing how, 
The lack of opportunities for young people was of particular concern to poor 
people, who consider that the youth “...see no real chance for participation in 
the development of this country. In spite of their education and energy, they 
are helpless, frustrated and dangerous.”(17) Rates of unemployment are high 
amongst young people because they lack practical training, exposure to the 
world of work and business, and access to credit, as well as information on 
employment, markets for their products, training opportunities and where to 
go for assistance. (156) 
 
It is the lack of practical training to which Rakodi is referring that one of the 
people I interviewed, IN, believes is available at the best of the institutes and schools 
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to which I am referring. 
Essentially, in my view, most of the coast students, have to also have 
opportunities for those who cannot make it to the university. To [have access 
to] institutions, medium level institutions of higher learning . . . Vocational 
learning opportunities . . . That has been the core of our human manpower 
training, you know, in Coast Province. (July 29, 2007) 
 
These institutes and colleges are examples that offer a potential path beyond 
the frustration Rakodi mentions, and that meet the manpower needs to which IN 
refers. In this, they come to be seen by some as a means out of the feeling of 
helplessness to which Rakodi refers. There are, to be sure, some who believe that 
many of these institutions are poorly staffed, low quality, possibly even fly-by-night, 
operations bent on taking money from people in tenuous economic and/or 
professional situations. The large number of such institutions present indicates, 
though, that there is at minimum a perception, widely enough held, that the 
education offered, or at least the credential one receives upon finishing, is worth 
taking a chance on as a means to improving one‟s lot in life. As interview respondent 
BA tells it, 
You finish your secondary school, or you are halfway through secondary 
school, you can‟t go to university. You want a job. [It is] very difficult to get a 
job. So, you‟ve got computer, you‟ve got business administration, you go to 
whatever. All kinds of commercial colleges, secretarial . . . and all these. What 
is the term for them?  People go to these places just to get a certificate in 
order to get a job. (August 30, 2007) 
Enrollment and Emergent Public University Forms 
I have outlined the growth of independent public universities in Kenya, and 
pointed out how this growth continues to leave Mombasa and the coast without a 
public university of its own. In Section Two of this work, I deal with specific 
discourses related to this absence in Mombasa, and the emergent presence of 
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university colleges there. Prior to moving on to those discourses, however, and as a 
means to better situate them, I will mention specific public universities processes 
and program iterations that do reach to the coast, and thus do form an element of 
the discourses to be described. 
As Mwiria45 and Ng‟ethe (2007) point out in their chapter entitled, “Motivation 
for & Management of Reform,” the chief route via which students are admitted into 
any and all public universities in Kenya is the Joint Admission Board (JAB). The JAB 
was established – “on a goodwill basis” (92) by the Vice-Chancellors of Kenya‟s 
universities in the 1980s, as Kenya was on the cusp of expanding its public 
universities. Essentially, then and now, the Vice-Chancellors46, along with registrars 
and deans, meet to establish the level at which each year‟s secondary school 
leavers must pass the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) exams in 
order to be admitted to a public university47. The JAB reviews its selection criteria 
each year, and then establishes each year‟s gender specific levels for admission of 
students48, while also attempting to manage regional disparities in admissions. 
                                                 
45
 Dr. Kilemi Mwiria is presently the Deputy Minister for Education in charge of higher education in 
Kenya. Dr. Njuguna Ng‟ethe is a long time member of the faculty of the University of Nairobi, former 
Director of the Institute for Development Studies there, as well as former Chairman of the 
Commission for Higher Education. I was in communication with both of these individuals during the 
course of my research. 
 
46
 Until 2004, the President of Kenya was the Chancellor of all Kenyan public universities. The Vice-
Chancellors were the on-site senior manager. Kenya‟s public universities each now have their own 
Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors, with the Chancellors managing external relations – political, etc. – 
and the Vice-Chancellors maintaining their prior role as on-site managers. 
 
47
 As of 2007, students must pass these high school leaving exams with an aggregate grade of B+ or 
risk not gaining admission. 
 
48
 In many years, the effort to better balance enrollments by gender has led the JAB to establish 
criteria for girls that are one or several point slower than that established for boys. 
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The JAB is repeatedly criticized, however, for the slowness with which it 
undertakes its work. It is often more than a year49 after students have taken the 
KCSE that they are told whether they have been admitted to university, and where. 
And, even planning based on prior years‟ results is not a sure path. As Mwiria and 
Ng‟ethe note, 
Parents whose children meet the previous year‟s cut-off points are often 
shattered to learn that the cut-off points have been raised [in the interim]. 
Some critics have agreed that it is „outrageous‟ that it takes two years after 
secondary school for students to begin at the university. (93) 
 
Beyond the aforementioned responsibilities and problems, the JAB is also 
responsible for determining what individual students go to which university to 
engage what field of study. Here is where much concern is expressed about being 
admitted into a university in Kenya, in a timely manner, in a field of one‟s choosing. 
As Mwiria and Ng‟ethe note, 
In order to strike a balance between the universities and the courses 
available, the board ends up admitting students to university and degree 
programmes they never requested. (93) 
 
As a result of the “sluggishness” of the JAB, and in partial response to this, at 
least one of the public universities (Kenyatta University) has begun admitting 
students on a semester basis (counter to the JAB admissions process, which 
assumes that students are accepted into and enrolled in programs are operated on a 
year-to-year basis). Kenyatta University began this practice outside of the JAB 
process in what some see either positively, as an attempt to either reduce the 
amount of time students spend waiting for admissions decisions from JAB, or less 
positively, as an attempt by Kenyatta University to skirt the agreed upon processes 
                                                 
49
 I spoke with some parents whose children had waited 18 months for JAB‟s decisions. 
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by which Kenya‟s public universities handle student intake and distribution. Mwiria 
and Ng‟ethe write, in a section entitled, “Challenging the Relevance of the Joint 
Admissions Board,” about the JAB and Kenyatta University, noting that 
On-going reforms in the public university sector raise questions about the 
relevance of the institution [of the JAB]. In particular, the slowness with which 
the JAB conducts the admission exercise is increasingly viewed as an 
impediment to reform . . . The University [Kenyatta] has potentially reduced 
the length of time KCSE graduates have to wait to join the university from two 
years to one. (105) 
 
But this attempt by Kenyatta University also lays bare the fact that public 
universities are reacting to declining support (on a per-student basis) from the 
central government, and doing so by creating means to skirt established practice 
while simultaneously having students pay a good deal more for their university 
education. Until the higher education reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
university students did not pay a large percentage of the cost of their education. 
There was a loan program in place from the mid-1970s that students were 
channeled to, but it existed with little enforcement of its payback requirements, and 
as such many students (and their parents) continued to see public higher education 
as largely free. However, 
In June 1991, the government introduced the current cost-sharing scheme 
that requires students to pay in full or in part through a direct charge 
depending on the perceived need for tuition, food and accommodation. The 
introduction of direct charges acknowledged that, in the context of growing 
enrollments and diminished funding, the government could no longer finance 
university education without compromising education standards. The 
introduction of a direct charge was also influenced by the general policy of 
introducing cost-sharing measures as part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) prescribed by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (Mwiria and Ng‟ethe, 66) 
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Expanding on the measures propounded by the World Bank, Chachage 
(2001) tells us that,   
The World Bank published a number of studies since the mid-1980s, which 
became the „philosophical‟ basis for the so-called transformations of 
universities, which are being imposed by many African governments. 
Fundamentally, these studies called for a restructuring of education, so that 
there can be a public cost recovery and reallocation of government spending 
towards levels with highest social returns. This, according to these studies, 
would promote higher efficiency and egalitarian distribution of education 
resources. They were of the view that higher education system should be 
made to operate at the lowest possible public cost. Accordingly, these 
institutions should exist by virtue of their being „viable‟ and „efficient‟. By 
viability, it meant that they must be made to produce for the „market‟ and pay 
for themselves. Thus, the introduction of cost-sharing. By efficiency, it simply 
meant that these institutions must be made to revise their syllabi to suit the 
„products‟ for the market. (4) 
 
In the face of this policy shift, the public universities have become quite 
creative about bringing in income, and have begun using the slowness of the 
admissions process as both an excuse and a means to do so. As one person told 
me,  
[R]ight now . . . it seems like the universities are just thinking about the 
money, because now they are not being supported fully by the government. 
They are just being given a certain percentage. Like University of Nairobi 
[where this person is on the faculty], I think, right now, we are getting about 
30% of our budget [directly from the central government]. So the 70% has to 
come from somewhere else. And that‟s why the drive now of Model-Two and 
Model-Three. [Model Two is] evenings and weekends. And I think Kenyatta is 
also doing that. Model-Three are these programs where the students come 
during holidays. This one here we call it [Model Three] External Studies, and 
is the one whose students come during school holidays. (SS, August 31, 
2007) 
 
The students enrolled in “regular programs” (i.e. those whose enrollment 
continues to be managed through JAB-led admissions) at the University of Nairobi, 
or Kenyatta University, or any other of Kenya‟s public universities are now paying an 
average of Ksh 120,000 (approximately $1,700) per year for tuition and 
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accommodation. Loan programs exist to support those students who qualify. Any 
students who wish to quicken the pace of their higher education, or who are not 
accepted into the university during the JAB-led admissions process, and so are left 
to enroll in these Model-Two or Model-Three programs can expect to pay five to six 
times the average price of the “regular program.” Mwiria and Nge‟the (2007) note 
that as of 2005, there were 77,000 students enrolled in Kenya‟s public universities, 
in all programs combined – regular and alternative. Of these, 33,000 (or more than 
40%) are enrolled in the privately sponsored alternative programs. 
These alternative programs are not the first iteration of “non-regular” 
educational offerings from Kenya‟s public universities. The distance and open 
learning programs offered by Kenya‟s existing public universities take in students 
who have passed their secondary school leaving exams but have not done so at 
levels sufficiently high to be admitted by the JAB to one of the public universities50. 
This option also is seen as an opportunity for people who are in the work force to 
attend classes and try to enhance their chances to improve their circumstances. 
There are several such opportunities to be found in Mombasa and elsewhere 
at the coast. For example, The University of Nairobi operates the Mombasa 
Extramural Centre. The centre occupies a suite of rooms on a single level of the 
                                                 
 
50
 As one interview respondent told me, for the institution concerned, a Nairobi-based university with 
a suite of offices rented in Mombasa for external program offerings, the admission criteria are, “A “C”. 
It is C-minus for a student who wants to do a certificate. Then a diploma is a C. A degree is a C+. But 
a student who comes in with a C and does a diploma then can qualify to do a degree after they have 
done the one-year diploma.” (September 11, 2007) 
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Jubilee Building in Mombasa51. As one person with whom I spoke during my 
research said in describing the offerings at the Extramural Centre, 
Those people who were [enrolled in the program are] already teachers. They 
were teachers who did not already have a degree. Actually, this center was 
opened more or less in the early 1970s here. And the idea behind this center 
was basically to cater for adult education, the adult learners, and the outreach 
program in Bachelor of Education . . . Basically that was the essence of 
starting the center here. To cater for the adult learners, to try and give them 
some form of certificate or qualification. And until from that particular time until 
2000, 1999-2000 is when now we started off delivering diploma courses 
which are more or less market driven. (KJ, September 11, 2007) 
 
This respondent went on to say that 
Every college that comes down [to Mombasa] always comes to start off with a 
business-related course. Kenyatta University – the same thing. Methodist 
University – the same thing. Bandari College came in – the same thing. (KJ, 
September 11, 2007) 
 
When asked to explain the reasons why commerce and business studies 
opportunities prevailed, and to offer an example about how this might play into the 
opening of full university at the coast, the respondent said that, 
Very few universities actually come up and offer science-related courses . . .  
It has to do with the cost of launching and . . . sustaining a science-based 
course. When . . . the first group of professors from the university were 
looking for collaboration . . .  we went to Kilifi Institute and Mombasa 
Polytechnic. We were out there. We found that the cost of running a science-
based program was very high. It was too high. (KJ, September 11, 2007) 
 
And so, coast-based open learning and satellite campus students are 
confined to those subjects the existing public universities see their way clear to 
offering. Figure 1 below shows the extensive network of sites at which the existing 
public universities offer programs. I have bolded those sites that are located in Coast 
                                                 
51
 Other tenants of this building include: The British Council library; DALC, a multi-site 
tertiary/professional institute catering to students who are in mid-career, or who had exam results 
weak enough to leave them under-qualified to gain direct access to the Extramural Centre‟s 
programs; and numerous commercial and/or professional businesses. 
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Province. While there is limited opportunity to pursue full degree programs at a 
couple of these “satellite” campuses, concern is nevertheless raised among those 
with whom I spoke due to the limited range of subject areas on offer. 
Regional University Centres Programmes Offered 
JKUAT has 18 centres: JKUAT-MMS Juja; Loreto 
Msongari (Nairobi); Kenya School of Professional 
Studies (Nairobi); Diamond Systems (Nairobi); 
Gitwe Technical College (Murang‟a); Nyandarua 
Adventist Technical College (Kisii); Lamu 
Polytechnic (Lamu); Kenya College of 
Accountancy (Nairobi & Kisumu); Strathmore 
College of Accountancy (Nairobi); Jaffrey 
Institute of Professional Studies (Mombasa); 
Bandari College (Mombasa); Kenya Air Force 
Technical College (Nairobi); Kenya College of 
Communications Technology (Nairobi); Holy 
Rosary and Tala (Machakos); Regional Centre for 
Mapping of Resources for Development (Nairobi); 
Institute of Advanced Technology – Symphony 
Ltd. (Nairobi) 
B.Sc. in Information Technology; 
Diploma in Information Technology; 
Certificate in Information Technology; 
Bridging course in Mathematics; 
Bachelor in Commerce; Bachelor of 
Business Management; B.Sc. in 
Computer Technology; M.Sc. in 
Entrepreneurship; B.Sc. in Electrical & 
Electronic  Engineering; B.Sc. in 
Telecommunications Engineering 
Kenyatta University Regional Centres: St. Ann‟s 
Junior Academy (Nairobi); Nakuru High (Nakuru); 
Kakamega High (Kakamega); Kimathi Institute 
(Nyeri); Todor Day Secondary School 
(Mombasa); Kangaru High School (Embu); 
Kisumu Day Secondary School (Kisumu) 
Certificate Diploma and Bachelor‟s 
degree courses in: computing; 
laboratory techniques, forest 
management, disaster management, 
participatory project planning, health 
and environment, foods and nutrition, 
HIV and family education, early 
childhood education, public relations, 
tourism, commerce, human resource 
development, marketing, ICT. 
 
Postgraduate Diploma and Master‟s 
and Ph.D. programmes in: education, 
journalism, distance education in 
school management 
University of Nairobi has 7 regional centres: 
Bandari College (Mombasa), Mombasa 
Extramural Centre (Mombasa), Nairobi, Nakuru, 
Nyeri, Kisumu, Kakamega, Embu 
B.Ed. Arts; B.Ed. Sciences; M.Ed. 
Moi University has 3 centres: Town Campus 
(Eldoret); Kenya Ports Authority Depot (Eldoret); 
Kenya Ports Authority Depot  (Mombasa) 
B.Ed. Arts; B.Ed.; B. Comm. Science; 
M.Ed.; M.B.A.; Bachelor of Business 
Mgmt; M.B.A. in ICT; B.S. Medicine 
Egerton University has one centre in Nakuru B.Comm.; Business Mgmt; Information 
Technology; B.Ed. Arts; B.Ed. Science 
Maseno University has one centre in Kisumu B.Comm. and Business Management 
Figure 1: Regional centers operated by Kenya‟s public universities: adapted from Mwiria, Ng‟ethe, et 
al (2007; pp. 31-32) 
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So, while the opportunity to pursue a university education is available to 
Mombasa (and coast) residents, the offerings are particular to fields of study that 
characteristically have a low financial overhead. I explore this point more fully in a 
later chapter on reactive discourses of strategizing given the absence of an 
independent comprehensive public university at the coast. However, I believe the 
comments included here begin to point to the ways in which a partial presence of 
university programming is seen by some at the coast as evidence of how they 
marginalized, and as a reason to pursue other options elsewhere. As some of the 
people with whom I spoke asked, where are the other engineering options open to 
students from the coast who did not have the exam results necessary to gain 
entrance to one of the existing public universities? Where are the medical training 
options? Where - by way of one often cited example - are the marine sciences 
programs? If all the university efforts at the coast seemingly fall into these easily 
offered, low overhead cost types of programs, how else should what the government 
provides to the people of the coast be viewed, except as evidence of 
marginalization? 
I posed the question to a number of the people I interviewed as to whether 
the external programs of the University of Nairobi that are on offer at Bandari 
College52 in Mombasa served any kind of modeling purpose, or heightened any 
perceptions of the value of university education. More or less across the board, 
people said that the programs offered at Bandari College are of real value. However, 
                                                 
52 Primarily business and commerce related programs. As one respondent said the University of 
Nairobi, “offer[s] some things at Bandari College. Masters and B.Comm. Bachelor of Commerce . . . 
You know they offer it as evening classes.” (SS, August 31, 2007) 
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the College‟s somewhat isolated location near the port – outside the bounds of 
Mombasa‟s main commercial and residential areas - and the fact that the University 
of Nairobi‟s presence there is not advertised with much, if any, fanfare, meant that 
comparatively few people were even aware of the university offerings there. And as 
was explained to me, the faculty who teach the University of Nairobi courses at 
Bandari do not, generally, stay in Mombasa and live there. Instead, 
There is an arrangement here where a lecturer goes for a week, two weeks, 
teaches then comes back. Then another one goes. They have even rented a 
house for the people from B.Comm. They have a good arrangement. (SS, 
August 31, 2007) 
 
In other words, the university-level teaching being done at Bandari College is 
being undertaken by people not living at the coast. Yes, the students are able to 
remain in Mombasa, free of the cost burden of travelling and living in Nairobi or 
elsewhere to pursue their higher educations. But if the lecturers are flying in, staying 
for a couple of weeks and flying out, the full benefits of having university offerings 
available will not accrue to the broader community. It is not simply that a full public 
university is absent, but that the faculty at this satellite campus is also, usually, 
absent. 
For some of the people with whom I spoke, the effort undertaken by Kenyatta 
University to establish a branch campus in central Mombasa was a significant step 
toward providing the kind of campus-based environment in which such role modeling 
and perceptions of higher education could be tested. I spoke with a number of 
people specifically about this, learning some of the history of the Kenyatta University 
effort, which culminated in the unofficial opening – first classes starting in May 2007 
- of the campus on Nkrumah Road in the heart of Mombasa. 
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Kenyatta University had engaged in long discussions among its 
administrators and faculty, identified a suitable site to purchase,53 and spent months 
negotiating. Interestingly, I was told by several people connected with the University 
of Nairobi that there had been initially interest there in the same idea on the same 
plot of land. The stories told by these people then diverged on the matter of how 
serious the University of Nairobi had ever been in this effort. As it was explained to 
me by people associated with Kenyatta University, the decision to open a campus 
was an outcome of their examination of the success (and future success path) of 
their open learning efforts at the coast. I was told, 
[The] government [was] being asked to establish a [public, independent] 
university, and it had not done so. Here we are saying we can increase our 
open learning. So, using our open learning arm, and in an attempt to increase 
accessibility, we said let us buy it. 
 
For an institution like Kenyatta University to purchase, the government must 
give approval. So, we wrote to the government. The government said we 
have no money. We approve in principle, that you can purchase, but we have 
no money. 
Now, we thought, how do we get it? So, we said, we could easily get a 
commercial loan from the banks, purchase the facility, and the facility now 
can be able to pay [for] itself. 
 
So we wrote a proposal about the purchase of this place. It went through the 
Council. It went through the government, and got approval. And we were 
given a commercial loan from a commercial bank. We purchased the facility 
using the loan – as a university, not as a government. With the plan that once 
we increased the numbers, they will be able to pay for that loan – the 
students‟ fees and so on, would be able to pay. And that is exactly what we 
are doing. (FV, August 8, 2007)  
 
This description opens up an issue with satellite campuses, open learning 
and parallel programs that was expressed by a few of the interview respondents: 
                                                 
53
 The site of Kenyatta University‟s Mombasa campus is the former Aga Khan Academy site. The Aga 
Khan Academy now sits on a newly built campus approximately two miles to the south, not far from 
the ferry to Likoni and the South Coast region. 
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quality of the education available at such sites and in such programs. By way of 
closing a small circle, here, I want to offer a quote from “SS,” the person whom I 
quote above in regard to University of Nairobi programs at Bandari College and how 
they engage their lecturers. I offer this further quote as a means to show a kind of 
competition that exists between the various universities looking to expand to the 
coast. SS says, 
We need to find out who will be the type of people teaching at those 
campuses [like the brand new Kenyatta University campus in Mombasa]. 
Because, will they get qualified people who are at the centers here in 
Kenyatta, or are they going to employ some part-time people who are in other 
lines, or teaching in some secretarial or business colleges? You know there 
are so many secretarial and business colleges in town in Mombasa. So, who 
will be the lecturers? I will really like to know. Will they be bringing the 
professors from Kenyatta University? Or will they be taking anyone to go and 
teach for them? Because that will be the issue. (August 31, 2007) 
 
Most of the people with whom I spoke expressed appreciation for the 
programs offered at the coast by the existing public universities. But the existence of 
such programs are not seen in an unbridled positive light, whether they be the 
commerce studies programs at Kenyatta University‟s new campus in downtown 
Mombasa, or the programs offered in the suite of rooms of the Extramural Centre or 
Bandari College. As I have noted previously, for many people these programs serve 
as prima facie evidence of the marginalization of the coast via incomplete 
investment. It also serves as the ground upon which people begin discussing how 
they might possibly achieve their desires for higher education. And, finally, it is the 
filter through which efforts to create an independent, full public university at the coast 
are viewed. 
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Emergent Private University Forms 
As enrollments in Kenya‟s public universities increased, and the public 
system‟s response to this lagged, a market for private university education in Kenya 
developed. I do not wish to go into great detail on the wholesale development of this 
market, but rather to focus on the minimal degree to which this market penetrated 
Mombasa and the coast. As such, I offer only a synopsis of the private university 
market in Kenya, and then focus upon the more specific market in Mombasa. 
Similarly, while recognizing that access to higher education (public and private) is an 
issue about which much has been written,54 it is not a specific focus of my work 
here. I am offering only a brief description of the governmental mechanisms in place 
that coordinate higher education efforts. 
In 1985, the Kenyan government established the Commission for Higher 
Education (CHE). The CHE was given the task of coordinating university education 
and rationalizing the provision of academic efforts across the multiple university 
campuses. However, as Murunga (2001) tells us, upon its establishment, the 
CHE quickly received applications to set up PUs [private universities]. 
Consequently, due to this rise in PUs and politicisation of planning and 
development of university education, CHE only concentrated on one of its 
statutory functions, that of developing accreditation instruments to regulate 
and permit the award of charters to PUs. Thus, in 1989, CHE established the 
rules for establishing PUs and immediately, three institutions were granted 
official recognition while 13 others were allowed to operate on interim basis. 
By 1999,CHE had 27 applications seeking to provide PU education. (12) 
 
                                                 
54
 See the work of the Program for Research on Private Higher Education (PROPHE) at SUNY 
Albany, as well as much of the work of Daniel Levy (PROPHE‟s Director). Similarly, the work of Philip 
Altbach and the Center for International Education at Boston College would be informative. In a more 
Kenya-focused sense, the work of the Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) would be 
useful, as would the individual works of Moses Oketch and Wycliffe Otieno. The Association of 
African Universities (AAU) and the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) 
each hold a focus on access and quality issues in higher education, as do the individual works of 
Akilagpa Sawyerr, Kingsley Banya and others. 
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Murunga goes on to point out that it would not be until some years later that the CHE 
would begin to focus on the other elements of its charge, especially those concerned 
with the public universities. 
The CHE remains the accrediting body for universities – public and private - 
in Kenya. It further sets admission requirements for students seeking entry into 
university, whether they are coming from Kenyan schools, or from outside the 
country. The CHE maintains a multi-tiered accreditation system, wherein institutions 
may be “fully chartered” (registered and accredited), “registered but unchartered” 
(awaiting approval by the Commission), or “unregistered” (but on having applied, 
able to operate on a Letter of Interim Approval). When each of these accreditation 
categories is considered, Kenya has, as of 2006, fourteen private institutions. Of 
these fourteen variably accredited institutions, thirteen are directly affiliated with 
Christian churches, many of them based in the United States55. 
However, despite the variably accredited private universities outnumbering 
the public universities by a wide margin, enrollments at private universities constitute 
                                                 
55
 Murunga (2001), Mutula (2002) and Oketch (2004) all describe (and categorize the registration type 
of) these private  institutions, with the latter two each providing a list of institution names and 
affiliations. Here, I offer Oketch‟s version: 
 
Registered and Fully Chartered institutions: University of Eastern Africa, Baraton (Seventh Day 
Adventist) – affiliated to Andrews University (Texas); Catholic University of Eastern Africa (owned by 
the Congregation for Catholic Education); Daystar University – affiliated with Messiah College 
(Pennsylvania) for undergraduate programs, and Wheaton College (Illinois) for graduate programs.; 
Scott Theological College; United States International University (affiliated with the Alliant University 
system, specifically its San Diego USIU campus).  
 
Registered but unchartered institutions: East African School of Theology; Kenya Highlands Bible 
College; Nairobi Evangelical Graduate School of Theology; Pan African Christian College; St. Paul‟s 
United Theological College. 
 
Finally, unregistered institutions using a  Letter of Authority and awaiting approval: African Nazarene 
University; Kenya Methodist University; Aga Khan University; Kabarak University (Africa Inland 
Church; former president Moi serves as Chairman of the Board). 
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only 16% of all university-level students. By 2000, public universities enrolled 41,000 
students, while private institutions of varying accreditations enrolled fewer than 
7,000 students (Oketch, 2004). This is the case even as Kenya‟s secondary schools 
graduate, on average, four times as many students whose school-leaving exam 
results qualify them to enter university as are enrolled at these public universities56. 
As Murunga (2001) points out, 
In the year 2000, these PUs [private universities] enrolled 6,920 students. 
They accounted for 14% of the total students (48,745) enrolled in universities. 
However, the difference that these universities make to the overall demand 
for PUs is minimal for they enroll only about 5% of those who qualify for 
university education while public universities take about 30% . Thus, in spite 
of their contribution, the number of students who qualify for university 
education but have no access remains significantly large. (13) 
 
For all that the number of private universities in Kenya is expanding relatively 
rapidly, this is not the case at the coast. In fact, it was only in January, 2007 that 
Methodist University opened a branch in Mombasa. At the time of my last research 
trip to Kenya, from July-September 2007, Methodist University‟s branch in Mombasa 
had enrolled 150 students. This can be compared to nearly one thousand in Nairobi, 
and about 800 at the university‟s home campus in Meru, established in 1997. 
The university offers Bachelors degree programs in Education and Business 
Administration, a diploma program in Business Administration, and a series of 
bridging courses at its Mombasa „campus‟ - a suite of rooms and a set of larger 
lecture halls on two floors of Ambalal House in downtown Mombasa. The bridging 
program, which enrolls one-third or so of the current student body, is for students 
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 Oketch (2004) – again – notes that, “In 2002, for example, only 10,966 of the 42,158 high school 
graduates who qualified for university education [26%] were admitted to the state universities.” (129) 
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whose high school leaving exams results were not high enough to qualify for direct 
admission to a degree program. 
While the university is said to have some ideas about purchasing land and 
raising its profile in Mombasa, that is not expected to occur very soon. There is a 
hope that enrollments will be maintained and that a stable presence established in 
Mombasa from which growth can be managed. Given the degree to which Methodist 
has expanded beyond Meru in the ten years of its existence it seems likely that 
further expansion in Mombasa will actually occur.  
Beyond Methodist University, there are currently no private universities in 
Mombasa or elsewhere at the coast of which any of the individuals with whom I 
spoke was aware. In Chapter Six I revisit this issue, and speak of some of the other 
private university initiatives at the coast that have not yet been realized (and which 
may never). 
The New University Colleges at the Coast 
As noted earlier, this work has engaged me for more than fifteen years. A 
great deal of change – social, political, economic within Kenya; academic and 
professional for myself - has taken place in this time, change that has impacted my 
ideas and feelings about the subject. C. Wright Mills (1959) writes of social 
scientists‟ understanding and account-taking of the “accidents” occurring in the 
research setting, saying that  
There is no necessity for working social scientists to allow the political 
meaning of their work to be shaped by the „accidents‟ of its setting, or its use 
to be determined by the purposes of other men. It is quite within their powers 
to discuss its meanings and decide upon its uses as matters of their own 
policy. (177) 
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I take the Kenyan presidential elections of December 2007, and the campaign 
that preceded the election, as a fine example of how an accident of timing – my 
doing final fieldwork in Kenya in mid-2007 – has impacted this study. Writing more 
than a decade prior, but in the wake of Kenya‟s multi-party elections of late 1992, 
Haugerud (1995) tells us that  
Ruse, disguise, feint, and counter-feint are so much a part of Kenyan political 
life as to suggest that nothing should be taken at face value. (p. 52) 
 
The themes expressed by those whom I interviewed for this project – the 
discourses they engaged - especially as regards feelings of economic and political 
marginalization, and political ineffectiveness, not to say powerlessness - appeared to 
play out throughout much of Kenya during the presidential campaign. The multiple 
ways in which each of the two primary candidates for President focused their 
campaigns, the overt nature of the stacking of the Electoral Commissions to benefit 
the incumbent, the lengthy vote-counting troubles, and the months of violence before 
a power-sharing agreement was reached, all pointed to a picture of Kenya as a 
disparate agglomeration of variously empowered communities. 
Of a piece with this presidential political campaigning, and a fully embedded 
aspect of my work here, was the explosion in university education opportunities 
created by Presidential fiat in August 2007, in the very midst of the election 
campaign. The long-time absence of an independent full public university at the 
coast was changing. I believe the politics of presidential elections played a 
significant role in this. 
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I will start with the January visit of President Mwai Kibaki to the coast in 
January 2007. As one function of the President‟s visit to the coast, he traditionally 
meets with VIP members of various local communities. As Kithi (2007) reported in 
the Daily Nation newspaper, 
Mijikenda elders yesterday placed a list of demands before President Mwai 
Kibaki and asked him to urgently act on them. In a memorandum on the 
development of Coast Province, the leaders asked for the establishment of a 
public university in the region and the setting up of an Utalii College campus 
in Mombasa. 
 
Kithi goes on to note that  
. . . a paper on the university would be presented to the Cabinet for 
discussion. The document proposes that Mombasa Polytechnic be turned into 
a university. 
 
Foreshadowing what many people with whom I would eventually speak 
thought of this, President Kibaki is then quoted as warning that  
You have seen the development projects that the Government has 
implemented in your areas. The important thing is not politicking all the time 
but the development implemented in the last four years. 
 
He also warned that confrontational politics had no place in Kenya. 
That is why we have concentrated on development instead of politics of 
empty words because what is important to us as leaders is to serve 
wananchi57by implementing projects that will benefit them. (52) 
 
That Kibaki placed a time frame of four years around what “the important 
thing is” only served to define how politicized the decisions being made were, again 
at least for many of the people with whom I would speak. I was more inclined to 
accept Haugerud‟s sense of politics to be a closer expression of the Kenyan 
experience than were Kibaki‟s comments. Kibaki seemed to be doing little more than 
                                                 
 
57
 Translates as “citizens”. 
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playing politics, setting his eventual Presidential campaign on more solid footing in 
Coast Province by offering government services and investment eleven months in 
advance of the election, in lieu of having done so at any previous time. 
Kibaki was engaging in the well-established (in the Kenyan context) discourse 
around the provision of a social good (university education) in an overtly politicized 
way. He engaged socially acknowledged leaders in the most populous coastal 
community (Mijikenda) in a shadow play wherein they voiced a longstanding need 
and he beneficently arranged to meet that need. That this happened to coincide with 
the start of his reelection campaign - and that Coast Province was understood to be 
one of the five (out of eight) Kenyan provinces where he needed to get at least 25% 
of the vote in order to meet a necessary threshold to retaining the presidency58 - is 
incidental, or so the pretense would have it be. 
It was in and around discourses such as this that I have attempted to focus 
my discussion of absence – both longstanding and, finally, partially at least, met. 
Gee (1992) speaks to the ways in which such discourses of the politics and 
practices of power are played – and played to – everywhere. 
If we define “politics” as relationships and interactions among people where 
power and status are at stake, then practices within and across Discourses 
are always and everywhere political. If we define “ideology” as beliefs about 
the appropriate distribution of social goods, such as power, prestige, status, 
distinction, or wealth, then Discourses are always and everywhere 
ideological. Each Discourse necessitates that members, at least while they 
are playing roles within the Discourse, act as if they hold particular beliefs and 
values about what counts as the “right sort” of person and the “right” way to 
be in the world, and thus too, what counts as the “wrong” sort and the “wrong” 
                                                 
58
 In Kenyan presidential elections, the winning candidate has not only to receive the highest vote 
total, but to have a particular spread of the vote across provincial lines. The winning candidate must 
receive at least 25% of the overall provincial vote in five of eight of Kenya‟s provinces. Kibaki was 
seen to be strong enough in Central Province, Nairobi Province, and Eastern Province. He was seen 
to be battling to reach the 25% threshold in Rift Valley Province and Coast Province. 
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way.  And “right” here means “worthy of respect and status,” both social 
goods. (141. Emphasis added) 
 
In the context offered above, Mijikenda elders are “worthy of respect,” as is 
President Kibaki himself. Each side has acted in the “right way.” 
By the end of March 2007, the Government of Kenya announced that it had 
received a gift from Saudi Arabia of 750 million Kenya shillings (approximately $11 
million at then-current rates of exchange) to construct a new public university at the 
coast (and to improve the road system in Coast and Northeast Provinces). Following 
the announcement of the gift from Saudi Arabia, on April 16, 2007, the Government 
of Kenya established a committee of local educators and politicians at the coast. As 
Namlola (2007) writes, in the Daily Nation newspaper, 
The task force comprising scholars from the region, has been given a 
fortnight to come up with proposals on location of the university, infrastructure 
and curriculum.  
 
In other words, the Government publicly gave the team two weeks to figure out how 
to locate, structure, pay for, and staff a university. Per Muiruri and Bulemi (2007), it 
would be only seventeen days from the establishment of this task force until the 
government announced that it would soon be elevating eight institutions to university 
college status, including the Mombasa Polytechnic and the Kilifi Agricultural Training 
Institute (KATI). I would end up speaking with several people involved in this task 
force‟s work. None had found the timeframe particularly do-able. The perception was 
that much had been pre-arranged, and their work was meant simply to rubber-stamp 
the process already completed by the government, to give the impression of coastal 
engagement in the decision-making process. In any case, by late August 2007, 
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Kibaki had kept his pledge to the Mijikenda elders, when the establishment of three 
university colleges in Coast Province was published in the Kenya Gazette. 
Kibaki‟s political supporters spoke of the hard work he had undertaken to 
improve things after the ruinous years of the Moi presidency (for the first ten years of 
which Kibaki had served as Vice President before breaking with Moi). Kibaki was 
said to be seeking five more years to complete his mandate. His challenger, Raila 
Odinga, on the other hand, energized his supporters by speaking of his plans to end 
the ways in which Kenya‟s less populous ethnic communities were repeatedly 
marginalized by government policy and practice. He sought votes by promising to 
bring change and aid to those less developed areas of Kenya (generally explained 
as anywhere outside of Nairobi, Kibaki‟s Kikuyu home territory, and former President 
Moi‟s Kalenjin home territory) that had long been neglected. Importantly, in terms of 
this dissertation‟s focus, Kibaki had also appointed Ali Mazrui, a longtime critic of the 
Moi government59, Chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and 
Technology. 
Odinga‟s campaign brought to the fore of political discussion a powerful 
sense of people and communities as marginalized. While his campaign was not a 
focus of my work, I would be remiss if I did not note how his campaign engaged the 
Kenyan public in ways that are markedly similar to how the people with whom I 
                                                 
59 Mazrui writes of the impact his political views had on his ability to work as a scholar in Kenya:  
 
During the Kenyatta years I could not be hired in Kenya, but I was free to give public lectures 
in the country from time to time. But, during most of the years of President Daniel arap Moi, 
even the public lectures dried up. Kenya‟s universities were increasingly reluctant to risk 
government disapproval by inviting me to lecture. From Kenyatta‟s death in 1978 until the 
year 2000 I had lectured on Kenya‟s campuses less than about five times in all. (2005, 16) 
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spoke understood the circumstance of the coast vis-à-vis marginalization, politics, 
development, education, and other issues. 
I mention this, and close this chapter by noting that while I have attempted to 
do much to specify what I was told about the longstanding absence of higher 
education opportunities at the coast, and the newly emergent presence of such 
opportunities, the themes expressed are part of a larger discourse that impacts 
people throughout Kenya.  
As Gee notes, when we engage issues such as this in a scholarly manner,  
All we can do is structure a story combining these elements in certain ways, 
assemble our documents to support it (if that is part of our historiographical 
practice), relate it to other “historical events” in sequence, and hope our story 
is at least accepted as a “historical” one, if not as the “right” one . . . If it is not 
accepted as a historical narrative, then we will have to change our way of 
telling such stories. Our stories and what‟s in our head don‟t take precedence, 
the social practice does (which is not to say we can‟t change the social 
practice). (77) 
 
In the following chapters, I will begin to more formally connect the discursive 
dots. I will attempt what Gee describes, an integration through historiographical 
practice, of events, memories and thoughts about these, that tell the story of why it 
took so long to bring public universities to the coast of Kenya. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION TWO 
 
Chapter Four: Grounded Theory, Dialectics of Change, and 
Discourse Analysis 
In undertaking this research, I sought to bring together multiple streams of 
information. I am interested in the history of education and schooling in Mombasa. I 
am similarly interested in education and schooling in colonial and post-colonial 
Kenya. I want to focus on the social and political differences and similarities between 
Mombasa (and the coast of Kenya) and the rest of Kenya vis-à-vis education and 
schooling. And, I want to do this within the framework of the question of why it has 
taken so long to bring a public university to Mombasa. 
As noted earlier, my engagement of the specific issues presented in this work 
began more than a dozen years before I undertook the doctoral coursework that has 
led me to this dissertation. My interest in these matters deepened in personal and 
professional environments and ways long before I undertook the more scholarly 
examination that is seen here. This renders important methodological and theoretical 
elements of this study quite complex, and somewhat difficult to contextualize in any 
single method and any single theoretical approach to the data. 
One result of this is that I take somewhat of a hindsight perspective on the 
ways in which my methodology and theoretical analysis developed. In this 
hindsighted light, I have utilized a variation of grounded theory in uncovering the 
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stories, over the years my work was in and about Kenya in the 1990s and after, that 
have gone into the analysis in this work. In the first decade or so of my interest in the 
ideas expressed in this work, I was not engaged as a scholar. I was not theorizing 
the meaning of what I was being told. I was gathering information, data. Glaser 
(1998) has it that,  
The first step in grounded theory is to enter the substantive field for research 
without knowing the problem. This requires suspending your knowledge, 
especially of the literature, and your experience. The researcher must take a 
„no preconceived interest‟ approach and not ask questions that might be on 
his mind. (p. 122) 
 
At the time I first began developing my interest in the questions I analyze in 
this work, I had only sufficient awareness of the circumstance of the absence of a 
university at the coast to ask the first question - why was the situation as it was. I 
had no knowledge of the literature on the matter, and my experience in Kenya was 
largely limited to upcountry. I had no theoretical stake in play. I knew of an absence, 
but was still a long way from knowing what the „problem‟ was. 
Thus, I believe this early, non-scholarly period of engagement constitutes the 
openness of mind to which Glaser refers. As I closed in on the decision to pursue 
doctoral studies, these issues formed the basis of my plan for a dissertation project. 
In a sense, then, to the extent that Duchscher and Morgan (2004) are correct when 
they note that grounded theory necessitates, a “symbiotic relationship between data 
acquisition and theorizing” (607), the long initial, non-scholarly period of data 
acquisition permitted a gradual, and yes symbiotic, connection between gathering 
the data and figuring out (theorizing) its meaning. 
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My initial experience of the data was something I saw as filling out a story. 
For many years, it seemed that this would be a story about absence and the ways 
people fought against, and worked around it. In order to understand this story in a 
formally constructed sense, it was necessary to identify a sample population with 
whom to engage in the telling of the story. 
As I described previously, my connection with Kenya included ongoing 
professional relationships with Kenyans working in higher education, the people with 
whom I have discussed this issue over the course of the past 17 years. All but a few 
of these individuals are professionals in the field of education, with most of these 
working in support of university and other higher education, whether as university 
faculty, university administrators, or as secondary school senior administrators. It is 
from this group that a snowballed, purposive sample of more than 30 interview 
respondents was developed. I developed an open-ended interview questionnaire, 
and undertook my first interviews during a short visit to Kenya in December 2005 – 
January 2006. Most of the interviews I eventually conducted were done during a 
second research trip, from July-September 2007. The interviews were conducted in 
a variety of environments – from the offices of those being interviewed, to a meeting 
room at the Swahili Resource Center in Mombasa, to the hotels at which I was 
staying in Mombasa, Lamu, and Nairobi, to public restaurants in two cases. 
The interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. In most instances, 
audiotaping was accompanied by note-taking, generally of key words and terms, as 
well as any themes that were being consistently raised. Coding was done from the 
initial interview onward, with prior interview coding in mind as each new interview 
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was coded. I began organizing the material around specific themes from early in the 
interview process, creating a spreadsheet file in which themes were separately 
identified and matched with interviews that held quotes/material pertinent to the 
theme. This is the memoing stage of grounded theory development. Figure 2 (Dick, 
2005) is a simple Gantt chart-like rendering of the constant comparative process I 
engaged. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Depiction of the time framing of data analysis in grounded theory 
As the interviews continued, a core category developed around which I began 
to arrange the coding. This core category I took to be „transformation,‟ and was one 
that could not have been arrived at without being present in Kenya and speaking 
with people there at the precise moment I was there. Much was occurring around the 
issue of university absence (and presence) at the coast in this time. The situation 
was changing and the interviews revealed this change. The data were being 
jumbled. 
By this, I mean that the other categories that I had been developing as 
possible core categories (marginalization, working together, working in disunity, 
constructing alternatives), were being subsumed into the broader idea of 
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change/transformation. Each of the other categories were, in a sense, pieces of the 
transformation. Due to the complex nature of some of the categories (especially 
marginalization), it took me some time to sort out the subsumed categories into a 
coherent frame. 
To help with this, and in keeping both with the core category of transformation 
and the idea that grounded theory helped tell a story, I adapted a dialectic 
framework. The structure of dialectic – thesis, antithesis, synthesis – can be 
understood as the telling of a story in three acts, with the transformative conclusion 
wrapping around to become a new beginning. But the complexity of the subsumed 
categories still troubled me. 
As a means to respond to this difficulty, I reverted back to another theoretical 
approach I had been considering. I saw Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a 
means with which to break out what I now constituted as subsumed categories (in 
CDA terms, discourses) within the core category of transformation. I engaged with a 
comment made by Gee (1992) about „access,‟ 
Only people who get access can do this and only people able and willing to 
live with the initial cognitive dissonance and conflicts. Such people are one of 
the leading edges of resistance and change. (111) 
 
„Access‟ was an appropriate term for my work on several levels. Regarding 
the interview group, it was a purposive sample – beginning with people I already 
could be in touch with, and expanding to people the initial interview respondents 
could suggest I contact. „Access‟ defined these people‟s connection to the 
institutional system at the center of the story – Kenya‟s public universities. And lack 
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of „access‟ was a succinct way to parse the sense of marginalization that was 
revealed in many of the interviews I conducted. 
In allowing that his discourse theory has “room for both individual creativity 
and for social resistance to domination and hegemony (111),” Gee‟s ideas also 
seemed to connect with my decision to adopt a dialectic approach to analyzing the 
data. Gee‟s work led me quickly to that of Fairclough (1992), a major proponent of 
CDA, who speaks to the place of dialectic when he states that his  
Position on discourse. . . is a dialectical one, which sees social subjects as 
shaped by discursive practices, yet also capable of reshaping and 
restructuring those practices. (45) 
 
As the chapters to come show, the dialectic between the discourses 
(grounded theory categories60) and the social and professional positions of the 
individuals with whom I spoke led to a renewed focus on what Wodak (2002) calls 
“societal conventions.” In the case of Mombasa and higher education in Kenya, this 
means the normalized, prima facie reasons most often given for policy decisions that 
long left the coast without full access to a comprehensive, at-hand range of higher 
education offerings (e.g. cost is too high; coast communities are not interested; etc.). 
The hows and the whys of the long-time absence of any independent public 
university in Mombasa or along the coast has led to engaged responses from those 
with whom I spoke, a desire to explore the absence and come out the other side of it 
changed. 
As Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) would have it, 
                                                 
60
 From this point onward, my use of „discourse‟ will incorporate the grounded theory conception of 
„category,‟ including references to both core category as well as what I have labeled the „subsumed 
categories.‟ 
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Discursive practice can be seen as an aspect of a hegemonic struggle that 
contributes to the reproduction and transformation of the order of discourse of 
which it is part (and consequently of the existing power relations). (76) 
  
Although I understood that both grounded theory and CDA see benefits in a 
focus on small samples, I came to experience a frequent feeling that any “next 
person” with whom I might speak might possibly explode the “plot” of a given 
discourse. I did not know whether the discourses would be disturbed, deepened, 
reconceptualized, or otherwise altered if I spoke with each next person. This feeling 
was in part, I believe, a realization that elements of my research had begun more 
than fifteen years earlier. It was already lengthy and complex. Yet maybe the next 
person would have something to add.  
In addressing this concern, I was struck by a point made by Fairclough (1992) 
One can interview those involved as participants in corpus samples, not only 
to elicit their interpretations of those samples, but also as an opportunity for 
the researcher to probe into issues which go beyond the sample as such . . . 
(227) 
 
“Going beyond the sample as such” reads to me as analogous to the 
foundational notion in Glaser‟s (1998) grounded theory that has it that the researcher 
should strive “to enter the substantive field for research without knowing the 
problem.” (122) Each had me thinking that I should continue seeking interview 
respondents as a means to deepen the story that was unfolding. 
From the perspective of CDA, in processing this material and constructing the 
analytical space in the upcoming chapters, I will be attempting to meet one 
description of what competent discourse analysis might look like, as expressed by 
Antaki, et al (2003) when they write that, 
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Compiling quotations into a profile can be part of a discourse analysis. For 
instance, an analyst might be seeking to investigate whether speakers, in 
framing their individual utterances, are using commonly shared discursive 
resources . . . some discourse analysts will consider it a matter of theoretical 
and methodological importance to show how particular utterances are 
themselves formed out of wider, socially shared 'repertoires', 'ideologies', 
'discourses' etc. The analyst might present a profile of quotes in order to show 
how different speakers might be drawing upon common repertoires etc.” 
 
This approach, I realize, is not without dangers. The duration of my 
engagement with these issues, and my feeling that I should try and speak with as 
many people as I could, has left me with a great deal of data to be distilled and 
utilized in - or to be left out of - this analysis. Given the amount of data I have 
gathered, a “compilation of quotes” approach, leaves me at risk of an error of 
analysis that Antaki, et al goes on to describe as “Under Analysis through Over 
Quotation.” They describe this as likely to happen, 
when the analyst is piecing together responses from different speakers . . . 
There can be analytic and theoretical reasons for presenting profiles based 
on piecing together such quotations. However, this profiling is not normally of 
itself discourse analysis, for again it does not of itself get down to the 
business of actually analysing in detail the discourse that is used. 
 
In order to mitigate the risk of over-indulging in the use of quotations from 
interviews, I will make frequent use of published historical materials and other texts. I 
take such materials to be part of the milieu within which the discourses are situated. 
Here I follow on Antaki, et al and their statement that such evidence can be useful 
to show the origins and development of various cultural patterns of talk. The 
particular analysis would aim to show how these wider patterns of talk are 
mobilized by the speaker in the particular context of the interview or 
conversation that is being studied. 
 
I am helped in this use of historical evidence to contextual discourses through 
use of a construct that Fairclough (1989) calls a “moment of crisis” and what he 
88 
 
refers to in a later work (1992) as “exceptional disfluencies . . . in the production of a 
text,” or “cruces.61” As Fairclough utilizes these terms, they represent instances 
when crisis 
make[s] visible aspects of practices which might normally be naturalized, and 
therefore difficult to notice; but they also show change in process, the actual 
ways in which people deal with the problematization of practices.” (230) 
 
As I focus upon each of the discourses, and where I raise „moment of crisis‟ 
examples in the narrative, I am invoking a transformational turn in the discourse. I 
explain the connection between the interviews in which the „moment of crisis‟ 
example is raised, and the impact that example has on present-day discussions 
about establishing a fuller range of public university opportunities at the coast. In 
adapting Fairclough‟s conception in this way, I point to the ways in which the 
disfluency, the crisis and conflict exhibited in the discourses, can end up working to 
access a space for change in society and social practice. 
In light of this, it is necessary that I point out that I will be using the term 
„dialectic‟ in two distinct senses in the upcoming chapters. First, within each chapter, 
I will use „dialectic‟ in the sense that Fairclough has described it, that is, as social 
subjects both shaping and being shaped by discursive practices. In using „dialectic‟ 
this way, I will be analyzing the way in which a small number of specific ideas are 
expressed in the interview texts I have included. This analysis will look at how the 
terms and ideas shift focus and/or are countered within the discourse that is the 
focus of each particular chapter. 
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 Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) use “crisis point” in describing similar, though less societal, more 
micro-level turning points in conversation. 
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For example, Chapter Five focuses on the ways in which „marginalization‟ is 
utilized in describing the longstanding absence and emergent presence of an 
independent public university at the coast. I begin the chapter by invoking and 
analyzing uses of the concept of marginalization from published materials and 
interviews I conducted. I then shift the focus to perspectives that were expressed to 
me that run counter to the initially described and analyzed invocations. Analysis of 
this shift is given in the dialectic sense that Fairclough is defining: the term is used 
by some; it is countered by other uses in ways that complexify and shift the initial 
use; this subsequent iteration is then brought through similar analysis through use of 
particular foci; etc. 
The second sense in which I am using the term „dialectic‟ has a longer arc, 
and a more societal focus, and is revealed in the segues that connect chapters. In 
this second use of „dialectic,‟ I am referencing the transformational stages that I see 
as having occurred as the absence that was the initial focus of my work has given 
way to an emergent presence. For example, in Chapters Five and Six, I see the 
discourse of marginalization as being opposed to a responsive discourse of 
alternatives in a thesis-antithesis manner wherein the development of a public 
university college presence at the coast can be seen as a synthesis. This synthesis, 
in turn, sparks realizations that work into a new discourse, which becomes the 
emergent thesis. This emergent thesis is constituted, in the discourses my work has 
revealed, as questions about the purpose of the new universities, who the new 
universities will serve, what the quality level of these will be, etc. 
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To avoid the possible confusion that this dual use of „dialectic‟ may engender, 
I will endeavor to keep clear the ways in which I mean to use the term. I will restrict 
my use of what I have described as the broader arc use of the term to the 
beginnings and endings of the chapters – these being, in my mind, the bridges upon 
which the transformational turn is being made. 
In the next chapter, Chapter Five, I examine the discourse and dialectic of 
“marginalization.” Marginalization is seen as a complex view of the interplay between 
the people of Kenya‟s Coast Province and “upcountry” Kenyans. The perception of 
both conflict and confluence between local and national politicians is explored. So, 
too, is a resonance still felt by many of the different pathways taken by individuals 
and communities to endure the colonial experience. This represents a far more 
nuanced picture of marginalization than I had initially expected to hear about. It is 
one that saw the longstanding absence of an independent public university as the 
fault and responsibility of numerous sectors of society, both national and local. It was 
the most frequently mentioned and most fully contextualized discourse – in 
historical, political, religious, and other terms. 
Marginalization, in the broader conception of „dialectic‟ that I am also using, is 
conceptualized as thesis, a foreground point in the transformation where absence 
has not yet begun the shift to emergent presence. In this conception, the discourse 
focused upon in Chapter Six is a responsive discourse of alternatives as adopted by 
the individuals and communities at the coast who seek opportunities in higher 
education, but must do so without the option of studying close to home. In what I am 
calling the more Fairclough-ian conception of dialectic, I will explore the ways in 
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which specific alternatives, whether local, national, or international, are constituted 
as subsumed categories or discourses. I will analyze the terms employed by the 
various individuals quoted, with focus given to the particular circumstances and 
subjectivities of these individuals. 
Returning to the broader arc conception of dialectic, I situate Chapter Seven, 
as synthesis to the thesis of marginalization and the antithesis of alternatives. It is 
within this discourse on the term “a university of our own” that absence begins the 
transformative turn toward emergent presence. From the perspective of the narrow 
filter of the particular discourse‟s dialectic, Chapter Seven is perhaps the most 
complicated in this work. The recent elevation of several coast-based institutions to 
university college status is thematically developed. I move through a set of 
Fairclough-ian crisis points, with the discourse illuminating the administrative and 
bureaucratic practices that characterize Kenya‟s current practices around identifying 
the need for and situating its public universities and subsidiary institutions. Here, 
importantly, I will use not only the interviews I conducted, but several written pieces 
that serve as examples of the complexity in this idea of a “university of [one‟s] own” 
anywhere in Kenya.  
Chapter Eight is an exploration of the broad arc dialectic‟s new thesis point 
which, as it is in its emergent state, is still in the process of being worked out. The 
emergent presence of public universities at the coast is not seen as an unbridled 
positive development. At the level of the Fairclough-ian dialectic, a new set of 
questions are being pondered as a means toward understanding how the newly 
elevated institutions will do their work, who will be beneficiaries of this work be, and 
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how well will this work be done. I explore these questions, though I do so at an 
analytical depth that is less fully developed than previous chapters, owing largely to 
the newly emergent nature of the issues at hand in the discourse. 
In the final chapter, Chapter Nine, I offer a brief summary of the conclusions 
made in each discourse-focused chapter. The bulk of this short chapter will then 
focus upon the broader arc dialectic of the transformation from absence to presence, 
and what this may mean for Mombasa and the coast of Kenya. By this end, perhaps 
all I will have done, as Gee (1992) would have it be, is begun to 
structure a story combining these elements in certain ways, assemble 
[my] documents to support it . . . relate it to other “historical events” in 
sequence, and hope [the resultant] story is at least accepted as a 
“historical” one, if not as the “right” one. . . . (77) 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter Five: THESIS –Discourses of Marginalization 
Introduction 
Before I get into the analysis of the particular discourse of marginalization, I 
want to remind readers that I am analyzing the material at two distinct dialectic 
levels. At a broader-arc, first-order level I take marginalization as used by the people 
with whom I spoke to occupy a foundational space in how they position themselves 
in Kenyan society. I identify this foundational space as holding the position of thesis 
in a dialectical analysis of the situation that is the focus of this work. I am not 
developing this level of perspective at the sub-chapter level, but rather as a string of 
chapters, wherein each following chapter constitutes the next point in the dialectic 
turn. By the conclusion of this work, I will offer commentary and analysis on this 
broader dialectic arc. 
Marginalization is a term that has been in use to describe coastal affairs in 
Kenya for some time. Whether in political, economic, social, cultural, religious or 
other realms, I have been able to identify large numbers of instantiations of the term. 
In its numerous uses, it revealed itself as a discourse, or as Fairclough (2001) 
describes it, “an inherently positioned representation of social life.” 
My experience with this material leads me to concur with this interpretation. 
The people of the coast with whom I spoke did not describe a perspective that is 
wholly marginal. The marginalization narrative is both hegemonically and counter-
hegemonically described. It is constantly contested. It is challenged in both mundane 
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and creative ways, and within itself, as a discourse, it is constantly changing. In 
some ways of being expressed it is a passive circumstance, „we are being 
marginalized.‟ In other expressions of it, it is active, „we are marginalizing ourselves.‟ 
In its discursive forms, marginalization is, in fact, a representation bound up with 
where people feel themselves to be. 
I want to begin the analysis of marginalization as discourse by quoting from a 
book entitled, Kenya Coast Handbook: Culture, Resources, Development in the East 
Africa Littoral. The book, published in 2000, is a compendium of short articles 
detailing the circumstances in which the people of the coast find themselves vis-à-
vis various social, economic, and cultural realms. The Preface to the Handbook was 
written by Ali Mazrui. The first paragraph of the Preface reads, 
Many have regarded globalization and marginalization as twin-processes in 
Africa on the eve of the new millennium. Nowhere is this better illustrated than 
at the coast of Kenya. The coast links Kenya with the wider global forces of 
economic interdependence, international tourism, and wider communications. 
But at the same time the coastal people have been relatively marginal to 
these forces, and sectors of the coastal population have sunk deeper into 
immiseration. (xxi) 
 
I choose to start with this selection because it offers access to several of the 
points of inquiry I will be following in this chapter. First, Mazrui is a titan it terms of 
scholarly positioning among people of the coast, and as such his work must be 
considered. Second, well after this Preface was written, Mazrui became Chancellor 
of Jomo Kenyatta University of Science and Technology (JKUAT), so he is intimately 
connected with higher education matters in Kenya. Third, it took Mazrui only five 
words before utilizing the term „marginalization,‟ an indication of how deeply rooted 
the conception of the marginalization of the Kenyan coast is. Fourth, and finally, 
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Mazrui lays out several of the levels at which the discourse of marginalization played 
out in the interviews I conducted.  
Beyond the first paragraph, Mazrui invokes „marginalization‟ numerous times. 
In fact, two full pages of the six-page Preface are given over to Mazrui‟s concept of a 
“matrix of marginalization.‟ The first heading in this matrix is „the paradox of retarded 
education.‟ The major point expressed in this heading is that 
The Government has been encouraging the establishment of universities in 
the hinterlands, but never in Kenya‟s second city, Mombasa. (xxiv) 
 
Here Mazrui plants the absence of a university at the coast squarely in the 
center of a discussion about marginalization of the people of his home area. And 
Mazrui‟s words are the filter through which the remainder of the book – all of its 26 
essays – is to be read. At root, Mazrui is saying is that the academic study of the 
issues facing the coast of Kenya is about marginalization because that is the 
condition in which its interactions with the Kenyan government leaves it. 
Even prior to additional aspects of Mazrui‟s preface, though, the Handbook 
has already engaged the discourse of marginalization. The use of the term littoral in 
the subtitle identifies the coast as being a space associated with edges (whether of 
the sea or the land), and not of the „center.‟ In certain connotations, „littoral‟ is either 
synonymous with or linked directly with „margin.‟ Viewed through such a filter, the 
people of the coast of Kenya are a people of the margin. 
Mazrui develops this connection himself in two of the headings within his 
“matrix of marginalization.” In the first, “the paradox of autocolonization,” Mazrui 
describes how the coast endured colonization from the sea (the littoral) for more 
than one thousand years, and has endured colonization from the interior since 1963, 
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when Kenya was granted independence. This is his use of “autocolonization,” 
wherein Kenya‟s government, “fellow Africans,” have colonized the coast. 
In his second connection to the idea of the littoral, Mazrui writes of “the 
paradox of ex-sularity,” wherein he extends the connection between the coast and 
being an outward-looking people. Because of its long history of mercantile and other 
interaction with outsiders, the coast is “the least insular region of Kenya historically.” 
Mazrui takes this lack of insularity and turns it toward “ex-sularity,” his term for a 
determination by the people at the coast to avoid being swallowed up in hinterland 
politics. This pursuit of “internal separatism” is a pathway to becoming and seeing 
oneself as marginalized. 
During the fifteen year rule (1963-1978) of Kenya‟s first Prime Minister and 
President, Jomo Kenyatta, the country‟s political leadership (which included only two 
Cabinet members with connections to the coast62) elaborated a broader discourse of 
the building of a new country, focused on drawing people into the capital city of 
Nairobi for all manner of societal effort. In this development paradigm, the political 
and social practices of building the country mandated that attention focus on building 
Nairobi. This had the ancillary effect of drawing Kenya‟s multi-ethnic population 
towards Nairobi, especially that portion of the population either deemed to be helpful 
to this paradigm of national development, or individuals who felt their chief 
opportunities were to be found in Nairobi. The city had been created in the early 20th 
century as Britain‟s colonial capital, and was thus already home to much of the 
administrative and bureaucratic structure for governance. As such, perhaps it was 
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an easy acquiescence to maintain these structures in the post-colonial period, and to 
build upon them in place. 
This decision (or acquiescence) had the particular effect of localizing the 
eventual discourse of national development. It created the “story” of national 
development. Gee (1992) writes of history as 
An open and generative system. . . New versions of historical episodes arise, 
versions which reflect later happenings, and not just the historical events 
themselves. The historiographical practices of a group determine whether 
these new versions “fit” within the practice (or whether the practice will be 
changed to accommodate them). If they don‟t fit, and the practice doesn‟t 
change to accommodate them, then they aren‟t history, aren‟t part of 
historical memory. (75) 
 
The focus upon building up Nairobi – in a time of limited resources – 
necessarily meant leaving other areas less focused upon, and less privileged, as 
time wore on. Even as those people whose territory included Nairobi and its environs 
benefited from the public services and investments made in the name of building the 
nation63, many people from other parts of the country - especially those areas in 
which people felt a profound sense of their own history, a history they felt no 
necessary need to give up so as to “fit” into the shared history of Kenya – were left 
having to react to the new discourse of the new country. For many such people, this 
left them outsiders in the discourse of “Kenyan” history. 
This notion that Nairobi came first was raised by many of the individuals with 
whom I spoke. One interviewee, HR, told me of the impact of the early 1960s turn 
toward independence, and the inclusion of the nominally separate “ten mile coastal 
strip” into Kenya. This turn was described as a shift from the long prevailing view 
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held by most coastal people (outward to the Indian Ocean, to Zanzibar and Arabia, 
where cultural connections lay; to a mercantile past64). This shift required the people 
of the coast to look inland, toward Nairobi, something they‟d done little of prior to 
independence. As HR conveyed it to me, and as others more generally supported, 
this shift is something the people of the coast have yet to wholly embrace. More 
emphatically, this is a shift that the people of the coast simply haven‟t done well – 
politically or economically. As a second interviewee, IN, stated, 
This was an area that . . . enjoyed some relative privilege within the systems 
of government before independence. After that, they have had to compete 
nationally, and found themselves literally usurped by the successive regimes. 
(July 29, 2007) 
 
IN‟s perspective on privilege giving way to usurpation is one explicit 
expression of Mazrui‟s theme of autocolonization. The local metrics of status, 
achievement, etc. were toppled when the move to independence was made. The 
dynamics of power and control had shifted. Britain had held the coast at a colonial 
remove relative to the tight control exhibited over hinterland peoples living in the 
Central Highlands (near Nairobi). For some of the residents of the Center Highlands, 
along with other people from even further inland, the coast became a place of 
opportunity – at least once they were free to move around the independent country. 
And so the people of the coast began experiencing a competition for political, 
economic, and social resources for which they had not prepared. 
Depicting Marginalization as Absence 
Why did the government - independent government - not build a university at 
the coast? . . . There are all kinds of explanations, most of which have one 
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thing in common – they felt that the central government was biased against 
the coast. (August 30, 2007) 
 
This quote succinctly connects the general theme of government 
marginalization of the coast with the particular issue of the absence of a public 
university there, through the more than four decades since independence. 
Government policy decision-making is brought into question. The statement of bias 
points to the distance BA feels as someone raised at the coast, but who does not 
recognize an open, positive connection to those in power. BA speaks of a decision, 
building a university at the coast, that could have been made long ago, but wasn‟t. 
His use of the term “independent government” is a marker that situates his comment 
in history. He is aware that the 40+ years of “independent government” is marked by 
not just the absence of a public university at the coast, but the absence of a 
government interested in providing that public with a university. 
In the process of conducting this research and undertaking the writing of this 
dissertation, I have struggled to find a succinct means to „show‟ the absence of a 
university at the coast. I have searched for a means to visually depict the way in 
which “absence” plays a role in how universities are seen in coastal Kenya. In the 
end, the point of entry into the complexity of this issue that I found most helpful is a 
map (Figure 2, below). This map is taken and adapted from page 17 of Mwiria and 
Ng‟ethe‟s (2007) Public and Private Universities in Kenya.65 
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The map identifies the provinces of Kenya. It makes abundantly clear the 
geographic skew that characterizes the distribution of public (and private)  
Figure 3: Distribution of public and private universities in Kenya, as of 2003 
  
—————  Provincial boundaries    - - - - - - - - - International boundaries  
Public universities: (1) Egerton University; (2) Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology; (3) Kenyatta 
University; (4) Moi University; (5) Maseno University; (6) University of Nairobi; Private universities (7) University of Eastern 
Africa; (8) Catholic University of Eastern Africa; (9) Daystar University; (10) United States International University; (11) St. 
Paul’s Theological Seminary; (12) Pan African Christian College; (13) Kenya Highlands Bible College; (14) Nairobi 
Evangelical Graduate School of Theology; (15) Scott Theological College; (16) East African School of Theology; (17) Nairobi 
International School of Theology; (18) Africa Nazarene University; (19) Kenya Methodist University; (20) Kabarak University; 
(21) Aga Khan University; (22) Kiriri Women’s University of Science and Technology; (23) Strathmore University 
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universities in Kenya. Taken from the perspective of people at the coast, the map  
supports the notion that seemingly “everyone else” in Kenya is nearer to one of the 
public universities while the coast suffers at a distance without one. The map depicts 
the distribution of these universities as of 2003. By late 2006, the six public 
universities identified on the map would be joined by Masinde Muliro University 
(MMU - formerly Western College) in Kakamega, Western Province. MMU is even 
further from the coast than any of the previously existing public universities. Finally, 
more pointedly, and as a means of cracking the visual representation of this 
discourse, the map shows, in stark terms, the heavy concentration of public and 
private universities in Nairobi Province. This concentration represents the results of 
a paradigm of national development that focused on the capital city, a geographic 
center point within the nation-state. 
I believe that the map may well come to be the visual representation of the 
discourse about absence and marginalization. It speaks to absence in a kind of mute 
relief of blank space. As Ninnes and Burnett (2003) explain it, the critical analysis of 
discourse(s) goes not solely or simply to what people say, but as much to 
What is not said, and what cannot be said; [as well as to] the particular social 
conditions under which discourses arise; and their effects. (282) 
 
The map speaks to what cannot be said, because there is nothing there. The map 
provides anyone who suspects bias with a powerful image. 
Generalized Discourses of Marginalization 
The quote discussed above by interview respondent, BA, incorporates a 
sense of the history of this perception. There are a number of written histories on the 
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coast of Kenya that offer additional insights and explanations as to how and why the 
political economies of Nairobi and Mombasa have remained disjointed such that 
discourses of marginalization remain central elements in the perceptions of many 
coast residents. 
Interview respondents shared with me their memories and impressions of 
various moments and elements of coastal and Kenyan history. I return to BA for the 
first quote, in which he makes reference to the colonial arrangement vis-à-vis the 
coast. 
When the British came, they looked at the coast as being a different part from 
Kenya, a Protectorate. They initiated a settlement, settler economy, with the 
railway all the way to Uganda. So, the new economy under the colonial 
regime was based inland, not at the coast. The coast was only convenient in 
terms of the port, not in terms of anything else. So, the colonial state itself 
was not so much interested in the coast, except for the port of Mombasa. 
(August 30, 2007) 
 
BA is describing the importance the British placed on development the port at 
Mombasa. He does so in a way that points to how Mombasa itself was a secondary 
concern. A second respondent, BZ, describes the history of this use of coast-based 
resources – human resources in this case – this way, 
The British used the people of the coast . . .  to run the local administration, 
the colonial administration.  And yet . . . they never shifted any resources, 
government resources, back to this area. (August 7, 2007) 
 
The natural geography of the island of Mvita, on which Mombasa is located, 
was of interest to the British. There is a natural, deep harbor there. The train was 
used to bring supplies up from the coast to support the further building of the 
railroad. This interaction would be what led to the creation of a supply depot at a 
watering hole used by Maasai herdsmen. This supply depot is what would grow to 
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become Nairobi. Mombasa, a city that can claim a written history going back a 
thousand years or more, was being used to support a place that was being creating 
out of nothing.  
This comparison in history between Mombasa and Nairobi is stark on its face. 
But perhaps more powerful, and certainly more directly connected with the issue of 
public university development in Kenya, it is deeply reminiscent of the way Moi 
University was, as Oketch (2004) describes it, created as a “. . . a university in the 
middle of nowhere.” It stands as both an evocative and provocative analogue, a 
bedrock connection in the marginalization discourse that weds history to the 
longtime absence of a university at the coast. That the coast would eventually see 
several existing institutions get elevated to university college status in August 2007 
will not be enough, for some, to dismiss this analogue. 
At this point, I want to develop additional historical context surrounding the 
impact of the British colonial presence on economic life at the coast. In his study of 
the influence of Swahili educator and intellectual, Sheikh al-Amin bin Ali Mazrui, 
Pouwels (1973) describes the impact on coastal life that was made by the East 
African railway construction project. He writes that, 
In Kenya, the most profound changes involved the shifting emphases given to 
upcountry development under Governor Sir Charles Eliot and his successors . 
. . Eventually, for example, Nairobi replaced Mombasa as the administrative 
capital of the protectorate, thus taking the focus of development away from 
Mombasa and the coast. The Uganda railway opened the interior and made it 
more accessible from the coast. The last is important for two reasons: it made 
Mombasa the principal port of Kenya and it brought thousands of upcountry 
peoples to the coast to work as wage-laborers . . . In these circumstances, 
townsmen soon found themselves being left behind by developments. Above 
all, they were losing in the competition for influential jobs in the new colonial 
order. Consequently, Sheikh al-Amin was keenly aware that townsmen were 
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slowly losing control over their town‟s future political, social, and cultural 
direction. (pp. 338-339) 
 
This text captures the feeling captured by interview respondent, BA, above, in 
his description of the way in which the coast was seen as convenient only because 
of the harbor, and the access to the greater world and international markets that this 
provided. The marginalization of employable people from the coast in favor of people 
from upcountry remains an issue to this day. It was, for example, difficult not to note 
references made to places along the coast that have become densely populated by 
Kikuyu (e.g. Mpeketoni, a mainland town located not far from Lamu Island), or Luo 
(e.g. little Kisumu, a neighborhood in Mombasa) or other upcountry ethnic 
communities. These „outsiders‟ take up jobs. They use scarce resources. Their 
children take up precious space in local schools. These issues resonate among 
those with whom I spoke. The issues mark people‟s understandings and center 
themselves in the ways many people at the coast discuss their place in, the 
connection they feel towards, Kenya. 
There were attempts to bring economic change to the coast during the 
colonial period. Salim (1973) notes this, but also puts a late-colonial spin on the 
current events of that period, which coincided with the so-called Mau Mau rebellion, 
and resultant State of Emergency, in central Kenya. Salim writes that, 
Malindi66 also witnessed notable development. One remarkable feature of the 
development was that by 1954, almost certainly because of the state of 
emergency, interest in land in and around Malindi had caused prices to 
appreciate abnormally, and astonishingly high prices were obtained for sea-
front patches.  Enough upcountry Europeans sought economic refuge in the 
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coast and purchased land to form an Upcountry European Association at 
Malindi.  (215) 
 
Thus, it would come to be that British colonials, who had not previously had a 
presence at the coast to anywhere near the degree they infiltrated the Central 
Highlands, would join the Kikuyu, Kavirondo, Luo, et al in snapping off pieces of the 
coastal landscape for their own use. Even as the British were beginning to see the 
need to rethink their presence in colonial Africa,67 the people at the coast were being 
squeezed, and their land - an abiding measure of place and wealth - was being 
taken. To this day, the area around Malindi, and other nearby seashore locations, is 
affordable to only the barest minority of local people. 
Tracking this story of economic alienation from their own land, as well as the 
more specific alienation from the kind of employment opportunities offered by 
transportation industry (as exemplified by the railroad), one interview respondent, 
XL, said,  
The coast has heavy investments, so you wonder why is it, with all those 
assets, the coast is not being targeted, for a university for decades. (XL, 
August 21, 2007) 
 
As others have said, and as I have shown above, one possible reason for 
why the coast did not see a public university until the university colleges were 
announced in 2007 was because much of what was developed at the coast was 
developed for (and by) others, whether in Nairobi or elsewhere beyond the seaside-
end of the railway. 
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Returning back to the period around independence, I want to bring into the 
focus on economic life a representation of the changes to political life that were 
manifested, and which continue to claim space in the discourses of marginalization 
at the coast. As interview respondent, BK, describes it, 
Somebody was brought in to survey the area here and to find out what the 
people wanted . . . At the end of the day, the decision was made between 
Kenyatta, Britain and the Sultan [of Zanzibar] . . . The British took that idea to 
give the coast to the rest of Kenya because they had already built the railway. 
. . . And the settlers were still here . . .  That railhead would have to continue 
working. So, they had to amalgamate, and ignored all of the local desires. 
[BK, December 25, 2006] 
 
As it was related to me, this story is reminiscent of efforts made in two 
separate British controlled areas of East Africa that were seeking self-rule in the late 
1950s and early 1960s. In the Kenya colony‟s Northern Frontier District [now 
Northeast Province], as well as in the British-controlled Ogaden area of Ethiopia, 
British authorities conducted a poll asking the ethnic Somalis (who constituted the 
majority population in each area) whether they wished to be part of an independent 
Somalia. The alternatives were, respectively, to become part of an independent 
Kenya or a self-ruling Ethiopia (Bujra, 2002). In each case, an overwhelming 
majority of Somalis stated a preference to be united into a greater Somalia. In each 
case, independence leaders (Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and Jomo Kenyatta in 
Kenya) acted to quell any action that would diminish their territories. That is, in 
concert with colonial authorities, they negated the results of the polls, and retained 
the boundaries and borders as had been determined by the colonial authorities. 
Thus for some, as with the alienation from economic power that feeds the discourse 
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of being marginalized from economic development, so, too, comes a discourse of 
alienation from political power. 
I was told alternate histories regarding the integration of the Coast 
Protectorate and the Kenyan colony, and what paths could, and justifiably should be 
taken, at the time of independence. And here is perhaps where I should make 
explicit that my interest in this matter is focused on the coast broadly, and its multi-
ethnic, multilingual population, in their own area, as well as within the construct of 
the Kenyan nation. I am not focused simply on histories of the Swahili. With this in 
mind, as Hyder Kindy68 (1972) describes it,  
That the ten-mile strip was really a possession of the Sultan of Zanzibar was 
a legal fiction created by the British. This legal fiction was continued right up 
to Uhuru [Independence], when Kenya finally ceased to be known as the 
Colony and Protectorate of Kenya . . . Before Uhuru, this legal fiction had to 
be resolved. Hence in the early 1960s we had the Mwambao episode. 
Although the Mwambao movement had many different strands, the most 
consistent demand was for some kind of political autonomy for a coastal 
state. (185) 
 
Both the Somali vote in the Northern Frontier District, and the mwambao 
episode can be understood as examples of a notion that was much discussed in 
Kenya at independence, and which is frequently revisited in present-day national 
politics. That notion is federalism, or majimboism – devolution of power from the 
central government to provincial and local levels. 
Majimboism is a live issue in Kenya. In fact, it would find its way into many 
discussions relating to the 2007 Presidential campaign. How governance is taken up 
in each of Kenya‟s eight provinces, and who has political power among Kenya‟s 40+ 
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ethnic groups, has many ramifications for economic, social, political and other 
matters. As one interview respondent, XL (who is not a coast resident), put it, 
In terms of politics, and in the context of Kenya politics, you come up with one 
word, and that word is marginalization. That is within the Kenyan politics, right 
after independence, there are certain communities that are marginalized. 
There are certain areas that are marginalized – economically, socially, 
politically and culturally. And there might be many reasons for that, whether it 
is because the coast was fighting for autonomy, you know - Mwambao. Or 
whether it is the whole issue of majimbo that the coast was also involved in – 
devolution of power. (XL, August 21, 2007) 
 
The repeated rise and fall of the majimbo concept in the decades since 
independence points to a tension between local populations, local governments, and 
the national government that informs issues in higher education. Godfrey and Mutiso 
(1974), in their article on the rise of harambee (community self-help) institutes of 
technology describe how these institutions were built largely through local initiative. 
They note the way in which majimboism shifted the way in which politics was 
engaged during the period immediately after independence, 
During the first ten years of independence, in the absence of a strong political 
party with a systematic ideology, politics in Kenya moved from the centre to 
the periphery and became increasingly tribal . . . Thus the institutes presented 
themselves as ideal vehicles for determining local leadership at a time when 
"non-politician" members of the elite were beginning to challenge the 
generation of politicians which inherited leadership on independence. (131) 
 
Haugerud (1995) speaks to issues of education, discourse, harambee, politics 
and marginalization in Kenya. She is clear that the efforts of politicians and 
communities was largely not about national development or upliftment, 
Rural political mobilization in Kenya, through such activities as harambee or 
self-help projects, was oriented toward “gaining a foothold” (Thomas-Slayter 
1991: 308), rather than toward fundamentally restructuring the political and 
economic systems.  Thus one of the most popular types of rural harambee 
projects is the building of local secondary schools, since many citizens view 
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education as the principal means of upward mobility and make enormous 
sacrifices to educate their children. (48) 
 
The rhetoric may have included discursive flourishes toward nation-building, and 
community togetherness in support of development of the country, but the practice 
revealed a participation in these community projects that teemed with self-aware, 
self-involved individuals who were out to better the circumstances of their own 
family. This recalls Anderson‟s (1970) explanation of how Luo and Kikuyu families 
viewed schooling (cited in Chapter Two), that is, as a pathway toward gaining “an 
increasing share of the positions of wealth and authority being created around 
them.” (5) 
As I will discuss later, and by means of closing this section of the chapter of 
discourses of marginalization, the Coast Institute of Technology proved 
unsuccessful. The community at the coast was unable to come together in support 
of the idea. It was eventually shelved as a Mombasa-based institution, and later 
moved inland, to Voi, about 75 miles from the sea. It remained in Coast Province, 
but barely. 
A Brief Review on Marginalization, Religion and Education 
Marginalization is discursively tied to issues beyond the economic and 
immediately political. While the analysis provided thus far has linked the geographic 
factors (coastline, harbor, etc.), many people spoke of the place that religion holds in 
the processes through which coastal peoples and communities have been 
marginalized. Returning to interview respondent, BA,  
The people that came out of that educational system and that British ideology, 
colonial ideology, and settler economy . . . looked down at the coast, and 
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looked down at Muslims . . . That was the reality. Power was economic 
power, political power was upcountry. Meanwhile, at the coast, no 
development was taking place outside of the harbor and the railway head. 
(August 30, 2007) 
 
As I have noted previously, Islam and schooling have been nearly inextricably 
linked for many centuries at the coast. This remains part of people‟s expressed 
understanding of what schooling can mean.  As interview respondent, BG, explains, 
And then the other part was the religious educational system in the coastal 
strip. You would start with your local madrasa here. You would be graduated 
to your local mosque. Then you would be graduated to other leading 
mosques within Mombasa. The system was you were supposed to go to this 
mosque because “KB” is the specialist on the knowledge of “dependency”. My 
scholar will attach me to you to learn that particular knowledge. Then you had 
teachers from Zanzibar, then you‟ll push me because you realize that this kid 
is good.  You‟ll be inspired to. . .  You need to be referred to this scholar in 
Zanzibar. Now this scholar in Zanzibar says, you know what, after you‟ve 
completed one or two years, you need to go to the Comoros Islands for 
specialized training. So, the flow was actually . . . (BG, December 25, 2006) 
 
The initial decades of the colonial and Christian missionary engagement with 
the coast in the mid- to late-1800s, was in many ways an attempt to separate coast 
people from their rich, historical connections to education practice. The schools 
opened by the colonial and missionary forces imposed an overtly Christian structure. 
Once it was determined that the colonial effort would be focused on the interior, 
mission schools followed to the interior, and has been laid out above, investment by 
both set of forces shifted away from the coast. 
It may reasonably be seen that the colonial effort shifted inland because it 
saw relative economic advantage to extracting the resources of the interior. The 
interior was a kind of tabula rasa, whereas the coast held too long a history of 
engagement with outsiders. The coast had the harbor and the railhead, but these 
were tools to be used. The greater resources were deemed to be inland, and so they 
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were pursued. To a significant degree, however, the missionary shift was 
undertaken as much because the coast had shown itself disinterested in converting 
(in any great numbers) to Christianity. 
As has been pointed out several times, the coast of Kenya has long been a 
cosmopolitan place. It is a base for Islam in East Africa. It was where Christian 
missionaries first set up shop in the 1840s, at the beginning of the first high age of 
Christian proselytizing. While never coming close to usurping the place of Islam, 
Christianity nevertheless remains a force at the coast, if only because the vast 
majority of the Kenyan power elite are, if they espouse any religious faith at all, 
Christian. 
This continues to leave some at the coast believing that it is religion that is at 
the center of their marginalization. Mazrui (2000) refers to the post-independence 
Muslims of the coast as “Harijans – an underprivileged caste.” (xxvi) But, as I noted 
earlier in this chapter, Mazrui offers a set of circumstances that extend beyond 
religion in explaining the marginalization. Religion is important, true. But the 
marginalization discourse taps broader sources than this. 
This, importantly, includes the transformation of MIOME into the Mombasa 
Polytechnic. MIOME was launched as a local institution for Muslim students. Almost 
immediately upon opening, it began enrolling more students from regions beyond 
the Kenyan coast than from the coast itself. Eventually, as Kenya moved through its 
first decade of independence, MIOME was transformed from the (at least 
rhetorically) local Mombasa Institute of Muslim Education into the nationalized 
Mombasa Polytechnic. As one interview respondent, NG told it, MIOME was 
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A fantastic thing, and then it was taken, and made into Mombasa Polytechnic. 
From being a 100% Muslim, it went immediately to be 0% Muslim. And now 
even today, it hasn‟t got more than 3 to 5%. (July 31, 2007) 
 
Placing MIOME and Mombasa Polytechnic in a somewhat broader arc of 
social change at the coast, BA had this to say, 
As Mombasa itself became more populated with people coming from 
upcountry and so on, so the Mombasa Polytechnic became less a coastal 
institution, and more of a Kenyan institution. And yet the state tended to think 
Mombasa and the coast has an institution . . . it is prevalent within the 
ideology of the state regarding the coastal people. (BA, August 30, 2007) 
 
The connection between the local Muslim community in Mombasa and 
MIOME has continued to evolve over the decades. The institution that stands on the 
grounds where MIOME was founded nearly 60 years ago is a several-times 
transformed institution. It remains a fundamental element in the provision of higher 
education at the Kenyan coast. I discuss the institution‟s most recent transformation 
into Mombasa Polytechnic University College in Chapter Seven. 
Marginalization, Politics, and a “Disunity of Purpose” 
Well, it is all part, is it not, of the broad marginalization of, not just Muslims, 
but of the Kenya coast . . . I have a feeling that it is just a question of amount 
of political muscle the coast can muster relative to what other people can do. 
(NG, July 31, 2007) 
 
In this quote, NG points to the connections between the Muslim community, 
the coast more broadly, and the nature of political influence in Kenya. This is an 
issue that was expressed almost universally by those with whom I spoke. This 
aspect of the marginalization discourse is quite complex. While some expressed 
their perception that the national government straightforwardly has little interest in 
the coast or its people, others saw a more active disinterest on the national 
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government‟s part. In this view, the government pursues policies that benefit 
upcountry communities, and this has been the case for so long that it has become 
normalized. 
There are those I spoke with who bring agency back to the discourse, who 
ask whether the coast people bear some of the responsibility for their estrangement 
from national influence. For such people, the marginalization discourse is as much 
local as national. It is as much about poorly structured engagement as anything else, 
as much about which politicians the people of the coast elect and what expectations 
they have, or do not have, about the ability of these politicians to effect change. As 
one person, PB, put it, 
No, the biggest problem is our politicians and our leaders. You know they are 
just focusing on themselves. (BP, January 1, 2007) 
 
BP goes far enough to acknowledge that the politicians being referenced are 
„our” politicians, “our” leaders. The perceived selfishness of these elected officials is 
plainly expressed. But there were a series of more complexly rendered 
marginalization discourses revealed in the interviews I conducted than that which BP 
offers. It is toward these more complex discourses that I‟d like to turn now. The 
following quote, from ER, seems good starting point. 
Marginalization of the coast I think has a political counterpart. It‟s not just that 
the central government is neglecting the coast in education. You can do a 
study of education development there – secondary. They haven‟t got the 
schools. They haven‟t got the finance. They haven‟t got the teachers, etc. . . . 
But there‟s a corresponding political dimension, it seems to me. It‟s obvious. 
The coast isn‟t really important for them politically. It‟s not important. It‟s not 
that it‟s a backwater culturally. It doesn‟t give you the votes. It‟s not going to 
determine the outcome of any national election…..If they can keep the 
politicians in their pocket, and keep the politicians happy, they don‟t have to 
worry about the people. . . . It‟s not just driven by educational needs. It‟s very 
cleverly done. (Sept. 15, 2007) 
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“It‟s not that it‟s a backwater culturally.” It is more blunt than that, it is because 
“It doesn‟t give you the votes.” ER is getting at a feeling expressed by many that 
they do not feel they are inferior in terms of how they could and would use 
government resources in education to improve their schools. It is that they do not 
play the political game well enough to access the resources and send them home so 
that schools could be built, teachers hired, and children better educated to the point 
where more of them would seek university education. As one person, IN, said, 
You‟re able to elect one or two Members of Parliament in a sea of two 
hundred ten of them . . . Then [you] demand so much, whether of a man or 
two, [who are then] unable to deliver because the character and structure of 
the system has remained the same, because Moi has been re-elected . . . 
And so, on the basis of your one Member of Parliament not able to deliver, 
you go into, you backtrack into disillusionment. And then, number two, the 
representation is so negligible for it also to effect change. So, your mass 
expectations are not met. So there‟s mass disillusionment, mass resentment, 
and then the movement starts to disintegrate, infighting and then it fizzles. 
(July 29, 2007) 
 
There seems to be nothing particularly „Kenyan” or „coastal‟ about what IN is 
pointing out. High expectations of change in a representative political system run up 
against obstacles as soon as the change one constituency is seeking runs up 
against the interests of other constituencies. What permits the perception IN is 
describing to resonate, to reach the point of becoming a discourse of marginalization 
is how the local politicians, in this representative system, then use their skills and 
their political positions, and on whose behalf they do so. Change remains possible, 
but it must be engaged with the difficulty of navigating the system in mind. 
Quite a few of the people with whom I spoke expressed their belief that this 
issue of ineffective political leadership at the coast has existed since independence, 
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if not well before then. Many mentioned Ronald Ngala and the role he played in first 
pushing for local autonomy (within the majimbo-federalism construct) and then 
defeating such efforts once he assumed a favorable position in Kenyatta‟s 
government. However, following Ronald Ngala, for whom some did, to be fair, also 
have positive feeling, there seems to be an absence of locally elected politicians 
who showcased a national profile alongside effective local political leadership. 
Among those cited as being seemingly more concerned with their national profile 
than with how much they were aiding their home region were three of the leading 
coastal politicians of the past three decades: Katana Ngala (son of Ronald), Ronald 
Matanu (cited as the General-Secretary of KANU in the 1970s), and Sharif Nassir, 
long a man who held the ear of President Daniel arap Moi. As OM put it, 
The leaders [from the coast] displayed a kind of sycophancy, historically. And 
they never developed into political persons in their own right. Except the first 
one [Ronald Ngala], the others have been pale imitations. (September 17, 
2007) 
 
In a more fully revealed exposition of this point, LM had this to say about 
Sharif Nassir, 
[Nassir] was a national politician, but really a sycophant of Moi. He was not 
powerful. He couldn‟t come up with new ideas. But apparently his calling was 
to protect Moi at all costs. He would not hesitate to be at loggerheads with the 
Kenyan population so long as he protected Moi. So, he wasn‟t looking out for 
– you know – development, education, other benefits that would accrue from 
his position, but really to say, „this is my friend.‟ (LM, July 23, 2007) 
 
Rather than trade in his political influence with the president so as to benefit his 
home constituency, as many remembered Ronald Ngala as having been a forceful 
enough political figure to do, LM sees Nassir as simply sycophantic. This view of 
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Nassir as sycophant seems not far from the generalized point made earlier by BP 
about local politicians just being „in it for themselves.‟ 
Others painted a more complex picture of Nassir and others like him. In this 
picture, Nassir and his ilk do make political moves that are of benefit to their home 
constituency. It is just that the constituency is the focus, rather than a more broadly 
constituted coastal community. As XL portrays it,  
If it is Sharif [Nassir] – he would say if it is not in Mvita69, my constituency, it is 
not going be in Taita70, where Taita has more land. Or Kilifi71, because the 
people who are in Kilifi are not “KANU Damu” as we used to say. (August 21, 
2007) 
 
Nassir comes to be the poster child for self-involved politicians. He is 
remembered as being willing to sacrifice bringing benefits to his home community if 
it meant being able to say the President listens to him. He is also remembered as 
being willing to prevent neighboring constituencies from bringing resources into their 
area, if such resources were not also going to spread to Mvita. 
In this regard, Nassir stands as the exemplar of a particular sub-discourse of 
marginalization, the discourse of disunity of purpose. As this discourse is utilized, it 
sees local politicians as being important players, alongside local civil society, 
educators, etc., as well as the national government. In the discourse of disunity of 
purpose, these influential actors are repeatedly unable to come together in support 
of the kinds of positive change that they, as individuals, offer rhetorical support for. 
                                                 
69
 Mvita is the name of the island on which is located much of the city of Mombasa. The city has over-
slid the island, along with the various causeways and bridges that link it with the mainland. 
 
70
 Taita is another part of Coast province, located inland from Mombasa. It is a separate political 
constituency from Mvita. 
 
71
 Kilifi is a town located at the coast, approximately 40 miles north of Mombasa. 
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On July 28, 2007, I had the opportunity to attend a conference presented by 
the Swahili Resource Center, an organization established in Old Town, Mombasa, 
and dedicated to improving educational opportunities for the people of Old Town, 
and Mombasa and the coast more broadly.72 The focus of the conference was 
“Enhancing Excellence in Higher Education” for people of the coast – especially 
school children and their parents. The conference brought together about 45-50 
people, including influential members of the academic and civil society communities 
in Mombasa, students, and parents. 
The keynote speaker at the conference was Professor Abdulrazak Shaukat, a 
native of Mombasa. Professor Shaukat is deputy vice-chancellor of Egerton 
University, in Rift Valley Province. In April 2007, he had been named chairman of the 
task force established by President Kibaki and charged with developing location, 
infrastructure and curriculum plans for a proposed public university at the coast. 
Shaukat is widely known to, and highly regarded by, the other people with whom I 
spoke for this work. 
A primary theme of Professor Shaukat‟s presentation was “Disunity of 
Purpose.” He spoke of his own experiences as a child living and going to school in 
various sections of Mombasa (Mvita) and the city‟s outlying communities (Mariakani 
and Changamwe). He spoke to his own rise to high school and university and his 
desire to – in some way – improve circumstances at the coast. He detailed his 
engagement as an academic and administrator with higher education issues and 
                                                 
 
72
 I should mention that the Swahili Resource Center was established in 2005 largely through the 
work of Athman Lali Omar, an old friend, and with some support from the School for International 
Training, for which both Athman and I worked. The SRC is an idea Athman and I had first discussed 
as early as 1998. 
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institutions elsewhere in Kenya (Egerton and Kisii are each several hundreds of 
miles from the coast). 
In his speech, Shaukat spoke of the visit he had recently made to Meru, a 
town in Central Province, on the slopes of Mount Kenya, approximately 100 miles 
north of Nairobi. Shaukat had gone to Meru to investigate local efforts there to create 
a public university. He spoke of his reaction on seeing the people of Meru and all 
they had done to establish the groundwork upon which the university they sought 
could be built.73 
I was really touched . . . When we arrived in that place, the whole place was 
full. Parents, teachers, youth groups, women, religious leaders, counselors, 
you name it. . . . They were holding to an agenda. The unity . . . and this in my 
opinion, is at the heart of the problem in . . . unity of purpose, unity as far as 
the child is concerned, the teacher is concerned, the staff is concerned. 
 
He continued, turning the talk, eventually, back to Mombasa, 
In [Meru] . . . they are mobilizing their resources. They are building their own 
houses. They are building their own schools. They have built their own 
university now. They have built their own university.  We have our own 
resources. . . . It‟s a process, we just have to wake up . . . 
 
Shaukat also directly addressed the parents at the forum, and urged them to 
speak to the parents of other school children in their community. He said, 
How do you engage in your child‟s education if you never go and visit the 
school? You‟ll never know even the teacher of your child. You have never 
been to a single PTA meeting. You have never attended any forum . . . this is 
the difference between us and the people in Meru . . . when I compare the 
difference, if there is a parent teacher conference, believe it or not, 80% of the 
parents are involved that side [i.e. in Meru], and 20% of the parents come this 
side [i.e. in Mombasa]. They [students] will push the teachers, they will push 
the parents. We don‟t take our responsibility. . . . It is not only that our children 
are missing their education. It is that they are getting bad knowledge. . . .So 
this is a problem we must try and address. 
 
                                                 
73
 Meru is already home to Methodist University - a private, Christian university. 
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And eventually, Shaukat turned the discussion around to the stories that get 
told so often that they become themes (or discourses). He pointed toward those – 
politician, civil society organizers, parents – whose work it should be to spearhead 
the pursuit of the resources needed to build schools. 
But look at the way we have taken the agenda of the education. We have 
become beggars when it comes to the issue of education resources . . . 
Where do our resources go? . . . [we say] we have no resources to give to 
[the local] education fund, no resources to improve our schools, no resources 
to build new centers, no resources to give our children . . . We have 
resources. If we want to have higher education, a center of excellence. . . we 
have communities in this region that have resources. 
 
But, he concludes, the communities do not work together sufficiently. They do 
not see the issues in education and higher education as regional issues. For 
Shaukat, many people sufficiently powerful to influence change have not yet come 
together. He concluded, 
We pull in different directions . . . Disunity of purpose. We must forget our 
differences. When it comes to educational matters, we should not politicize 
education matters. We should not accept people to come in and politicize 
education matters. What we want is excellence . . . Unity of purpose is the 
most important thing. 
 
 Shaukat was speaking specifically about efforts to bring a public university to 
the coast. His perspective on disunity of purpose, the inability of politicians, parents, 
civil society organizers, et al to work together in support of a common goal resonates 
with the story I mentioned briefly earlier in this chapter about attempts to create the 
Coast Institute of Technology (CIT). 
Godfrey and Mutiso (1974) describe the efforts to establish the CIT in 
Mombasa in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This effort, different from that which 
had produced MIOME/Mombasa Polytechnic, arose out of the nationwide, local, 
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community-supported harambee movement to expand educational opportunities in 
all levels of schooling. Relating the issue to the politics of independence and 
majimboism, Godfrey and Mutiso break the technical institute efforts of this period 
into three types. Coast Institute of Technology was classified amongst “those 
competing on an inter-ethnic basis.” What Godfrey and Mutiso are speaking to with 
this classification is seen in their subsequent description, and more or less speaks in 
unison with Shaukat‟s point about “disunity of purpose:” 
Lack of agreement on site at the coast, which probably includes the largest 
number of ethnic groups, ultimately allowed the Provincial Commissioner to 
step in. There is still anxiety lest location in Mombasa would lead to its being 
taken over by “interior people” as is the case with other educational 
institutions in the town. (119) 
 
 Godfrey and Mutiso are writing about the generalized harambee movement 
and the institutes of technology that spring up all over Kenya. They spend a good 
deal of space and time describing the nature of the groups that sought to establish 
these institutes, outside of, and at times in direct conflict with, the government‟s own 
efforts.  
[T]he organizers and initiators of the institutes of technology have been 
primarily “non-politicians” and in many cases conscious efforts have been 
made to exclude professional politicians or to allot them a subordinate or 
symbolic role. (125) 
 
As this quote from my interview with ER makes clear, the failure of the CIT to 
be established in Mombasa is remembered in ways that resonate with the call for a 
public university at the coast: 
If you‟re looking at the absence of a university, first of all, one is the 
grassroots desire for that just isn‟t there, I don‟t think. Second, the capacity 
isn‟t there either, even if the grassroots desire to create the university existed. 
And I‟ll go back to my example of Coast Institute of Technology which I think 
would be a very interesting institute to study, for you to look at, well how did 
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this evolve . . . My sense is that Coast Institute of Technology is more a 
replication than a grassroots movement that is being driven by what is 
needed at the coast. It‟s the politicians saying „everyone else has one of the 
institutes, let‟s start one.‟ You can look at that, it doesn‟t succeed. They 
eventually put it in Voi, which is the most like the upcountry you can get and 
still be at the coast. It‟s not in Mombasa. (ER, September 15, 2007) 
 
This lack of grassroots desire, this pursuit of an option as a replication rather 
than an expression of grounded need, does point to the lack of cohesion in the 
perspectives that impacted the attempt to build the CIT. And, if Shaukat‟s point is 
accepted, and most of the people I spoke with voiced similar thoughts, the disunity 
of purpose, the lack of cohesion continues to impact, if not cripple, what eventually 
does arise at the coast. 
At this point, the lack of cohesion no longer involves working to end the 
absence of a public university at the coast. The university has arrived, or a university 
college has arrived, one that will eventually be elevated to full university status. What 
is involved, if this lack of cohesion, Shaukat‟s „disunity of purpose,‟ does continue 
will impact the ways in which the new university colleges define and meet their 
purposes. I will talk more about this issue in Chapter Eight. 
Discourse: The Contributions of Elder Coast Academics 
While the greater part of the expression of the discourse of marginalization 
focused on religion and politicians, Shaukat‟s theme of „disunity of purpose‟ did 
expand the discursive field of players somewhat. Civil society, as a link between the 
state and the local, can now be seen as partially responsible for the marginalization, 
though ineffective advocacy. Parents are now involved in the marginalizing, though 
their inaction and inattention. So, too, for Shaukat, are educators. 
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But there was, among a sub-group of those with whom I spoke, another more 
particular group who were taken to task for contributing to the disunity. I can 
characterize this sub-group of interviewees as younger and mid-career scholars, or 
those who would have liked to reach such positions. The people about whom they 
were somewhat critical is the group of well-known elder scholars from the coast. The 
younger people expressed disappointment that their elders seemed disinterested in 
working to create opportunities to help them – opportunities in the form of positions 
at a new coast-based university. 
When you talk about Kenyan scholars, you start with Mazrui. You have 
Abdullah Bujra, you have Mwaidin. You have Alamin Mazrui. You have 
Mohamed Bakari . . . The interesting thing about the coast scholars is that 
they are famous, those who have taught in the university, they are well known 
not just in Kenya, but elsewhere. (XL, August 21, 2007) 
 
The exchange below, from December 25, 2006, goes deeper into showing the 
extent to which the careers of the older scholars have been tracked by those 
proposing to follow them. I say “older” here rather than “elder” because the people to 
whom BG and BK refer below are younger than those to whom XL was referring 
above. In other words, BG and BK are speaking about a kind of next generation, 
second generation scholarly elite. In this exchange, I am “KB”: 
BG: [Y]ou find this gap between Professor Hyder‟s group and where we are 
now. 
 
BK: You know that is almost like a fourth layer. So, you‟ll have Alamin and 
who else in that age? 
 
BG: Alamin. You‟ll get, I think, Mohamed Bakari in the same group. 
 
BK: Bakari we have mentioned. 
 
BG: You will probably get, what is his name . . . Professor Aboud Abdulahi 
(sp)??? 
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BK: Abdulahi, yes. 
 
BG: This is in Egerton University. You will get people like Dr. Ali Islam who 
is in Egerton University also. He is in Biostatistics Department. These 
are the people who, you know, had to patch their way through to be 
able to go to reach where they are now. 
 
BK: It is like they never thought that they would go to university anywhere. 
 
KB: So what would you say the ages of those are? Are those the sixty year 
olds? The ones who are now sixty? 
 
BK: Sixty, sixty-five now. 
 
BG: Will be, most likely, in their early sixties. I would put Dr. Ali Islam in the 
late fifties. Probably getting close . . .  
 
BK: Plus-minus 
 
BG: Sort of like the same group. And Professor Mohamed Rajab (sp??) 
who is the Deputy Vice Chancellor of - is it Kenyatta now or Moi - 
Kenyatta.  
 
BK: Kenyatta 
 
BG: This is the same group now. In fact, Mohamed Rajab I would put him 
after Dr. Mohamed Bakari, because Dr. Mohamed Bakari was teaching 
already at the University of Nairobi. Professor Mohamed Rajab was a 
master student completing his Masters degree. So, I would put 
Mohamed Rajab ahead of us. Not actually in that league. 
 
BK: Yeah. 
 
BG: Yes. So, he is like older than us, but not in the same league as Dr. 
Mohamed Bakari. 
 
BK: But you know, the thing is, the whole difference comes – these are the 
people who are already within the system. Like, Mohamed Bakari was 
already a Professor before he even did his PhD program and all this. 
 
KB: So, he was a lecturer. 
 
BK: Yes, so he was already in the system. Not like some of us who are 
kind of struggling - in, out, in, out. Because of, you know, looking for 
financial support and all. They were in the system. 
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This conversational snippet depicts the degree to which both Kenyan 
participants are aware of the career arc of the prominent scholars of the generation 
that preceded their own. Neither BK nor BG lack professional cache. Rather, they 
have never felt that working within the public university system has been a realistic 
option for them. There remains an aura about the public universities – especially the 
University of Nairobi – that makes working there the goal to be pursued, yet for them 
this has not been an accessible goal. 
In later comments, both BK and BG offered further perspective on the people 
who had preceded Alamin, Bakari, Rajab, et al. In these comments, they are 
somewhat sharper in their critique. 
So, I think then there was this gap between the so-called intellectuals who got 
it and the community. We never saw them in town. We never knew about 
them. We never heard about them. (BG, December 25, 2006) 
 
So, there was quite a big number of people of that age who went to 
universities in England – Oxford, the University of London. Abdulaziz went to 
SOAS actually. So did Salim, who wrote the Swahili Speaking People of East 
Africa . . . And now, the question is why they did not, you know, come into 
starting a university in Mombasa, these guys? What made them feel that they 
could not pursue that education and relate it to work together and give that 
education to the locals, to their own brothers and sisters who were in 
Mombasa? And this is a big blame from all coastal people to the people like, 
people of that age. They think that they just got their education and they did 
not do anything for their community. 
 
And the majority of them are retiring now, you know, from their professions, 
so it is like it is now that they want to come back and do something. So, is it 
because they were overwhelmed by work? Is it because of the impacts of, 
you know, independence? That is really a very important question for a thesis 
like yours to help answer – why they could not contribute towards, you know, 
university education? (BK, December 25, 2006) 
 
Often though, even as this type of perspective was being broached, most who 
mentioned it would provide added context that posited how these senior academics 
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may have simply been going about their careers, supporting higher education as 
they were able. More complex iterations of these contexts may also have taken into 
account the question of whether the fame held by the elder scholars isn‟t precisely a 
result of their having spent decades working in higher education environments, albeit 
in places other than the coast. Many were working in Nairobi, in support of the 
national university – this at a time, for the elder scholars, the 1960s – when there 
was only a single university in the country. How much should such people be faulted 
for working in the one place in their country that offered them a teaching opportunity 
at the university level? 
And, too, the global politics of the 1960s, the 1970s, and the 1980s would 
come into the picture for some people. There was acknowledgement that part of the 
fame certain of the elder scholars had achieved was due to their willingness to 
speak their piece, and to deal with the ramifications of this on their personal and 
professional lives. Staying with comments from BK on this issue,  
I think if you look at the radicalism of Mazrui, he could not teach in Kenya . . .  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have begun to see a lot of these 
people. Like, we began to see Ali [Mazrui] coming back. You know, we began 
to see Abdul Lateef Abdullah, who . . . after detention in Kenyatta‟s time, he 
went to Tanzania. And then he comes back . . . Professor Idha [Salim], who 
was appointed as a diplomat to Scandinavian countries. He is back. (BK, 
December 25, 2006) 
 
XL offers another perspective, specifically about Ali Mazrui, that supports the 
latter comment made by BK.  
That question really bugs him, because Ali Mazrui doesn‟t want to see himself 
as a regional . . . in the Kenyan politics there are people who resist that, they 
don‟t want to be pigeon-holed, they are bigger than that. So if you go to him 
and say what have you done for the coast, obviously he gets very offended, 
because he has done a lot for Africa, he has done a lot for Islam, he has done 
a lot – there are other things where he thinks he has a legacy. 
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What is occurring when people see scholars working where work is available 
to them or forced to work where they will not be bullied by regimes that do not 
appreciate their viewpoints? Mazrui, quoted in an interview with Ellis (2004) in which 
he talks about being named Chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture 
and Technology (JKUAT), allows that, for much of his scholarly career,  
I would not even be invited to give a public lecture. I was taboo for the public . 
. . This marks a major change in my relationship with the political 
establishment in Kenya. 
 
JKUAT is now the overseer of Mombasa Polytechnic University College. It 
seems, thus, that Mazrui at least has met head on with some of the criticism of the 
lack of initiative around a university at the coast. 
Conclusion 
There has been extensive change in the environment of higher education at 
the coast since I began this research in earnest in 2005. Since mid-2007 alone, 
there has been an explosion of higher education opportunities at the coast, an 
explosion due, in part, to the agitations of the younger scholars making the criticisms 
above, and of the selfsame senior scholars they are criticizing. 
This conflict, though, seems to illustrate a point made by Gee (1992), 
If we define “politics” as relationships and interactions among people where 
power and status are at stake, then practices within and across Discourses 
are always and everywhere political . . . Each Discourse necessitates that 
members, at least while they are playing roles within the Discourse, act as if 
they hold particular beliefs and values about what counts as the “right sort” of 
person and the “right” way to be in the world, and thus too, what counts as the 
“wrong” sort and the “wrong” way.  And “right” here means “worthy of respect 
and status,” both social goods. (141) 
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It seems that the younger scholars making their points about the elders can 
be considered as seeing a “right way” for the elders to have acted – that is, on behalf 
of those who would come later. 
As for the broader discourse about coastal politicians, and the lack of faith 
and lack of trust felt by those with whom I spoke toward those politicians, it is, in my 
view, a discursive turn that renders more complex the whole issue of what 
„marginalized‟ means in the coastal context. The discursive focus on politicians and 
politics, because it speaks to a public role that one gets voted into, opens up 
responsibility and agency to the people of the coast themselves. 
This is a central part of Shaukat‟s theme of „disunity of purpose‟. People – 
whether parents, teachers, school children, politicians – need to see that they are 
responsible forces in the creation of their own experience. They must see that 
working together will bring them a more remunerative reality than will working as 
separate forces. As such, I see the discourse of marginalization as being engaged 
on a number of fields, in a number of frames. 
Again, Gee (1992) connects with this point,  
We have seen . . . that any Discourse is defined in terms of who is and who is 
not a member, and sometimes in terms of who are “higher” and “lower,” more 
“central” and “less central” members. Discourses can even have “colonized” 
members.  Furthermore, any Discourse is ultimately defined in relationship to 
and, often, in opposition to, other Discourses in the society. (141) 
 
Yes, the people with whom I spoke saw a decided bias in the way the central 
government, located in Nairobi, deals with issues related to the coast and its people. 
But the same people spoke nearly as readily of their own elected officials. By 
extension, I take them to be speaking about themselves, and assigning responsibility 
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for the ongoing lack of economic, social investment in education at the coast across 
a broader range of coastal society. 
This sense of responsibility is the link to Chapter Six, in which I focus on what 
I describe as a responsive discourse of alternatives. In shifting to the ways in which 
people have responded to the longtime lack of a public university at the coast and 
pursued engagements with other forms of university education, I am seeking to 
extend my identification of a broader dialectic arc. I see marginalization as a thesis 
point, against which the alternative responses engage as antithesis. Chapters Seven 
and Eight then speak to the synthesis and emergent thesis, respectively, of this 
broad dialectic. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Six: ANTITHESIS: A Responsive Discourse of 
Alternatives 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I speak to what I call a responsive discourse of alternatives, 
wherein the people for whom the absence of a university is an issue create 
alternatives and strategies in response to their perceived needs for a university. As I 
have explained elsewhere, I see these discourses arranged in a thesis-antithesis 
relationship, one that has led to the synthesis – the presence of new public 
university forms in Mombasa – in 2007. In this way, I am using a conception of 
dialectic at the chapter level that I need to distinguish from the sense in which 
dialectic is engaged within the theme of each particular chapter. 
This latter use of dialectic is in keeping with that of Fairclough (1992), when 
he notes that the relationship of  
discourse and subjectivity . . . is a dialectical one, which sees social subjects 
as shaped by discursive practices, yet also capable of reshaping and 
restructuring those practices. (45) 
 
This construct of dialectic is focused on the transformation within each discourse, 
that is, the changes wrought to/by the social subjects and users of the discourse. 
The focus of this chapter will fall largely upon a set of three notions, which I 
am treating as „crux points‟ (or „crisis points‟). I am borrowing the term from 
Fairclough (1992) and Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), and will use it to mean points 
in the history of a discourse at which meaning is altered, and transformation is 
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engaged. Each of these crux points takes the absence of a public university at the 
coast and shifts it towards an alternative form of university education that meets 
some, though far from all, of the characteristics of a public university. 
The relative “strength” or “weakness” of the degree to which the alternatives 
approximate a public university is somewhat a part of the analysis here. My intention 
is more to identify how the alternatives arose, what elements of the absence they 
engage, and to what degree they meet an expressed need for a public university. I 
believe that the combination of alternative forms of university access at the coast 
that I speak to here has gone a long way toward preparing the ground for the 
eventual creation of a public university. I treat this last point in Chapter Seven. 
Crux point: Mombasa Islamic University 
In Chapter Five, I laid out aspects of the discourses of marginalization that 
focus upon religious differences and access to power in Kenya. In Chapter Three, I 
briefly reviewed both alternative public university forms and emergent private 
university forms at the coast. At the time of my research in 2007, the only university 
in this latter category that was offering courses in Mombasa was Methodist 
University. However, there is an ongoing effort, iterations of which reach back 
decades, to establish a private university at the coast, Mombasa Islamic University. 
The longstanding absence of a public university at the coast, home to a significant 
percentage of Kenya‟s Muslim population, is understood by many as an exemplar of 
marginalization. 
In this section, I will begin by offering a series of quotes from written materials 
in order to establish a history with and against which interview quotes will then be 
131 
 
posed. This history will be contrasted with the present lack of access to university 
education experienced by many people from the coast. Jamalilyl (2006) points to the 
longstanding practice of young scholars and students from the coast moving from 
place to place to find and work with mentors in a wide range of academic fields. 
Some of this movement, as he notes, includes travel overseas: 
It was a very common phenomenon to see students . . . traveling to different 
towns to study under a particular alim [authority/mentor] who was an expert in 
a particular field . . . From thirteenth century up to post-colonial era, the 
exchange program between ulamaa [scholars] within East African cities as 
well as ulamaa from Arab world was at its peak form, in a manner 
unprecedented in the academic history of East, Central and South Africa, in 
the past and even in our present time. The local ulamaa had the tendency of 
visiting and settling in various towns within East Africa, and there were others 
who went overseas for higher education, in what is termed at our present time 
as post graduate studies. To site [sic] a few examples, Sheikh Muhyiddin bin 
Sheikh bin Abd Al Kahtany[37], Sheikh Ali bin Abdalla bin Nafi Al Mazrui[38] 
Sheikh Muhammad bin Saleh Al Farsy[39], Sheikh Muhammad bin Ali bin 
Mselem Al Amry[40], Sheikh Muhammad bin Fadhil Al Bakry (1865)[41], 
Sayyid Ahmad bin Abubakar bin Sumeit, Sayyid Alwy bin Abubakar Al 
Shatry[42], Sayyid Abubakar bin Abdulrahman Al Husseiny (1828 – 
1922)[43], Sheikh Abdalla Bakathir (1860 – 1925) and Sheikh Abdalla bin 
Muhammad Khatyb (3/7/1954) are among ulamaa who traveled overseas for 
studies and also taught in various towns in East Africa. (pp. 14-15) 
 
Hyder (1994) makes the general point – made many times by numerous 
others - that the coast was long a place of literate, intellectual people: 
Steeped in the fabric of these lands are a thousand years of Islamic 
intellectual ferment written in virtually every page of the history of the East 
Coast of Africa. It is written in the history of the peoples of these countries, in 
their worship, in their architecture, in their culture, in their music, in their 
dances, in their poetry, in their legends, in their political systems, in their 
weddings, in their funerals, in their mirthful laughter and in their woeful cries. 
 
As previously noted in Chapter Two, Salim (1973) and Pouwels (1981) both 
write of the British colonial imposition of schools in East Africa. Both Sir Ali bin Salim 
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(on whom my citation from Salim is focused) and Alamin bin Ali Mazrui74 (about 
whom Pouwels‟ piece focuses) actively engaged the notion that the local Muslim 
community in Mombasa and along the coast could and should control the education 
of their communities. 
Thus, for people at the coast today there are examples, remembered and 
shared, of people who fought for the maintenance - through education and schooling 
- of Islamic culture. As BP put it during our interview, 
The Western education, straight away, it came with missionaries and, 
colonialism. Education and missionaries together. So, it was a big threat to 
the set up of the community. (December 25, 2006) 
 
Another interview respondent, BG, describes the educational system as he 
experienced it in his youth, during which he pursued both the westernized education 
available in Kenya‟s 1960s and 1970s era schools. In this quote, previously cited in 
Chapter Five, BG says  
You would start with your local madrasa here. You would be graduated to 
your local mosque. Then you would be graduated to other leading mosques 
within Mombasa . . . Then, now you had teachers from Zanzibar . . . you need 
to be referred to this scholar in Zanzibar. Now this scholar in Zanzibar says, 
you know what, after you‟ve completed one or two years, you need to go to 
the Comoros Islands for specialized training. (December 25, 2006) 
 
Picking up on present-day expectations of education held by Muslim parents 
and their children along the coast, with a particular emphasis on how girls move 
through their local educational experience, ER, focusing specifically on Islamic 
education, speaks to its role as an elemental aspect of community life for a large 
proportion of the coast population. In this lengthy quote, ER offers that 
                                                 
74
 Father of the noted scholar Professor Ali A. Mazrui. 
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I would bring in another dimension, which I‟m actually studying myself at the 
moment and . . . this is what is happening to Islamic education. Because the 
parents whose students – let‟s look at this at primary level. 
 
The parents whose [children] finish standard eight – eighth grade - the kids 
who don‟t get into secondary school – they‟re not pushing for a high school. 
Why not? Because there are institutes around them, institutions around 
them providing Islamic religious education, and those Islamic religious 
education institutes are taking up the pressures for education . . .  
 
So a girl who finishes eighth grade – she doesn‟t get into high school – her 
parents aren‟t really pushing to get her into a secular, government secondary 
school. Because she can go for three years, she can do three years of Islamic 
religious education studies – I‟m thinking of Gedi. I‟m giving you the example 
of Gedi. 
 
There in Gedi I visited a family when I was just there at the coast last week – 
this is first hand information from the daughter who finished her standard 
eight. She is now doing a three year course in the madrasa which is attached 
to the mosque at Gedi . . . which is right there as you go in opposite the post 
office. She proudly told me, and I thought this is wonderful – „I‟m just about to 
get my certificate.‟ 
 
So after three years she gets her certificate from the mosque college and 
she‟s done in three years. That‟s something. You can almost see the family 
and this young girl attributing more worth to that certificate than to the 
KCSE - you know a “D” in the KCSE which gets you nowhere. 
 
I think underlying this is a feeling among parents, quite a strong feeling 
among parents, that the government system of education alienates their 
children - not just from Islam, but it alienates their children from coastal 
society. So I perceive this, this is a bit of an intangible . . . intuition I have. It‟s 
clear that secular education alienates them from, let‟s say, rural life. It 
alienates them from their religion of Islam. But I have a sense of the feeling 
that is also, the parents have a sense that it alienates them from coastal 
society. (ER, September 15, 2007. Emphasis added) 
 
This sense of alienation exemplifies an important element of the differences and 
tension between the coast‟s Muslim views on education and learning and the 
predominantly colonial and Christian missionary-influenced education system from 
which Kenya‟s present public education system arose. 
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One place where this tension can be seen in regard to higher education is in 
the longstanding effort to establish an Islamic university in Mombasa. Hyder (1994), 
a well-known scholar from the coast, contextualizes the issue by pointing out that it 
is 
interesting to note that the majority of the private Kenyan universities have 
been motivated by religion. [Most] of the private universities in Kenya are 
supported by religious organizations. The Deputy Principal of Daystar 
University recently described it on KBC TV as a "Christian Liberal Arts 
University" . . .  To date, for sure, the only private university in Kenya which is 
not directly underwritten by a religious organization is the United States 
International University. (p. 12) 
 
Hyder continues, noting the ways in which Western intellectual and 
educational institutions have tended to rely upon the research of Western scholars 
on Islam and Africa. This tendency, Hyder points out, seems too frequently to 
preclude the possibility that the people from areas like coastal East Africa, where 
Islam has long existed, have scholarship of their own. While Hyder is not impugning 
the work of these Western scholars, he is left to ask an important question as he 
posits that the pursuit of education and knowledge in the Islamic community 
suffuses and permeates the entire way of life of the peoples that are generally 
known as the Swahilis.  Do we have to wait for the Nevill Chitticks, the James 
Kirkmans, the John Middletons and the James Allens of this world to come 
and study these historical and intellectual riches for them to attain credibility? 
(p. 13) 
 
Hyder connects the history of Islamic education and scholarship in East Africa 
(as the citation above from Jamalilyl describes) with the long centuries of Islamic 
higher education as exemplified by such institutions as the universities in Fez 
(Karawiyyin University) and Cairo (Al-Azhar University).75 With such history and 
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 These institutions are briefly treated in Chapter Three of this work. 
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connection to the pursuit of education and knowledge, Hyder asks, “So why not a 
private Islamic university?” (12) 
This question was addressed by a number of the people with whom I spoke. 
What I found intriguing was the different directions from which the interview 
respondents approached the issue of Mombasa Islamic University. OM looks at the 
history of the public schooling system in Kenya, with its long reliance upon Christian 
denominational efforts, and says, 
Islam has never been sufficiently integrated into the educational system of 
this country. I think there was always the unstated fear that a coast university 
would take on an Islamic character. In other words, the policy makers didn‟t 
know what to make of a university without Muslim character. It‟s a foolish, 
unfounded fear, because we have all kinds of Muslim universities in the 
continent. In Uganda we have a Muslim university. In Tanzania there is one. 
So they are there. (September 17, 2007) 
 
But this fear – unfounded, unstated, or not - does impact the government‟s 
practice of siting its schools and universities. This matter has been written about by 
numerous scholars, including Hyder, cited above. Ahmed (2006) takes this point 
about what is not available in Kenya, and looks – as has OM – toward neighboring 
countries. What has been created there, not by the government, but rather by the 
Muslim community, he notes as coming from the work of the Muslim financial elite. 
He says, 
I am sorry to say that the Christians have already more than ten registered 
universities in Kenya whose degrees are recognised by the government. The 
Muslims are yet to build just one. Recently, in Tanzania, ten Muslim elite have 
each contributed one hundred Million Tanzanian shillings and others 
contributed a vast land for the foundation of a Muslim University to be in the 
making. In Kenya we are yet to see the same. 
 
This links several threads of the discourse of marginalization directly to efforts 
to establish a private Islamic university in Mombasa. I read what Ahmed is saying 
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here as an engagement of the generalized marginalization of Muslims in Kenya. He 
combines this, and so makes the discursive connection, with a lack of involvement 
among Mombasa‟s financially elite Muslims. This resonates with Shaukat‟s 
discourse of a disunity of purpose. Later in this chapter, I offer the crux point 
example of the Universal Education Trust Fund, which has undertaken elements of 
what Ahmed sees as needed. 
Other common questions people have – and are asked by others – about a 
Mombasa Islamic University include: Who constitutes the university‟s community? 
For whom is the university meant? What will the curriculum be? One respondent, 
LM, touched upon a point made by both OM and Ahmed about what is happening in 
regard to similar initiatives in neighboring countries, 
I went to Morogoro recently in Tanzania, and they do actually have an Islamic 
University in Morogoro and they do not shut out non-Muslim students. And 
this is important for us, so that the Muslim student does not grow from 
primary, secondary, university without interacting with other members of the 
community. (July 23, 2007) 
 
On this specific point of how and whether non-Muslim students would attend 
a Mombasa Islamic University, Abdulrazak Shaukat, whose discourse of a disunity 
of purpose is discussed in Chapter Five, had this to say in his speech to the Forum 
on Enhancing Excellence in Higher Education, 
The problem, the challenge of Mombasa Islamic University, is our own . . . 
We have money. We have our land. [But] we are moving with a snail‟s pace . 
. . We will teach not only Islamic students . . . It is not a university for Muslims 
only . . . our students are Muslim, they are non-Muslim. (July 28, 2007) 
 
There was a feeling expressed by several people I spoke with that it is the 
predominance of Christian-connected private universities, and the dominant role 
held by Christian adherents in Kenya‟s national government that tends to keep alive 
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these questions about who an Islamic university would be for. Thus, the question 
and the need to pose it, as well as the need to proactively engage it seen in 
Shaukat‟s speech, point to the positioning of the Mombasa Islamic University in 
discursive opposition to a marginalization of Muslim interests. The Mombasa Islamic 
University is not a public university, but it is positioned as an informative analogue in 
matters germane to this work. 
Crux Point: The Alternative of International Opportunity 
The longstanding absence of public university options at the coast plays into 
an ongoing trend in Kenyan higher education, one that opens opportunity out 
beyond the country‟s border. In this section, I analyze the connection between this 
current response to the longtime absence of local university options and the 
historical practice at the coast to seek further education abroad. I will also connect 
this current response to the burgeoning market in advertised enrollment possibilities 
at foreign universities. This marketing effort is an appeal to those seeking to join the 
7-10,000 Kenyans studying overseas at any given time (from Mwiria and Nge‟the, 
2007, page 80). This recruiting market has recently expanded into the Mombasa 
area. I will profile one recruiting agency that has recently opened an office at the 
coast in the belief that the new office will attract enough students to the foreign 
universities for which it works to make the investment worthwhile76. 
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 One direction in which I have opted to not take my research at this point is toward “brain drain.” 
Manuh (2002) mentions “brain drain” in the context of the “. . . estimated 100,000 African academics 
who are located in institutions in the North, while the same number of expatriate experts is imported 
to advise African governments each year at annual costs of 4 billion dollars in foreign exchange 
reserves. The author wonders aloud what this vast expense, if spent differently, would have 
contributed to retaining or returning desperately- needed African faculty, some of whom might have 
provided sounder advice than all those expatriate experts.” (47) 
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Beyond the private university option exemplified by the Mombasa Islamic 
University, and the alternative academic options offered by the existing upcountry 
universities described in Chapter Three, there exists a small, but growing alternative 
path to university education – pursue higher education outside Kenya‟s borders. In 
one sense, this could be looked at as a continuation of an old practice, wherein 
some coastal students took their studies of Islam to other centers of learning in the 
Muslim world. In a related sense, this can be looked at as continuing the practice 
undertaken by the first generation of coastal students to attend university, who did 
so, by necessity, outside the Kenyan colony77. As one interview respondent, BA, told 
me, 
Mohammed Hyder went to Makerere78. Mazrui went to England. I went to 
England. Abdulaziz went to England. Almost all the people of that generation 
had fellowships from the colonial government to go to England. (August 30, 
2007) 
 
These first students to go abroad – Hyder, Mazrui, Abdulaziz, BA himself – 
did so because not only was there no university at the coast at the time, there was 
not a full university anywhere in Kenya. Yet, even as Kenya‟s public university 
system grew from the 1960s through the 1990s, it continued to be outpaced by the 
                                                                                                                                                       
“Brain drain” is not an untroubled concept. Kinuthia Macharia, in a presentation at the African 
Studies Association conference in Washington, DC in 2005, worked to destabilize staid assumptions 
about the circumstance that defines “brain drain” – i.e. Kenyans (in his case) living and working 
outside of Kenya and sending money “back home.” He acknowledged that there was a loss to Kenya 
of some potential economic and social value due to his absence from Kenya. But he was arguing for 
a more complex examination of the situation. He sought to trouble the presumptive notion that people 
in this circumstance are doing less to support the development of their nation than would be the case 
if they returned “home” and contributed more “directly” to developments there. One of his points was 
that if he and others did return to Kenya, their access to money would be reduced – and thus less 
money would be available to do what they are already doing. 
 
77
 I go into this issue at greater length in a subsequent chapter on a “university of our own.” 
 
78
 Makerere University is in Kampala, Uganda. As outlined in Chapter Two, Makerere University was 
initially a constituent college of the University of London. It eventually became the core campus of the 
University of East Africa – at which time the University of Nairobi was its constituent college. 
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number of students whose performance in secondary school qualified them to attend 
university. The response to this insufficiency in enrolling qualified students has been 
to retain international opportunities among one‟s options. As BA describes it today, 
A lot of students from Kenya are going out. There are large numbers now 
going to India. Europe and America has become more difficult. They used to 
go to America. U.S., Canada, Europe. But it has become very expensive, very 
difficult situation in the last ten years or so. So, it is cheaper for students to go 
to India, Malaysia, and these places . . . Philippines, and so on. (BA, August 
30, 2007) 
 
BA connects with a primary consideration impacting the capacity of 
individuals to respond to the international opportunity – cost. Yet he notes the 
degree to which this issue has seen transformation. For many individuals, the initial 
international options of 50 years ago have shifted away from the West, which had 
provided scholarships, bursaries, travel grants, etc. in support of the kind of national 
development described in Chapter Three. With such support at far lower levels 
today, the cost of a university education in the west is far greater than what is 
available in countries like India, Russia, and China. 
I offer the following vignette as a means of detailing how one mother 
investigated these kinds of options, why she thought it necessary to do so, and what 
she encountered. I treat the story told here as an exemplar of the responsive 
discourse that plays against the longtime absence of a university near where this 
woman and her daughter live. This woman, GA, who is a longtime educator at the 
coast, and who described how she had previously assisted some of her students as 
well as her niece to get into university, had this to say, 
My daughter . . . managed to get a B+, a very strong one. And now we are 
looking forward to going to university . . . I was looking for scholarships: in 
America, in Poland. I was looking in Malaysia. I was looking in Russia, I was 
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looking even in Uganda. Anywhere. I even checked in India. Everywhere. I 
was looking for scholarships or donors to send my daughter to school. I am 
up and down looking at internets, newspapers, searching here and there. 
Filling in applications. I have filled about eight applications. I have applied to 
Sudan University, Poland University, Rhodes South Africa University. I have 
even applied in Dar es Salaam, and one in Uganda. In Uganda, they say they 
want an “A Level” – she has to go for “A Levels” first, before they take her for 
university. (GA, August 17, 2007) 
 
The daughter has performed well. In fact, she was the number one ranked 
student at her school. Yet she was unable to gain admission to one of Kenya‟s 
public universities. Her family does not have the financial resources necessary to 
pursue the kind of alternative entry options (Model Two; Model Three; private 
university) that are available within Kenya. Her mother, whose professional life 
contacts her with people who have been educated internationally, saw international 
options as her one opportunity. The family is able to access internet resources, and 
as a result has become quite efficient in researching its options, and savvy enough 
to balance the wide range of different cost forces at play among these options – e.g. 
tuition; transportation; room and board; texts and materials; other supplies; and the 
ability to return home periodically. When I left Kenya, the family was still pursuing 
options. 
What this family was fortunate enough to have knowledge of, and skills at, 
however, many others do not. In this vein, it seems necessary to note how 
information is dispersed in the present day. Similarly, how this information might be 
consumed by people responding to local absence, but without the savvy the family in 
the vignette has, is crucial to understanding how international opportunities are 
experienced. 
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This last point is no small matter, as the following quote, taken from a short 
article in the East African Standard newspaper on September 14, 2005, notes, 
Degrees awarded to 231 university graduates were declared bogus when the 
government announced their former university is illegal. The Commission for 
Higher Education‟s decision that Newport International University has no 
authority to offer degrees means Newport‟s graduates will not be able to use 
their transcripts to apply for further education or jobs. 
 
Newport International University had not recruited the 231 Kenyan students to come 
to the United States. The students remained in Kenya, and went through an online 
program. As such, it is not directly analogous to the vignetted family‟s story. As a 
cautionary tale, however, it resonates. Newport International University‟s website, 
which can be found at  http://www.newportinternational-edu.com/ does indicate that 
there are only three staff administrators working at the home „campus.‟ And the 
website‟s Profile page does state that while the university is licensed by the State of 
Wyoming,  
Neither The Department of Education nor the Wyoming State Board of 
Education has accredited or endorsed any course of study being offered by 
Newport International University. 
 
So, the university may be able to walk away from any charges that they were 
defrauding their students. But, basically, 231 Kenyan students spent money 
pursuing a degree that has been deemed value-less in Kenya. This is an important 
example for anyone in a position of responding to lack of local opportunity, and 
needing to look elsewhere to find a chance at university education. 
Crux Point: Local Recruiting by Non-Kenyan Universities 
In examining what I am calling the responsive discourse of alternatives, I met 
with representatives of some of the recruiting agencies and international universities 
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that operate within Kenya. While on my final research trip to Kenya in July-
September 2007, I learned that one such agency had recently opened a small office 
in Nyali, just a few miles north of downtown Mombasa. The recruiting agency 
maintains its main office in Nairobi, where it is joined by a number of similar 
agencies79. I went to the agency office and met with the single agency 
representative working there. 
The agency recruiter was holding an open house the afternoon that I visited 
(September 10, 2007). In addition to speaking with the recruiter who works out of 
that office, I also had a chance to speak to a British university representative who 
was on a recruiting trip and was in Mombasa that day to speak with any interested 
students, and to begin ascertaining how viable a recruiting market the coast 
constituted. 
I asked the recruiting agency representative what the rationale was for 
opening the office in Mombasa. I was told, 
There was a demand for students from here, and it wasn‟t feasible for them to 
go all the way to Nairobi. So they do everything here and we forward their 
application and visa application. 
 
The feasibility to which the recruiting agent was referring was cost-based. It is 
expensive to travel to and from Mombasa and Nairobi. The Mombasa office of the 
recruiting agency had only been open for six months when I visited, and had ended 
up processing materials for six students who ended up going overseas for their 
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 A partial list of the organizations that do operate in this manner would include: Australian Education 
Consultants; AUSI – Australian University Services International; British-Canadian International 
Education; Canadian Education Consultants Network; Dovec Education Consultants – East Africa; 
Education Malaysia Limited (for Malaysia only); Global Education Counseling; KenRuss Ltd. (for 
Russia only); Lawrie-Green Education Associates; Millennium Global Education Services; Overseas 
Education Advisory Centre; Pan Africa Focus; Uniserv LTD.; and Wisemen Trainers & Consultants. 
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studies within that period. When asked about the services the recruiting agency 
provides, I was told, 
We help students with career counseling, university admission, visa guidance. 
But this is mainly done for the universities that we represent, which are about 
40 in the UK, one in Malaysia, one in Dubai. 
 
The timing of the recruiting agency‟s decision to open an office at the coast 
interested me. It coincided with the arrival in Mombasa of satellite campuses of both 
Methodist University and Kenyatta University. It seemed to be that the recruiting 
business was another example of recognition that there existed a need for a 
university presence at the coast. When I asked the university recruiting agent how 
long it took to establish whether a market would be viable for them, I was told, 
I would say it takes at least six months to a year to get familiar with the 
market and be able to develop strategies and an understanding of the 
business, and the process. 
 
I asked what steps the university took to gauge the market, how did they 
approach it. I learned that that they engage 
Local partners, and if there were [an opportunity for us], then we would come 
and see what the potential was, and to meet them, and see what the end 
results are. And if it didn‟t produce then we would decide to move away. 
 
When asked what the current view – after six months of operation at the coast 
– of the coast market was, the recruiting agency representation and the university 
recruiter concurred that  
To the U.K. from Mombasa, you are probably talking a hundred to two 
hundred students, as a ballpark figure, you know, maybe a bit generous, but 
that would be the maximum, I would say.  
 
I followed up on this, asking what the limiting factor(s) were. Unsurprisingly, 
the recruiting agency representative said that it came down to, 
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Money. Money. They have the grades. It‟s just the funding. 
 
There are plenty of students from the coast who “have the grades.” The 
daughter of the woman I profile in the vignette above had the grades. Tens of 
thousands of others around Kenya have the grades. Nearly as many do not have the 
funds. And so many of those who might otherwise qualify for international 
opportunities will be closed out for financial reasons. 
Nevertheless, I believe that these international opportunities will continue to 
be pursued, as the vignette I offered earlier shows. This is because the lack of 
available spaces at public universities in Kenya continues to necessitate the creation 
of individual responses. And so each year students work through what their 
possibilities are, and each year recruiters work with those Kenyans who want to see 
if it is possible to join those already studying overseas. 
This constitutes an active response to the limited possibilities that exist at the 
coast (and elsewhere in Kenya). It is, in my view, evidence of the engagement 
between absence at the coast and possible presence elsewhere. It is a response 
that will be transformed as a fuller range of university possibility takes up space at 
the coast. It may not eliminate the outward look for opportunity, but this is, after all, a 
historically well-rooted practice. 
Crux Point: The Universal Education Trust Fund 
The final crux point I wish to examine in this chapter is one that I believe 
exists as a response to a range of discourses discussed up to this point. While in 
Mombasa, I began asking whether there were any organizations and individuals who 
financially supported coastal students‟ pursuits of higher education. Within my 
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conception of a responsive discourse of alternatives, and given the relative paucity 
of university options available locally, I see such support as directly engaging the 
marginalization of successful students whose lack of opportunity could be mitigated 
if funding assistance were identified. What I ended up finding stands as perhaps the 
strongest response to marginalization that I encountered. 
I had the opportunity both to meet and to interview the founder of the 
Universal Education Trust Fund (UETF), Amir Swaleh, and to attend the ceremony 
in honor of 63 Kenyan students who are presently in Russia, where the UETF is 
sponsoring the entirety of their five year medical studies. The UETF is devoting 
approximately $3 million to this particular effort, which is but one of the ways they 
are working to support education in and for Kenyans. I want to take time and space 
here to describe the work and the history of the UETF within the context of higher 
education – as I have previously described it – at the coast. I will cite at length 
directly from my interview with Swaleh. 
After I had briefly described what I was in Mombasa to research, I asked 
Swaleh about the origins of the UETF, and about what he saw happening that 
spurred his interest and effort? He replied that, 
I started this program because I personally went through a bursary. I was 
sponsored by the Catholic Church until I finished my “O” Levels. And then “A” 
levels, I was sponsored by the school, Ali Dinar Visram80. So I never paid any 
school fees. Then I went to the University of Nairobi. 
 
Swaleh began his response by speaking from his personal experience. As a 
poor child (he was an orphan), he had few options. He then continues, explaining 
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 Still one of the best schools in Coast Province. In fact, in results from the Kenya Certificate of 
Secondary Education exams for 2007, Ali Dinar Visram was the top district level school in Coast 
Province. 
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how the sponsorship support enabled him to attend law school, after which he 
established his practice in Mombasa. Once his practice began, in 1989, he 
explained that 
Because I [had been] sponsored by the Catholic Church, I wanted to give an 
opportunity to people like me, who, if given the opportunity, maybe tomorrow 
they will come and assist others. So I started this program by giving bursaries 
to about five students. And, I continued slowly. In 1993, I had about 50 
students – primary and secondary school. [By] 1996, I had 150 students. At 
that time, I had a budget of about KSh100,000 a month81. 
 
By this point, and as may be inferred from the level of giving, Swaleh‟s law 
practice had grown quite successful. And, as more students were sponsored, even 
more learned of the opportunity. And so, in 1998, Swaleh told me, 
I talked to a friend of mine . . . I am an orphan. He is also an orphan . . . He 
had finished at Kenyatta University. He was doing economics. So, I told him, 
this is what I have. He said, „fine, let‟s make it big, you know‟ . . . So we 
registered an organization, in 1999, called Universal Education Trust Fund. 
Yeah. So, and I became the chairman of the Fund. And within one year, with 
the grace of God, this man started doing very good business, and we were 
able to sponsor - in the year 2000 - six hundred students. 
 
By this point, the UETF was still sponsoring only primary and secondary 
school students. However, within a couple of years, by 2003, the Kenyan 
government had more fully implemented a free primary school system. UETF‟s 
efforts then turned toward the possibility of sponsoring some students for university. 
Swaleh said, 
In 2002, we expanded the program to cover universities. So, we started 
paying school fees for university students who do specific fields like medicine, 
law, engineering, architecture . . . Then, [by] 2005 the program expanded. In 
2005, we had 6,000 students countrywide . . . Today, we have 7,800 
students, with a monthly budget of $150,000 a month. 
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 This amounted to an approximately $1,400 per month, out-of-pocket expense for Swaleh. 
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The UETF‟s effort, again, can be seen as a direct response to the broader 
marginalization discourses around education in coastal Kenya. Swaleh, et al‟s 
energies went into identifying students who would have encountered financial 
difficulty if it had been left to their own family resources to fund their further 
education. These students had to be academically strong enough to be admitted to 
university in Kenya. UETF gave the sponsored students mobility, the sponsorship 
went to the institution the student enrolled in. Thus, the UETF was aiding the 
students in their response to the political, societal, and financial forces that might 
otherwise have kept them from transforming their circumstances.  
I asked what kind of review the UETF did of its sponsorships, and how it 
measured whatever impact it felt it made. Swaleh told me that, 
In 2005, we sat down, and we tried to look back on how much we have 
achieved. And we realized that even our goals have not been achieved. [But] 
in what sense? We still don‟t have many professionals within our 
communities. We still don‟t have people very educated up to university level 
from our community. So, we said something must be wrong somewhere. Why 
is it that our students drop at “O” levels? Even students who get B, B+, A- [in 
secondary school leaving exams] are not able to go to the university, because 
we don‟t sponsor students who go to do geography, or history, or Kiswahili. 
 
Here Swaleh admits that UETF prioritized the fields of study it would sponsor, 
which were the very fields of study that were the most sought after at Kenya‟s public 
universities (medicine, engineering, etc.), and had fairly small cohorts on entry. In 
response to this realization that his efforts were not helping his community as much 
as he wanted, he told me that,  
We decided to undertake a study to see how the program can achieve its 
goals. And we realized that unless we branch out, and sponsor students to do 
medicine abroad, we will not be able to, you know, get benefit or add value 
from this program. So, I went to China. I went to India, Malaysia, and Russia, 
to see . . . . . because these are the places where you can get cheap 
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education. So, when I went to India, I realized most of the Indians now go to 
Russia to study medicine. When I went to Malaysia, I realized the government 
of Malaysia sponsors 1000 Malaysians every year to go and study medicine 
in Russia. In English, not in Russian. In English, because Russian universities 
– the government subsidizes the cost of education, even for foreigners. 
 
This point makes the explicit connection between what opportunities are 
available for university education in Mombasa (few), what is available elsewhere in 
Kenya (limited spaces), and what might be available if one could search in the wider 
world. Swaleh was able to search. He engaged and responded to the forces that 
marginalize the people of his community. And because the UETF had itself become 
such a sizable force, he was able to negotiate. 
So, we realized that to send a student to America to study medicine, we will 
need $20,000 a year. In UK, we will need 15,000 pounds. In Russia, we will 
need $5,000 - inclusive of accommodation per year. So, with the help of the 
Russian embassy, and our embassy in Moscow, we got in touch with several 
universities and we came up with a program which started this year. And I am 
glad to tell you that this year we are sending 60 students to study medicine in 
Russia. 
 
UETF, though overtly engaged in efforts to strengthen Mombasa‟s Muslim 
community, is not devoted solely to supporting Muslim students. The Fund will assist 
non-Muslim students whose circumstances meet the Fund‟s stated goals of support. 
Swaleh said, 
[Our fund] is supposed to be used to uplift the standard of living of Muslims . . 
. because Muslim areas are the most marginalized, like Northeast Province 
and Coast [Province] . . . Our fund assists 95% Muslims and 5% non-Muslims 
. . . So, we try as much as possible to cater for Muslims students all over the 
country, plus we also go for Christian students who are very bright, and who 
cannot have access to their own . . . we have six, seven, eight students, out 
of the sixty, we have eight Christian students going to Russia. 
 
The UETF‟s move into Russia led me to ask Swaleh if the fund will be 
continuing only in Russia, or if it saw expansion possibilities in other countries – 
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even given the initial investigation‟s finding that costs in Russia were significantly 
lower than other possibilities like China or Malaysia. Swaleh said, 
We have been invited by the Chinese embassy. And, you know, they told us 
they have a number of universities doing it in English . . . We are just taking 
them to Russia [now] because we have an arrangement. We are paying a 
very subsidized amount of fees per student. And, the good thing about this is 
that 98% of these students scored very, very high marks, but with zero 
chances of being taken to do medicine at the University of Nairobi. So this is 
an opportunity to them. 
 
Referring to the possibility of sponsoring students to go to China, Swaleh was 
quite straightforward, saying, 
Well, if they give us good rates, then the airlift will be to China. 
 
Swaleh‟s energy and UETF‟s money have created a powerful counter-force to 
overwhelming marginalizing pressures. Certainly, 63 students is not a large number, 
but this was a single year‟s intake. And the UETF does sponsor some students for 
medicine, engineering, and other highly competitive fields within Kenya‟s public 
universities. In fact, Swaleh and the UETF have already begun trying to leverage 
their financial strength and 20-year history of sponsorship into agreements with 
Kenyan universities. One such effort that Swaleh described showcased the ways in 
which the existing public universities in Kenya are limited in what they have the 
resources to even attempt, never mind accomplish. Swaleh told of how he went 
personally to Nairobi University, and I met the Dean of Faculty of Medicine. 
And we told them what we do, and we told them, „Listen – if you can reduce 
the cost – not for everybody, but for us. Because we are trying to help – and 
you make it about $3,000 a year – we are prepared to bring 200 students.‟ He 
said, we are even thinking of increasing the fees. Currently, it‟s about $8,000 
per year. 
 
As the story relates, the current circumstance within Kenyan higher education 
is toward further reliance on students to pay a fuller portion of the overall costs. This 
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is supplemented by a broadening of entrepreneurial undertakings by the universities 
in response to the reduction of government subsidy of the universities. One result of 
this, and another sign of the influence UETF is able to have because of its size, its 
focus, and its history, is an increase in the number of countries in East and Central 
where UETF now sponsors students. As of 2007, Swaleh says, 
In Uganda now we are sponsoring 51 students, Ugandan students going to 
Makerere [University], Busoga University, Islamic University of Uganda [at 
Mbale], Kampala International [University‟s] western campus for medicine and 
pharmacy. A total of 51 students. We are going to increase the number by 
100 students for next year. 
 
We are opening in Tanzania in October . . . In Dar es Salaam. [In] Zanzibar, 
we are [already] there. We have ten students at the university. 
 
We have ten students in Congo . . . at Kinshasa. We have six students in 
Rwanda. And we have offered 20 scholarships to southern Sudan . . . these 
are all Christians - what they requested [from] us is to bring students to 
Uganda to do “A” levels. So, we‟re still trying to see which school we are 
going to take these students. And then after “A” levels we can proceed with 
them. 
 
With this tremendous outlay of capital, and the ability to negotiate agreements 
with institutions in a multitude of countries (if not its own, yet) I wondered if UETF 
had ever considered the idea of developing its own university at the coast, or of 
becoming a primary sponsor of another effort to create a coastal university. Swaleh 
acknowledged that there had been some investigation of that idea, but that, 
We realized it was going to be too expensive to have a university in 
Mombasa. [There would be] a lot of overhead. Because in Nairobi, the same 
lecturer who teaches in [the University of] Nairobi teaches at Daystar 
[University], at USIU [United States International University] . . . it is cheaper 
[that way]. To have professors and doctors and lecturers based in Mombasa, 
in one university – we cannot afford to pay them. We cannot afford it. 
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Conclusion 
As I have shown in this chapter, there are a number of significant and high 
profile responses to the limited access to university opportunity at the coast. The 
three crux points examined here each have engaged elements of the forces that 
have long marginalized coast pursuits of university education. Whether as a means 
to counter religious imbalance in university level by opening Kenya‟s first explicitly 
Islamic university (as against the multitude of overtly Christian universities already 
operating in Kenya), or looking to the broader world for opportunities not available at 
home, the coast region has pursued ways to fight against the marginalization it 
experiences. 
None of the efforts profiled here face a future without potential difficulties. The 
Mombasa Islamic University will be a private university, which means it will face the 
financial difficulties private institutions often face. It will have to find ways to balance 
its costs against its desire to offer any kind of comprehensive (and expensive) set of 
course offerings. If there is any question as to how such costs can cripple, see the 
last quote from Amir Swaleh – even the UETF with all its financial resources and 
philanthropic spirit does not see a private university as a sustainable endeavor at 
this point. 
International opportunities in higher education have long been part of life at 
the coast of Kenya. This is true whether from the historical perspective of pursuit of 
ongoing Koranic studies in Zanzibar, Seychelles, etc., or from a more recent past, 
wherein well-known academics from the Kenyan coast have had successful careers 
as internationally-based scholars. It remains true even as a thread connected to the 
more common path that sees thousands of Kenyans studying outside the country in 
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any given year. Yet any next individual student who enters the international market 
faces unknowns – personal, cultural, social, political, academic – that could upend 
their idea. While group programs like that sponsored in Russia by UETF may 
mitigate this because the students travel together, this kind of difficulty remains 
possible. 
There are higher education options available at the coast, whether the new 
campuses of Kenyatta University and Methodist University, the long-offered 
certificate and diploma programs of Mombasa Polytechnic, the programs offered by 
the local institutes and colleges, or even the new degree programs on offer at an 
emergent Mombasa Polytechnic University College. But for all of this opportunity 
(and remember, much of it – Kenyatta; Methodist, MPUC – is only emergent), I 
assert that the existence of the programs I have described in this chapter show that 
there is space for further moves, further options. Mombasa Islamic University has 
been pursued for too long, there are too many Kenyans going abroad for university 
education, UETF has too long a philanthropic history and too much money to be 
disappearing anytime soon. 
In the next chapter, I focus on the discourse of „a university of our own.‟ I see 
this discourse and the recent changes that have brought public university colleges to 
the coast as being the synthesis, the broad arc discursive transformation that results 
from the longstanding responsive discourse of alternatives and the moves made 
against the discourses of marginalization. The notion of „a university of our own‟ is 
not a new one, nor is it an untroubled one. I will spend some time at the narrow, 
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Fairclough-ian level, working through the complications that have defined this 
discourse over the decades.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Seven: SYNTHESIS - A „University of Our Own‟ 
 
Also vital is a strategy of geographical balance. This has to be one of the 
seven strategies of potential transformation of our universities in Africa. This 
geo-strategy is a quest for rational geographical balance. This is needed 
within each country, including the different locations of universities. In Kenya, 
the coast was the first to be literate historically, but seems to be the last to 
have a university of its own. Mombasa was literate a thousand years before 
Nairobi as a city was born. Yet Kenya‟s second city still does not have a 
university of its own. It is a case of blatant geographical discrimination. We 
need to redress the issue and try to approximate rational geographical 
balance. Mombasa and Lamu initiated literate intellectualism a thousand 
years before most of the country could read and write.82  
 
In the history of Kenya as a whole the coast was the first to be literate by 
hundreds of years and yet the coast was allowed to be almost the last to host 
a university in postcolonial Kenya. I have lectured and written about this 
anomaly, and I continue to hope that it would be corrected in the near future . 
. . But the coast has since been relegated to marginal cultivation. Mombasa is 
Kenya‟s second city in size, but it is Kenya‟s first city in age and recorded 
history. Nairobi is a product of the twentieth century, but Mombasa is older by 
a thousand years. Should it still lack a university long after six public 
universities had been established elsewhere in the country? In trying to 
correct this academic anomaly, I have become more active than ever83. (p. 
16) 
 
Are we going to have a coast university? Inshallah, yes. . . . I quoted from a 
senior respected scholar, Ali Mazrui. I use his phrase to describe my article . . 
.  First to Go to School, Last to Graduate. . . . That means we are the first 
ones who started schools in this area. But there is not a university at the 
coast. And that‟s why we say “last to graduate.”84 
                                                 
82
  Quote from Professor Ali Mazrui, Lecture at Taifa Hall, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya, 2003. 
Published in “Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations,” v.2, no. 3&4, Fall & Winter 
2003, p. 161.  
 
83
 Quote is from Mazrui Newsletter 2005, written by Professor Ali Mazrui. 
 
84
 Quote is from Dr. Abdulrazak Shaukat, at the Forum on Enhancing Excellence in Higher Education, 
held at Koblenz Hall in Mombasa, July 28, 2007 
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Introduction 
The concept of a „university of our own‟ is not a new one. It is also not 
necessarily a coast-based one. It is, however, with the changes brought in August 
2007, in many ways closer to becoming a realized one. In this regard, the discourse 
of a university of our own is the synthesis point in a transformative dialectic that 
begins with the discourses of marginalization that permeate the coast‟s relationship 
with the remainder of Kenya. In opposition to this marginalization come the 
responsive discourse of alternatives, as I described in the previous chapter. It is 
owing to the long time engagement with these responses that the situation at the 
coast is being transformed, with several university colleges now located in Coast 
Province, one of them in Mombasa itself. 
Within a more narrow construct of discourse however (Fairclough, 1992), 
there are questions both about the conception of „a university of our own‟ and about 
the form its realization is taking, and what may arise from this. During the course of 
conducting the interviews and gathering the additional resource material with which I 
have put together this study, it quickly became clear that this concept, this discourse, 
was one of the more frequently invoked: coastal Kenya should have a “university of 
our own.” As I heard and saw the phrase or its variants used85, it is a concept for 
which each of three words “university,” “our,” and “own” merits investigation for 
meaning. It is here where I will start my analysis. 
Whether the people who mentioned this notion felt that the coast region was 
“merited” or “had earned” or “deserved” a university, this notion that a university - a 
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 “University for the coast people” being one such variant; the idea that each province should have at 
least one university, at minimum, being another, perhaps less Coast-specific, variant. 
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public university - should be developed or built was and is strongly felt. Yet there 
was no necessary agreement about the path such development of the eventual 
university would take. Would, for example, it arise as first a constituent college of an 
existing university, eventually to become an independent university – as is the case 
with most of the public universities in Kenya? Or would it – should it – be established 
as an independent university from the beginning – as with Moi University, the 
singular, very contentious example in the history of the development of higher 
education in Kenya of such a university? 
And, too, given that there was no uniformly held idea of who constitutes the 
“our” of the coast – at least among those with whom I spoke – it remains an open 
question as to which people, or which communities, such a university would be for, 
or, whose “own” university it would be. Given Kenyan government policy on 
enrollment and support for public universities, there are bureaucratic and 
administrative politics that cloud any easy understanding that location of a university 
would make it something of any community‟s “own.” 
All of this can be seen as reflecting or responding to the dominant discourse 
of universities as sites of national development. Yet if this dominant discourse 
initially sought to bring the intellectual and academic wealth of the country into the 
capital city of Nairobi, it accordingly had the impact of concentrating those 
universities in the particular ethnic and linguistic communities in which specific 
populations resided. Making this connection between the establishment of 
universities with the communities in which they were located, Mwiria and Ng‟ethe 
(2007) are quite straightforward when they write that, 
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[T]he University of Nairobi is situated in the heartland of the Kikuyu 
community, and the community is, comparatively speaking, economically 
advantaged, hence its big numerical student presence at the university. (33) 
 
Mwiria and Ng‟ethe also note that those ethnic communities that do not reside 
in proximity to Nairobi, especially those that constitute a smaller demographic slice 
of the overall population, have seen their enrollment in Kenya‟s public universities 
fall well below their percentage of the overall population. Figure 3 below86 indicates 
the university enrollment side of this mismatch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: Ethnic distribution of Kenya’s public university enrollment 
 
 
                                                 
86
 The pie chart is adapted from the one shown on page 33 of Mwiria, et al (2007) 
  
While each of these ethnic communities can be found in many of Kenya’s provinces, each of them retains 
demographically central locations in specific provinces and regions – see map on page 94 for the locations 
of Kenya’s provinces. In general, the Kikuyu make up a large portion of Nairobi Province’s population, and 
an overwhelming proportion of the population of Central Province. The Meru and Embu are largely in the 
western portion of Eastern Province (contiguous with Central Province). The Kamba are primarily in the 
southern portion of Eastern Province. The Luo make up the majority of the population in Nyanza Province. 
The Luhya are concentrated in Western Province. The Kalenjin are primarily located in Rift Valley 
Province. And the Kisii are found between eastern Nyanza Province and southwestern Rift Valley Province. 
158 
 
Mwiria and Ng‟ethe tell us that, 
. . . the large presence of the Kikuyu group in the public university system 
reflects their numerical strength in the country . . .  there are geographical, 
regional and developmental factors that selectively promote higher education 
among the Kikuyu community, so that they are over-represented in the 
university system compared with other large ethnic groups such as the 
Kamba, Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin, who are under-represented in relation to 
their demographic numbers. (33) 
 
Toward the low end of the distribution of university population, Mwiria and 
Ng‟ethe note that, 
Only 6.7 percent of all students originate from the remaining ethnic groups in 
Kenya such as Teso, Mijikenda87, Maasai, Samburu, Turkana, Boran and 
Somali. These other groups individually account for no more than 1.4 percent 
of the students in the public universities. (33) 
 
What Mwiria and Ng‟ethe reveal about the population of Kenya‟s universities 
is in line with what other researchers have seen regarding the education system that 
feeds the universities. Concerning Mwiria and Ng‟ethe‟s earlier noted point about the 
comparative economic advantage of the Kikuyu population vis-à-vis advances in 
access to education, Alwy and Schech (2004) note that, 
Nairobi, the Central Province and presently the Rift Valley Province88, have 
the highest enrolment rates in all education sectors, primary, secondary and 
higher. Inequalities also exist in the number of schools and higher institutions, 
where schools in the three better resourced provinces are more numerous 
than in the other provinces, and these inequities are compounded by the fact 
that students from other regions, like the North Eastern Province and Coast 
Province, are more likely to have poor parents, a poor road network, and 
poorly qualified teachers. (273) 
 
Amutabi (2003), in his article focusing on the politicization of the education 
system throughout Kenya‟s post-colonial history, notes that, 
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 Mijikenda are the most populous ethnic group in Coast Province. 
 
88
 These three provinces are the home to Kenya‟s first three Presidents, as well as the country‟s most 
populous ethnic group, the Kikuyu. 
159 
 
[D]uring Kenyatta‟s time in 1977, of the eleven secondary schools that took 
most students to university, five, namely Kagumo (92), Thika (76), Alliance 
Boys (72), Alliance Girls (60) and Nyeri (48), were in Central Province. 
Kagumo with 92 had more qualifiers to university that year than the whole 
number of qualifiers from the whole of Western Province schools that had a 
combined total of 87. (135) 
 
Amutabi goes on to describe the actions of the Moi government, which came 
in upon the death of Jomo Kenyatta in August 1978. Over the next twenty-five years, 
President Moi would build richly endowed secondary school upon richly endowed 
secondary school, each designed to increase access to high quality secondary 
education, and thereby increase opportunities in higher education for its graduates. 
Many of these schools were built in Moi‟s own Kalenjin community. Amutabi 
comments that,  
After a few years of President Moi‟s rule, the fortunes of other provinces had 
changed vis-à-vis Central Province as the President had helped in building 
the best schools in the country especially among his ethnic group. 
Kabarak, Sacho, Moi Girls-Eldoret, Kapsabet Boys, Kipsigis Girls, Kabarnet 
Boys, Kapkenda Girls, were emergent giants and yet the positions in these 
schools were being shared equitably by students from areas that were 
previously privileged like Central Province hence perpetuating the imbalance. 
(135; Emphasis added) 
 
In this way, Moi brought high quality secondary education opportunities to his 
own community. Yet not all of the spaces at these new schools could be taken by 
local students, since their primary schools were not as numerous, nor as strong as 
those in other locations. Hence, as Amutabi points out, the results were a 
continuation of advantage toward already privileged communities. In any case, it is 
clear that the building, staffing and supporting of high quality schools during the Moi 
presidency was not focused on Coast Province. 
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This demographic distribution and imbalance was something about which the 
people with whom I spoke were well aware. And most of these people were able to 
compare Nairobi, and the benefits accruing to its nearby communities, with Kenya‟s 
next two most populous cities: Mombasa, and Kisumu.89 In Kisumu, the 
predominantly Luo community long fought for access to the benefits of education, at 
primary, secondary and higher education levels. They would only really begin to 
realize the benefits of a full range of local higher education opportunities within the 
last decade, when Maseno University90 was elevated to full university status91 in the 
early 1990s. 
In order to better understand the idea of a “university of our own” as situated 
in Mombasa, it became clear to me that the “our” in the discourse needs to be better 
defined. As some of the quotes in a previous chapter on the perceived 
marginalization of the coast pointed out, Mombasa (and the coast more broadly) is a 
cosmopolitan place, and has long been so. Strobel and Mirza (1989) extend the 
point to include the impacts of the British colonial period, writing that 
As part of a British colony, Mombasa experienced tremendous expansion, 
becoming the largest seaport in East Africa. It grew from a Muslim 
community, with a population of about 25,000 at the turn of the [19th/20th] 
century, to a cosmopolitan city of 100,000 by about 1950, and over 340,000 
by the time of the 1979 census. The migration of Africans from upcountry 
transformed the culturally Muslim community into an even more diverse city, 
                                                 
89
 Kisumu is located on the shores of Lake Victoria, in western Kenya, some 250 miles west of 
Nairobi. 
 
90
 From Mwiria and Ng‟ethe (2007), Maseno University began as a Church Missionary Society 
mission center in the first years of the 20
th
 century, eventually becoming Siriba Teacher Training 
College. In 1990, it was established as a constituent college of Moi University, and finally elevated to 
full university status in 2000. 
 
91
 Kisumu is now also home to Great Lakes University, a private institution established in just the past 
few years. 
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in which Muslims by the 1960s were the minority92. Old Town, the area of 
original settlement, remains a Muslim Swahili community93, but the newer 
settlements on the island and those spread onto the surrounding mainland 
were more eclectic. (7) 
 
So who constitutes the population of Mombasa? Who is the “our” of this 
discourse? Salim (1973) describes the political atmosphere surrounding the run-up 
to independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He cites a 1961 colonial report 
in noting that,  
Arabs, Swahili and Bajunis on the coastal strip totaled 37,000 only as 
opposed to 300,000 Africans, 48,000 Asians, and 7,000 Europeans. (240) 
 
This point can be taken in a number of directions. Looking at it from a 
particularly technocratic perspective, one interview respondent noted that the 
Kenyan government last sought to identify the ethnicity of Mombasa‟s residents in 
the census of 1989, ceasing to ask the question since then. One way to interpret 
this, it seems, is as an acknowledgement that the question had come to be too 
politically hot to continue to be asked. This person noted that the 1989 census 
determined that as much as 34% of Mombasa‟s population was of “upcountry” ethnic 
origin. 
In a different direction entirely, Benjamin (2005) writes of the Mijikenda94, who 
are far more populous along Kenya‟s coast than are the Swahili. And if only to 
further complexify this point, the histories of both the Swahili and the Mijikenda each 
identify numerous distinct sub-groups. While the Mijikenda, as noted, are more 
                                                 
92
 Per Lodhi (1994), approximately 25% of Kenya‟s population is Muslim, with far more outside of 
Mombasa and the Coast region than within. Chande (2000) allows that between 20% and 30% of 
Kenya‟s population is Muslim. 
 
93
 Old Town , while a sizable place, is but one of many sections of the island, Mvita, that is frequently 
equated with the name “Mombasa.” 
94
 In the cited work, Benjamin focuses on Katana Mkangi, the late Mijikenda sociologist, and his 
“seemingly common-sense orientation to Mijikenda history.”  
162 
 
populous, the Swahili continue to constitute a distinct, important, concentrated 
minority of the coast‟s population. 
The following quote by BK, one of the interview respondents, gets at some of 
the complexity of this issue of what a university at the coast may face, 
So, now, if I advocate for a university, it will be a university for whom? It will 
be just a university for the same upcountry people who already have the 
universities anyway. So, now it is like we are just building branches for them, 
you know, to the coast. So what I say is like, with a few Swahilis or coastal 
people we have, if now we do not give them the university, and then the ones, 
even the upcountry people who came this way, if they don‟t go to school, we 
will have a very difficult community to handle. (December 25, 2006) 
 
BK is acknowledging the heterogeneity of the present admixture of ethnicities 
living at the coast, while including “Swahili” and “coastal people” as constituencies to 
be served by such a university. Thus, the “our” in the phrase “university of our own” 
remains a nebulous idea, useful in any number of directions due to its lack of 
specificity, yet weakened by virtue of possessing that very characteristic. Again, 
though, however nebulous the definition of “our” is, its use in the local discourse 
around universities at the coast reveals just how complex the issue is, and how 
many threads there are to be parsed. 
Beyond the example of MIOME which I describe in Chapter Three and 
mention elsewhere, there was another example of an education that might have 
been “of the coast” – had it ever been built there. But Utalii College,95 though initially 
set to be built at the coast, where a majority of Kenya‟s tourism revenue is 
generated, was constructed in Nairobi. It continues to serve as a further example of 
                                                 
95
 The word “Utalii” translates to English as “Tourism,” and Utalii College is the premier higher 
education institution in Kenya with programs focusing on hotel management and tourism studies. 
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how the economic and development interests of the coast are seen as marginal to 
the interests of the Kenyan government. As is said in these two interview quotes, 
But again, it really does go back to this question of political clout. An Utalii 
College ought to have been established at the coast. I do not know how it 
happened, because I was out of the country when Utalii was established. But 
I will not be surprised if that [planned at and for the coast, but moved and 
implemented in Nairobi] is how it happened . . . (OM, September 17, 2007) 
 
Utalii College - the decision was made to set it up in the coast, and [then] they 
set up in Nairobi. I don‟t think they would have documented that. Any 
documents [in] which an appraisal was done which had suggested that this 
Utalii College should be in Malindi or Mombasa - they would have 
disappeared. You see, all this, the funding was external, so before funding 
was approved, a document had to be prepared to get an approval for that 
funding.  But at the end of the day . . . (BG, December 25, 2006) 
 
Crux Point: Moi University as a University of Its Own 
 I will return to discussion of Mombasa Polytechnic later in this chapter. Before 
doing so, however, I want to further contextualize the discourse of a “university of 
our own” by offering some perspectives on how Kenya‟s universities have generally 
arisen, and the specific way in which Moi University is very different. This difference 
opens up a discursive space for people anywhere in Kenya to question why Moi 
University remains the only example of its kind. It frames a frequently posed 
question as to why any community that is without a university should not, in fact, 
push to follow the example of Moi University, rather than the more common 
examples of constituent colleges being elevated. Where the University of Nairobi 
was gradually elevated, first from a constituent college of the University of London to 
a constituent college of the University of East Africa, Moi University was not an 
offspring of any other institution. Neither was it located in a particularly populous 
area. As the following quote states, 
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There are two ways of establishing a university. Two ways, I know of. One, 
you establish a university from scratch. For example, Moi University was 
constructed from scratch. . . . the other way is to build on the existing 
institution. (BR, July 28, 2007) 
 
Many other people with whom I spoke had related ideas about the history and 
impact of Moi University. I offer a couple of the more straightforward quotes on this 
below: 
[I]t was only when Moi came and tried to diversify in terms of decentralization 
but he also targeted areas that were predominantly of his ethnic or original 
background, that's why the second university in the country, Moi University, 
was established in Eldoret. And that was the only university, as you heard the 
professor say that was built from scratch, using the Mackay plan. (IN, July 29, 
2007) 
 
Okay, now, if we are talking about the ways, in fact, you can say, the ways of 
universities in Kenya, some of them, or most of them, they have come up as 
this constituent college of another. For example, when I was at, when I was 
learning, I was taking my degree, my first degree at Kenyatta University. At 
that time it was Kenyatta University College. It was under Nairobi. Then, after 
completing, then it became KU. The same with JKU - Jomo Kenyatta College 
of Agriculture. The only college, the only university that came up on its own 
was only Moi University. But the rest, they have started as . . . constituent 
college[s]. (KL, August 3, 2007) 
 
As often as not, though, the details I heard about the impact of the “built from 
scratch” Moi University were more sharply rendered, and/or more nuanced. As one 
person simply stated, in sharp tones, 
Moi did it [built Moi University] for his [Kalenjin] people so that they could get 
education so they can have a piece of the cake from national resources. (GL, 
August 17, 2007) 
 
There is certainly something to be said for the economic impact of the 
establishment of a university - Moi University - near the town of Eldoret, in Rift Valley 
Province. Among the fuller descriptions of this impact, there is this, 
Currently, I cannot cite any study that has been done on the economic impact 
of Moi University. But my look at what is happening in Eldoret, I can tell you 
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that there is a lot more. For example, the staff of the university have been 
able to get plots around, and build their own houses. That is development. 
The staff of the university are housed in the estates in Eldoret. If you check in 
Eldoret now - the rents - Eldoret has the highest rate of payment of rents. 
Why is it very high? Because of the factories and the university. Because 
there were not many houses in the university, so a lot of people stay in town. 
There were no matatus [local taxis] from Eldoret town to where Moi University 
is. Now, you have regular matatus there, really, many of them. 
 
Now, this is coming from nowhere . . . There is now a town that has 
developed there. Tarmac has moved from Moi University to Eldoret. So, there 
is development, as far as I am concerned.  And the university has now put up 
a campus in Eldoret town. It is one big building, and that is mainly for the self-
sponsored programs [SSP]. So, SSP is bringing in a lot of students. They 
have enough students for SSP. They have two campuses by the way, now. 
There is one that is built, and one inside town. So, that is development. So, 
here, as well, I can add that, definitely from what I can see, there is 
employment. (FV, August 8, 2007) 
 
An example of a more nuanced telling of the story might go as follows, 
I don„t know whether you‟ve been to Moi, but there was an attempt to weave 
it, the university into the local culture and practices, into the library. Well, 
they‟re dedicated to Kalenjin culture and cultural artifacts. So they are feeding 
into the notion of a university of [one‟s own]. . . And once you have opened 
that route, then it is very difficult to control it. (OM, September 17, 2007) 
 
Whether the stories of the establishment of Moi University speak to its 
creation out of whole cloth, or its economic impact on the area, or its strong 
connection with and straightforward focus upon the social, economic, and political 
interests of the people of Eldoret and the surrounding area (and their connections to 
the former President Moi), one thing seems clear given the strength with which the 
image of Moi University as a place “built from scratch” is retained in people‟s 
memories. It seems almost an iconic understanding of Moi University – it is the “only 
one” established in this way. But that is why, as the final sentence in the last quote 
cited above says, once a route is opened up, it becomes very difficult to control.  
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Politically, people have been fighting to have a university in each region. 
People have been fighting to have institutions in their respective regions. 
Depending on their political authority, they have been able to establish 
institutions based on their wishes. So, Moi University came up from nowhere, 
but it was established straight from scratch. Jomo Kenyatta came up. Egerton 
came up, and so on. Now, from the coast region there was nothing. 
Northeastern, there was nothing. Western – they were crying. Maseno came 
up. They said we want an institution. So, they were given. Now Coast 
Province did not come up with anything. (FV, August 8, 2007) 
 
The people with whom I spoke at the coast, and others with whom I spoke in 
Nairobi and elsewhere remember how Moi University got its start. Even as change is 
arriving in the provision of university opportunities at the coast, they question why 
the coast had to wait as long as it has, and why the coast, like Eldoret, was not been 
provided with a university of its own. As one person said, 
If we had someone in political leadership, let‟s say the President hailed from 
this region, I would support the establishment of the university in September. 
He . . . could commit the entire nation-state into building that university. He 
would make sure his Minister of Finance budgeted for it. He would make sure 
his Minister for Planning planned for it. He would make sure his Minister of 
Education did a charter for it. He would make sure . . . he would call donor 
governments and donor agencies.  He would go Saudi Arabia ten times. He 
would go to Libya fifteen times. He would go to China. He would do anything 
to get it done. But we do not have the capacity. (IN, July 29, 2007) 
 
Yet, the coast has not had such a political leader show up to lead this effort. As I 
described in Chapter Five, there have not been any politicians from the coast who 
have both managed to gain a foothold on power at the national level, and worked to 
bring resources to areas at the coast not bound by narrow constituency borders. As 
that discourse goes, the coast‟s politicians act in terms of a „disunity of purpose.‟ 
It seems clear that these questions are an important aspect of many people‟s 
views about higher education provision. Why Eldoret but not Mombasa? Why them 
but not us? Why some political leaders, but not “our” political leaders? These 
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questions point to why I take Moi University‟s creation to be a crux point, a turning 
point in how people understand the issue of getting a university. 
Crux Point: The Joint Admissions Board 
In Chapter Three, I described the workings of the Joint Admissions Board 
(JAB) and the influence it had on enrollments to Kenya‟s public universities. The JAB 
constitutes a technocratic, bureaucratic aspect to the way in which Kenya‟s existing 
public universities enroll their students that must be brought into this discourse of “a 
university of our own.” JAB decisions constitute, for a number of the people I 
interviewed, a significant barrier to any university in Kenya ever truly being a 
university for “its own” people, the people living in and coming from the communities 
neighboring the university. 
While I realize that I have offered a description of JAB‟s work in previous 
chapters, I want to provide additional context here as a means of showing why I feel 
it to be a “crux point” in the discourse. Mwiria and Ng‟ethe (2007) note that, 
The Joint Admissions Board was established in the 1980s for the purpose of 
regulating entry to Kenya‟s public universities. It comprises the six Vice-
Chancellors from the public universities, their deputies, registrars and deans 
of faculties and schools. It was established on a goodwill basis by the Vice-
Chancellors: as such, it is not recognized under any legislation. It is, however, 
recognized by the Commission for Higher Education and the Higher 
Education Loans Board. The JAB is charged with selecting students for 
admission to the Kenyan public universities and distributing them to various 
faculties. Its chairmanship rotates on an annual basis among the Vice-
Chancellors of the six public universities. 
 
Every year members of the board hold a number of meetings to determine the 
cut-off points for admission which vary from year to year. Based on capacities 
within individual universities and faculties/schools and in the light of students‟ 
[stated] preferences, selected students are allocated to various courses. 
Since some courses are more competitive or have smaller capacities, 
individual faculties/schools and/or departments may have specific admission 
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criteria and different cut-off points. Thus, the main criteria for admission to the 
public universities and specific courses are the available space, performance 
in the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) Examinations and 
the level of demand for [university] courses. Recent disclosures by the JAB 
show that the number of students applying for public university places has 
been declining. Even so, on average only 30 per cent of applicants are able to 
secure a place. (pp. 92-93) 
 
So, the JAB determines the baseline exam results that will open up the 
possibility to secure a place at university. Mwiria and Ng‟ethe offer further detail on 
some of the issues that have tended to make the JAB a contentious body within the 
higher educational sphere in Kenya, and one whose influence (or perhaps whose 
impact) is felt by students, parents, teachers, et al. In particular, they note that, 
The JAB has also been accused of sluggishness in selecting students for 
admission to the universities. Thus, when the Kenya Certificate of Secondary 
Education is completed, these results are announced almost a year before 
the JAB publishes its admissions cut-off points. Parents whose children meet 
the previous year‟s cut-off points are often shattered to learn that the cut-off 
points have been raised. Some critics have agreed that it is „outrageous‟ that 
it takes two years after secondary school for students to begin at the 
university. (93) 
 
But waiting more than a year for the JAB‟s decision – having already waited 
the better part of a year for the KCSEs to be graded – is only one aspect of the 
problem that has led many people to express that they note an air of capriciousness 
to the JAB‟s actions. Mwiria and Ng‟ethe, again, offer some detail, 
In order to strike a balance between the universities and the courses 
available, the board ends up admitting students to universities and degree 
programmes they never requested. To address the problem of qualified 
students being denied university admission as a result of restrictions on the 
number to be admitted, some universities have gone ahead with admitting 
more students to parallel degree programmes. Some administrators have 
contended that it is dishonest for the universities to admit regular students 
through the criteria set by the board, and then admit others separately for 
parallel programmes. Viewed in this way, it may appear that the JAB has 
reduced the whole admissions process to a gamble. Aware of these 
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weaknesses, the Vice-Chancellors of the public universities issued a directive 
to the JAB to admit only those students who meet the board‟s criteria. (94) 
 
In short, the JAB is at the center of a logjam of fundamentally important 
information – test scores, available spaces, etc. – that leave it unable to work quickly 
to meet the desires of young students (and their parents) to move ahead with their 
studies. As I noted in Chapter Six, I spoke with the mother of a female student who 
sought to enroll in medicine. The daughter had done quite well – first in her school – 
at the KCSE. Even prior to knowing what the JAB decision would be as to whether 
and where her daughter would attend university, whether she would be accepted for 
medical studies, whether she would be selected for a university that her parents felt 
was right for her, the mother was anxious as to what her daughter would do in the 
intervening time, nearly a year. The daughter did not want to waste her time not 
studying; she did not want to study something that would not match a course or 
program potentially offered to her at university; and she did not want to study at a 
place or level that would not advance her interests. She felt stuck. 
In a second example, I spoke to a woman who had 
applied for medical sciences or biological sciences – but was shunted. [I was] 
accepted for “wood science” at Moi University – [but] missed out completely 
on my chance to attend university in Kenya in the subject of my choice. (BZ, 
August 7, 2007) 
 
This woman ended up being community funded to study statistics in India at the 
undergraduate level. Her husband, also from Mombasa, did not work via the JAB 
system but instead went directly to Canada for his undergraduate studies. 
A third person with whom I spoke about this particular issue, also a woman, 
had applied to study medicine at the University of Nairobi. After waiting a year for 
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her KCSE results, and while waiting for the JAB‟s decision, she opted to enroll in a 
parallel program in medicine at the University of Nairobi. She was eventually told 
she had been accepted for the textile studies program at Moi University, by which 
point her medical studies were well underway. When I met with her, she was already 
in the third year of her medical studies, and doing well. 
The confusion that arises when people are made unsure as to whether they 
will be offered the course they desire, when writ large across whole communities, 
begins to define why I see the JAB as a “crux point” in the discourse of a “university 
of our own.” In short, the universities do not presently have a fully free hand in 
enrolling the students who will be attending there. Admission to a public university in 
Kenya is a matter that is handled at the national level effort. The impact that this 
nationalized approach would have on whether a new university developed at the 
coast – and whether such a university could be, in the present discourse, a 
“university of our own” – is noted in the following interview quotes: 
I think there are some who are for having a university and there are some 
who are against. There are some who . . . I have talked to some few people, 
and there were some who were saying even if we have a university it will not 
be the local people who will benefit. They have a feeling still that the students 
who will be brought down, the majority will be from upcountry. I think that is 
the feeling. The coast people want a university where they could take more of 
their students. Because if you go through the JAB admissions, not many of 
our students . . . And even now, with these campuses, because most of what 
they have is the fee-paying . .  . . Parallel; Model-2; Self-sponsored. I doubt if 
when we say there is a campus at the coast, if the number of people who go 
there are really coast people. (SS, August 31, 2007) 
 
[P]lacing a university at any one location does not make it the property of that 
location, the admission criteria being centralized through JAB. The curriculum 
has to be overseen by the Commission for Higher Education. And if it is a 
public university then the curriculum has to be in line with other public 
universities. So, the extent to which a university can be localized is, that‟s an 
argument - you can have some locally relevant courses, like marine sciences 
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in the case of Mombasa. But the institution admits from every corner of the 
republic. (OM, September 17, 2007) 
 
Yes, each university, as SS notes above, and as Mwiria and Ng‟ethe detail, 
has a series of alternative enrollment programs (parallel; self-sponsored; Model two; 
Model three) that allow them to accept additional students beyond those dictated to 
them by the JAB. But that choice often brushes up against the limited access many 
students and parents have to the resources necessary to pay for the more costly 
alternative programs. Kinyanjui, et al (2006) in the report96 for the Public Universities 
Inspection Board (PUIB), note that, 
Another constraint is that the current position with respect to admission of 
students to public universities through JAB is that the candidates are in limbo 
for a period of about two years between the time they sit for the Kenya 
Certificate of Secondary Education Examinations (KCSE) and their admission 
to universities. This time span leads to idleness and parents pointed out that it 
could lead to formation of anti-social behavior. The system also creates 
non-equity as the children of the rich enter university early on self-
sponsored basis whilst the poor have to wait for two years with anxiety, 
not knowing their fate. The Board notes that earlier on the government had 
tried to fill this period with the three months of compulsory national youth 
service; however, due to its militaristic nature, it was so unpopular that it was 
finally discontinued. In developing countries, the year before admission to 
universities, popularly known as the „gap‟ year is used by some students to 
travel or pursue other interests while they make up their minds about what 
exactly they want to study. (pp. 132-133. Emphasis added) 
 
Related to these perspectives on the JAB are others that speak to the belief 
some people have that the opaque processes through which the JAB make 
decisions are deemed to leave an excessive number of coast-based students out of 
the hunt for positions at university that they express a desire to pursue. A couple of 
these perspectives tracked alongside the following concern about the JAB 
elucidated by Kinyanjui, et al (2006). These map on to the perspective of the student 
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 Transformation of Higher Education and Training in Kenya to Secure Kenya‟s Development in the 
Knowledge Economy, published in December 2006 by the Government of the Republic of Kenya. 
172 
 
mentioned above, who had been offered a position in the textile studies program, 
rather than in any program more closely related to her interest in studying medicine. 
She is hardly alone, as the following indicates, 
Currently, some of the students are admitted to unpopular programmes, 
which they consider neither competitive nor strategic, and hence a drain on 
public resources. Basically, JAB allocates students to these programmes in 
order to utilize the available facilities and keep the permanent and full-time 
lecturers attached to the programmes gainfully occupied. Such courses are 
poorly subscribed since they are not demand-driven. Retention of unpopular 
programmes in the roll of academic programmes available in public 
universities should be reexamined. (p. 84) 
 
Kinyanjui takes the point further, though, in pointing out the impact on the 
universities themselves from this kind of admissions policy, 
The policy of channeling qualified students to unpopular courses can lead to 
lowering of standards, since the universities do not need to compete for 
students on the basis of quality of their programmes. In such cases, 
universities are not compelled to design and implement quality assurance 
systems and enhancement schemes. There is, therefore, no incentive for the 
universities to enhance quality in order to attract talented students, since such 
programmes are guaranteed government supported students whether their 
programmes are fully subscribed or not. The rigorous, though inflexible 
admissions process into public universities often directs a large number of 
candidates into academic programmes which they did not choose. Admission 
procedures also peg admission levels of government-sponsored students to 
bed capacity available in the universities, instead of pegging them on 
available academic facilities. (pp. 84-85) 
 
In the end, the PUIB report offers the following, somewhat watered-down 
recommendation, 
To the extent possible, students should be admitted to the degree 
programmes of their choice subject to the availability of teaching resources. 
(pp. 85) 
 
In addition to the focus of the PUIB on improving admissions processes to all 
higher education institutions in Kenya, the group focused on the geographical 
spread of such offerings within Kenya. The board travelled to seven towns and cities 
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throughout Kenya, both to visit existing institutions, and to speak with 
representatives of other communities – including Mombasa – that were pursuing the 
elevation of existing institutions, or advocating for the creation of new institutions. In 
the end, the PUIB recommended that, 
o On the basis of the above criteria, a public university in Coast Province 
should be established focusing on fisheries, oceanography, tourism 
and marine studies. Another university should be established in the 
Eastern Region focusing on dry land farming, environmental and water 
studies; and another one at North Eastern focusing on livestock 
development, renewable energy (solar and wind) and environmental 
studies. 
o New public universities should be established on the basis of proper 
planning, availability of resources, opening new frontiers of knowledge 
and research and be a catalyst for human capital and infrastructure for 
national and regional development. 
o New universities should be well-planned, appropriate and where possible 
utilize available facilities. (Kinyanjui, 2006: 41) 
 
Although the PUIB is a government body, it is unclear to me how closely the 
Kinyanjui-led group was working in concert with specific elements of the national 
government, that is, with the Ministry of Education, and, as will be seen shortly, the 
Chancellors of the existing universities. What is clear is that having published their 
report at the end of 2006, very little time was left for the national government to act 
on the recommendations had they not already been of a mind to do so well before 
the report‟s publication. 
Returning to a point made earlier about the shift away from an admissions 
policy keyed to the number of available dormitory beds, the policy shift to separate 
available dorm-based, on campus bed space from admissions levels permitted the 
JAB to announce, in August 2007, that they would be able to offer space at 
university to an additional 6,000 students each year. This would represent a 60% 
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increase from the 10,000 students who had been admitted per year prior to this 
change. Given that there are approximately 260,000 students who take the KCSE 
exams each year, and approximately 70,000 who receive “passing” marks on the 
exams, this still leaves more than 50,000 “qualified students” without a place in the 
regular intake at public universities. 
Against the stated feeling of several of the people I interviewed, others made 
clear that they felt there was no real discrimination by the JAB against coastal 
students, but rather other reasons – some revealing a different take on 
discrimination – as to why coast students have been less than fully fortunate at 
reaching universities. As one person put it, in this somewhat lengthy quote, 
That one I don‟t believe. I am from coast. And I am in the university. But I 
know there is no bias. There is no bias. Because those students from Sheikh 
Khalifa97 – why were they top on the list of medicine students if there is bias? 
We would have seen other students on top. It is just that we need to work 
more harder at coast. And I think the biggest problem is we don‟t have our 
own teachers. Most of the teachers in the schools are from upcountry. And I 
don‟t think they do their job properly. At Sheikh Khalifa, a majority of the 
teachers are Muslims and you will see the students are doing very well. 
Because they care. They care. These are our students. They push them. But 
in these other schools - I go around during teacher practice. And sometimes 
the things I see, I pity the people at the coast, when you hear the teachers in 
the staff room – they talk. . . .  
 
I think first for the coast people, we need to become more serious, and know 
our priorities . . . Most of our students, the ones at the coast, in their minds, 
they want engineering, medicine. And that is where the problem is. Some 
don‟t qualify for those types of courses. So they lose their chances because 
they never, they are not advised, I think, properly. The schools need to really 
advise properly, because you know the type of students you have. You know 
that this is medicine material, this is not medicine, this is material for 
something else. And so they don‟t normally advise them properly, and 
students normally try to choose these courses which are more marketable, 
and then in the end they lose out, because they are not choosing, they don‟t 
come to change. Like now, the university, the JAB has advertised for people 
to come and change. I doubt if you go to the Provincial Education office in 
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 A top school at the Coast, and frequently one of the top secondary schools in Kenya. 
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Mombasa that many coast people take advantage of that. (SS, August 31, 
2007) 
 
Another interview respondent, IN, offers the perspective that the existing 
bureaucracy around university admissions is unlikely to change very quickly, thus, 
One thing I must also point out is, even if we were to build a Coast University, 
there is an assumption that most of us despite our competitiveness or lack of 
it in education will have gotten an opportunity to advance to higher education. 
I want to argue to the contrary, because these universities will still have to be 
competitive. They will still have to have a certain standard of regulation as 
stipulated by the [Joint Admissions Board], and they will not have been 
allowed to simply to admit people from the coast with lower grades on the 
basis that the university is centrally placed at the coast. They will have to 
have had an entry kind of formula that maybe ups your lack of attaining those 
grades to allow, [or] to give you an opportunity to advance to your higher 
education. (July 29, 2007) 
The Synthesis: A University of Their Own? 
There has been a great deal of change in the higher education circumstance 
at the Kenyan coast in the time I have been conducting this research. Where for 
decades there were only small efforts to offer limited university-level programs at 
satellite offices in Mombasa, in the months since the beginning of 2007, there are 
now two university colleges formally established at the coast, as well as one satellite 
campus of a Nairobi-based university and a small satellite campus of a private 
university. 
However, these changes have only partially engaged the „university of our 
own‟ discourse. As I hope to show in this section, there are aspects of the 
establishment of the university colleges that mitigate some of the concerns 
embedded in this discourse. Yet there are a number of issues that remain to be 
addressed and undoubtedly changes to come in the tenor and engagement with this 
discourse. 
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I have used the first portions of this chapter to move through a set of related 
discourses – perspectives on the idea of a “university of our own” for the coast; the 
establishment of Moi University as a project specifically designed to bring large-
scale economic develop to particular areas in Rift Valley Province; and perspectives 
on the nationalized university admissions operated by the JAB. At this point, I want 
to begin to tie these discourses together. 
On August 26, 2007, The Standard, one of Kenya‟s leading daily newspapers, 
published an editorial written by Professor Ali Mazrui98. Mazrui has been, for more 
than five decades, one of the coast‟s premier scholars. Several years ago, he was 
appointed Chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology 
(JKUAT), a position he continues to hold. As the two quotes that open this chapter 
evidence, Mazrui is a man long engaged in the effort to establish a university at the 
coast. Mazrui is also a senior member of the faculty of the State University of New 
York at Binghamton, a fact that constitutes a fundamental point at the core of the 
suggestion in his editorial regarding how Kenya‟s universities could work toward 
being more responsive to their students, their communities, and to the needs of the 
country99. 
In the editorial, Mazrui poses the following question: 
But how will a coastal university of the future be really coastal if 90 percent of 
the students and staff are from Nyanza and Central province? 
 
With this question and the potential answers he offers, Mazrui has brought 
together several of the various discourses mapped out in this chapter. His 
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  Mazrui is a regular editorialist for The Standard, his column appearing each Sunday. 
 
99
  In his editorial, Mazrui also references Nigeria, where he lived for many years, and “the federal 
character of Nigeria,” as another useful analogue in his pitch for regionally-focused universities. 
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suggestion of a Kenyan analogue to the “in-state” system in operation in New York 
(a manner of quota system) would permit students from areas near to a university to 
be admitted on a platform separate from general admissions such that each 
university retains a regional appeal. This would offer a means to address some of 
the concerns about the JAB and its nationalized admissions process that I have 
outlined above. 
The regional appeal that would develop toward the universities that now admit 
a larger number of local/regional students would also open up the possibility for a 
fuller engagement of the universities by local populations. For example, as several of 
my interview respondents noted, there is already a movement among professionals 
(especially teachers) to pursue additional degree studies when such studies can be 
done with some convenience. Mazrui‟s idea has the potential to enhance such 
professional development efforts. 
Mazrui has written about such a possibility before. In this quote, from his 
Mazrui Newsletter of 2005, Mazrui had this to say about Mombasa Polytechnic and 
a university at the coast, 
It is now under consideration as a future university college and potentially a 
full-scale university. The old Aga Khan‟s dream of a coastal university may 
attain fulfillment at long last, but no longer designed to help Muslims 
specifically to catch up with their compatriots. I have been involved in these 
recent secular negotiations. Over the years, I have often complained that 
while the coast was the first region of Kenya to become literate, it seemed 
destined to be the last to have a university in postcolonial Kenya. Will my old 
technical institute of the early 1950s [MIOME] now mature into the fulfillment 
of our own dream for a coastal university at long last? (18) 
 
One interview respondent, a faculty member at one of the Nairobi-based 
universities, had this to say about Mazrui‟s efforts to establish a university at the 
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coast during approximately the same time period from which the above quotation 
was taken, 
I remember there was some effort about two, three years back. Some of us 
lecturers came together . . . and we met about three, four times. The first 
meeting we had with Professor Mazrui, Ali Mazrui. And I think that‟s one of 
the steps he took towards making Polytechnic a constituent college . . . He 
suggested that we could start by having constituent colleges before asking for 
a full university. (SS, August 31, 2007) 
 
Mazrui had made it clear in a number of fora in the past few years that he was 
working to bring a university to Mombasa. It seems clear that he was focusing on 
elevating Mombasa Polytechnic to university status. It thus seems safe to that 
Mazrui, as Chancellor of JKUAT, has been long and fully engaged in the 
negotiations to elevate Mombasa Polytechnic to a university college. And it seems 
equally clear that Mazrui‟s editorial was written with full foreknowledge of the 
announcement that would be made the following day by the Government of Kenya. 
On August 27, The Mombasa Polytechnic University College Order, 2007 
(under the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology Act, 1994) was 
published in the Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 82100. The Act formalized what the 
government has previously stated, in early May 2007, would likely occur. The Order 
announced the establishment of a University College at the coast, in Mombasa. 
Perhaps the most pertinent section of this Act, for the purposes of this work, is 
Section 3(1), which announces that  
There is hereby established a university college to be known as the Mombasa 
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Polytechnic University College which shall be a constituent college of the 
Jomo Kenyatta University. (pp. 1432-1433) 
 
Section 25 may also be understood as holding some pertinence. It reads, 
The status accorded to the University College by this order as a constituent 
college of the university shall be transitional only and the University shall 
initiate the necessary administrative and legal measures to ensure that the 
University College becomes a fully fledged university. (p. 1454) 
 
The same issue of the Kenya Gazette also announced the creation of 
Pwani101 University College102 (PUC) in the coastal town of Kilifi. PUC will be a 
constituent college of Kenyatta University. While the various sections for the two 
orders have largely identical wording, there is some differences between the 
Sections 25. Section 25 of the Pwani University College Order reads, 
The University shall initiate the necessary administrative and legal measures 
to ensure that the University College becomes a fully fledged university within 
a period of three years from the date of commencement of this Order. (p. 
1538) 
 
I find it interesting that Pwani University College, the former Kilifi Agricultural 
and Technical Institute (KATI), with its previous focus on those areas its name 
mentions, has been put on a three year timetable toward achieving full university 
status. Mombasa Polytechnic, on the other hand, while in a „transitional” state as a 
university college, is in a more open-ended situation. I will be interested in watching 
to see what occurs around this issue over the coming years. 
The elevation, or potential elevation, of Mombasa Polytechnic (the former 
MIOME), in particular, was something that several interview respondents spoke to. 
Here is one perspective on the issue of the „transitional‟ period, 
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 “Pwani” translates from Swahili to English as “coast” or “shore.” 
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 Pwani University College Order, 2007. 
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MIOME was nationalized by the central people up there in Nairobi. Now we‟re 
going through the same syndrome again. The Mombasa Polytechnic which 
was beginning to be our own somehow, though not really our own is now 
taken over by a national university which is run by the people up there. So, 
although you‟re saying this is going to evolve and eventually . . . in a three 
year period of time it won‟t happen. It‟s not going to happen. So JKUAT is 
going to controlling Mombasa Polytechnic as a constituent college for ten 
years, twelve years, I don‟t know. They will give it up eventually though. (ER, 
September 15, 2007) 
 
In a comment that described a longstanding perspective among many at the 
coast, rather than necessarily a currently held perspective (albeit newly engaged by 
recent changes), respondent, OM, had this to say, 
Coast people were not prepared to accept the elevation of the Mombasa 
Polytechnic into a degree institution. That was not enough, because it did not 
fit into their image of what a university ought to be. And being relatively non-
technical in character, I think they would feel more at home not with a 
polytechnic that is offering technical degrees, but with an institution that also 
studies culture and civilization.  (September 17, 2007) 
 
This perspective that OM elucidates concerns a belief among some that were 
MIOME/Mombasa Polytechnic elevated, the coast would not simply gain the 
university so many have been seeking, it would also be losing a nationally 
recognized technical training institution. This was something that few people wanted. 
In fact, even as Mazrui is a primary actor in the current changes, for some people, 
these changes amount to an example of the very “autocolonization” Mazrui has 
decried. 
But the elevation of Mombasa Polytechnic and the former KATI brought other 
perspectives to the fore. Interview respondent, IN, had this to say about any thought 
that because the coast now had a couple of university colleges that it would 
automatically be easier to be admitted to university, or thought that coast-based 
academics might be the ones teaching at these institutions, 
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You might find a university that has more American professors than it does 
have local professors, because maybe you do not have the professors locally. 
And we might have more students [from] outside Coast Province getting 
admission by their competitive grades, and maybe the affordability of the 
University. And we could ascribe or say or allude to some kind of a new form 
of marginalization. (July 29, 2007) 
 
OM also spoke to the issue of increased chance for coast-based students to 
be admitted to university now by agreeing with Ali Mazrui‟s take on regional 
enrollment in universities, and the fact that, as Mazrui himself writes, “these 
adjustments need to be negotiated and worked out in the future.” OM notes, 
That is the next level of argument, but it will take years before it becomes part 
of the policy discourse. It will probably work then as a question after we have 
established a critical number of universities. Then we shall afford to ask 
ourselves that question: what are all these institutions doing in the context of 
local development. That is not part of the discourse at the moment. And as 
you know, even in secondary schools, secondary education in this country, 
there is a great deal of resistance to the notion of a quota system. It would 
take a lot of political will to create two levels of universities: provincial 
universities and national universities. There just isn‟t a sufficient concentration 
of intellectual energy going into the thinking about this. (September 17, 2007) 
 
Conclusion 
By way of wrapping up this chapter on the discourse of „a university of our 
own,‟ I want to highlight two Letters to the Editor, each printed in the final week of my 
time in Kenya. The two letters, placed side-by-side, show the power of this 
discourse. The two authors, one whose name indicates that he may originally have 
come from the coast, and the second, who is from Nairobi, each invoke the idea of 
possession of the university, though they do it from opposed points of view. 
Here is the first letter, published in Coast Week, on September 14, 2007: 
“University Status is a Reason to Celebrate”: Presidential political goodies or 
not, coast people have every reason to be elated for being given three public 
university colleges by the government of president Mwai Kibaki. After more 
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than forty years of independence and two successful governments of Mzee 
Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi that span for all those years but five, the 
region had been marginalized in all aspects of developments particularly in 
education. Other than the sparsely and least populated North eastern 
Province, all the country‟s other six provinces have public and private 
institutes of higher learning, or universities. That is until when the head of 
state was visiting Coast Province the last week of August. 
 
In that Tuesday‟s Kenya Gazette, President Kibaki upgraded six institutions in 
the country to university status, two of them located at the coast. This is a 
good reason to celebrate. Although plans for Pwani University were already in 
the high gear after the government received the much needed financial boost 
from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but the Kibaki government still went ahead 
and upgraded Mombasa Polytechnic (or MIOME) to a university college 
status. In addition, Jomo Kenyatta University – Taita Taveta Campus, a 
constituent college of JKUAT, will soon open its doors for students. 
 
Coast people should not allow this educational development and or 
advancement [to] be played down or trivialized by anyone. When other 
provinces were being given „political goodies‟ by the founding President Mzee 
Jomo Kenyatta and his successor Daniel arap Moi, no one played down or 
trivialized the „goodies.‟ 
 
Why should the coastal people allow that to happen now? With three 
university colleges in the province, the region now wants a constituent college 
or satellite campus of Utalii College to be set up in Mombasa or Malindi. As 
the backbone of the tourism industry, the coast region deserves at least a 
satellite campus of Utalii College if not a fully fledged Utalii-like College. 
 
Education is the key to any and all developments. (Omar Ahmed Ali, 
writing from Philadelphia, USA) 
 
Here is the second letter, published in the Daily Nation, September 17, 2007: 
“University in Coast Province is a national institution”: When President Kibaki 
recently signed a gazette notice for the establishment of a university in Coast 
Province, some politicians from the region misconstrued his good intentions. 
One prominent leader was quoted saying that the president had given the 
coastal people “what was rightfully theirs.” 
 
He further hoped that all subordinate staff for the institution would be recruited 
from within the province, instead of being imported from other parts of the 
country. An assistant minister saw the university as a gift to coast people. 
 
. . . I would suggest that the institution be named Oceanic University of Kenya 
rather than Pwani or Coast University, a title that is prone to abuse by 
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proponents of regionalism. Alternatively, it can be named the University of 
Fort Jesus, in recognition of one of the greatest historical features at our 
Coast. (Mabuto Chebweche, writing from Nairobi) 
 
I find the contrast between these two letters to be fascinating. The first letter, 
written by someone who appears to be originally from the coast, extols the decision 
to bring the university colleges to Mombasa and Kilifi. He speaks to the perceived 
long-term marginalization of the coast by Kenya‟s previous governments and 
leaders. He explicitly mentions the perception that other regions and peoples in 
Kenya had long been recipients of “political goodies.” And he warns others not to 
think that the people of the coast are finished with their requests. For him, there 
remain a lot of efforts to pursue. 
The second letter, from someone whose family name indicates that he may 
be, by heritage, from Rift Valley Province, warns the people of the coast away from 
just the kind of thoughts the first letter writer expresses. He reiterates a point made 
in the JAB, the PUIB and other technocratic, bureaucratic pronouncements that all 
institutions of higher education are, in fact, national institutions. Many of the 
interview respondents spoke to this very point. 
But I do think this second writer has taken the point a bit far when making the 
suggestion that the newly announced university change its name from Coast 
University (a.k.a. Pwani103 University). This suggestion immediately raises at least a 
few questions for me. What would this writer do, then, with “Moi University?” Does 
the writer believe that no one outside of Rift Valley Province is troubled by how much 
largesse the former president bestowed upon his own people? And what does the 
writer have to say about the name bestowed upon the newest of Kenya‟s public 
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universities, Masinde Muliro University? Muliro was one of the heroes of 
independence, as well as a hero of the early 1990s push for multi-party democracy. 
Muliro was also Luhya, and as such, the name of the university speaks directly to a 
specific ethnic group. What would the writer of the letter to the editor think about 
someone requesting that the names of these institutions be changed? 
One interview respondent spoke directly to this set of questions in 
commenting about friends employed at Maseno University, in Western Kenya. LM 
noted, in our discussion about a university at the coast, that 
Maseno would be a very interesting place to study . . . I have friends at the 
university who say it is 80% Luo in terms of faculty. And that is absolutely 
shocking because it suggests that when you locate a university in one place, 
there are certain benefits that accrue, that go to the home crowd. The 
gentleman who told me this is from Western Kenya. He told me I am a 
foreigner in this university. He is from Kakamega . . . I think that if there is any 
community that has shown tolerance, in this country, in terms of tolerance 
difference, it is the coast community. They have seen difference forever. (July 
23, 2007) 
 
In a sense, the Kalenjin have “their” university – Moi University. The Luo have 
“their” university, Maseno University. The Luhya have “their” university – Masinde 
Muliro University. And now the people at the coast are on a path toward having 
“their” universities: Pwani University and Mombasa Polytechnic University (once they 
are elevated to independent status). 
In the end, for me, Ali Mazrui‟s question, offered in an interview conducted by 
the Standard and published on December 22, 2007, remains a good one, though, 
and stands as a fair point with which to end this chapter. Mazrui asked, 
And why did we have to wait until 2007 before allowing Kenya‟s second city 
(Mombasa) to have a public university – when far smaller towns had been 
given campuses of their own? 
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The coast now has public university colleges. There is transformation here. 
There is presence where there had been absence. What I had originally planned on 
writing about has become something more. 
But this is not the end of the cycle. For what arose as the synthesis of the 
establishing dialectic as I have constructed this history can now be established as 
the thesis of an emergent dialectic. The coast has several subsidiary variations on a 
public university. Next up is to examine the questions that arise as this instantiation 
of the pursuit is embraced, questioned, changed. 
In the next chapter, the conclusion to this work, I will examine the events that 
have led to the present circumstance. I will also pose some of the questions and 
challenges that face the university colleges as they crystallize into their future form. 
There won‟t be an „end‟ to this story, per se, merely a place to stop, temporarily, until 
the questions and challenges are clarified, and the field of further study is revealed. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Eight: EMERGENT THESIS – What Comes Next? 
Introduction 
In the structure of discourses that I have adopted throughout this work, the 
recent gazetting of the university colleges at the coast described in the previous 
chapter completes one dialectic cycle. I saw marginalization around local access to 
university education as an establishing discourse against which the responsive 
discourse of alternatives was engaged. I see the creation of the university colleges 
as adapting aspects of the marginalization as well as the response to it and building 
a new circumstance vis-à-vis university education at the coast. This new 
circumstance, though, is not an end game move, but a turn toward a new dialectic 
position. 
The present circumstance is the emergent thesis. Many of the people with 
whom I have spoken have already begun discussing and debating the relative 
aspects of how the new institutions will be perceived. Although it was an infrequently 
focused upon aspect of the interviews I conducted, the issue of the quality of 
Kenya‟s newest university colleges, and how such quality will be retained and 
improved upon, did come up. Related to this are the comments made by several 
interview respondents as to the impact of the entrepreneurial push ignited at the 
existing public universities as the national government reduced – in ever larger 
proportions – its share of the financial support to the universities. Also of interest will 
be the ways in which the presence of these elevated institutions changes (or does 
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not change) the perceptions of higher education – and schooling more broadly – 
held by the residents of the coast, especially as regards access to university 
education for girls and women of the coast. 
Finally, the issue of how these new university colleges (and eventual new 
universities) fare in the global marketplace for Kenya‟s university students will be 
something to keep an eye on. Though globalization was not explicitly mentioned by 
many of the people I spoke with, it did play out in one particularly interesting way – 
how the coast, as a bastion of Islam within Kenya, is viewed by foreign powers such 
as the United States and Britain, and what ways Kenya‟s foreign policy vis-à-vis the 
global powers impacts opportunities for coastal residents. 
As I have already alluded, none of these points were a primary focus of the 
interviews I undertook. As such, I do not treat them in depth here. Rather they 
should be taken as, and so this chapter should largely be read as, a statement about 
what issues serve as substance for further research. 
Discourse: Quality and Entrepreneurship 
In my introductory chapter, I wrote of the expectations created in Lesotho 
when new schools opened. In the case of the school at which I taught, Emmanuel 
High School, the opening was met with interest by a sufficient number of students 
such that under-enrollment was not going to be an issue. What was likely to occur, 
and what appeared to be understood (as I eventually learned) was that the school 
itself was not expected to produce strong results (as shown by student performance 
on national exams), at least not until it had been around for a while. There was a 
good deal of surprise, then, when after the school‟s first year producing high school 
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graduates (coinciding with my first year teaching there), we actually had one student 
pass the national school leaving exam sufficiently well to qualify for the national 
university. 
I raise this point here because it resonates with some of the questions and 
comments raised by a few of the people I interviewed. There is already a discursive 
engagement with the new university colleges around the expressed belief, or lack 
thereof, that the new university colleges will be (or at least become) “quality” 
institutions in the eyes of the people of the coast. In order to do this, it is necessary 
to ask whose definition of “quality” will be operative? It is also important to 
understand what time frame will be granted to these new institutions to become 
“quality” universities. And beyond these points, the circumstances under which 
„quality‟ will be gauged needs to be known: 
I sometimes wonder whether the government really understands the problem 
of quality. The private sector understands it. But then I don‟t think they focus 
very seriously. They have a strange idea of what quality means, it is just 
specific gains for themselves. I don‟t think they care about question of quality. 
They focus not on educational terms, but on fiscal terms. Maybe resource 
development terms, except for maybe teachers and special groups, 
engineers, perhaps . . . but I don‟t think they understand the issue of quality. 
(OM, September 17, 2007) 
 
This notion of quality being measurable in financial terms was voiced by 
several of the people with whom I spoke. This was raised, in part, I believe, because 
the existing universities – the ones controlling the coast‟s new university colleges – 
are based elsewhere and are thought by some to be pursuing increased enrollments 
as much to satisfy bottom-line financial interests than to expand access to university 
education. As interview respondent, NG, stated it,  
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One of the side consequences of this [university expansion] is that most of 
the universities have gone down enormously in quality . . . Essentially, they 
are after recruiting, using the students from here to be able to increase their 
funds from fees and other things. It is not because they‟ve got a deeply 
entrenched interest in the academic development either of the people or the 
area, or what it is offering in terms of research, and pursuits of that kind . . . 
The essential thing is that they try to grab whatever funds so that they will be 
able to get fees from teaching students. (July 31, 2007) 
 
NG continued, 
Egerton, Kenyatta, Nairobi . . . all have been trying to establish campuses 
here, with a view to expand their studentship in order to generate more fees. 
None of them - either through the mouthpieces of the Chancellors or Vice 
Chancellors – despite the fact that Ali Mazrui is Chancellor of JKUAT - has a 
long term interest in stimulating or promoting research . . . In other words, it is 
going to be one of the same. And they are going to be suffering from the 
same illnesses. 
 
Ali Mazrui‟s long-term interest in research and his presence as Chancellor of 
JKUAT (the university charged with administering the Mombasa Polytechnic 
University College) notwithstanding, another interview respondent, ER, had this to 
say: 
I‟ve seen the monetary side of JKUAT driving them to the point where – you 
might say it is the primary institutional factor at the level of the administration. 
There are teachers there who say, fine, this is great . . . JKUAT is, now I think 
has something like 16 affiliated institutions . . . now I don‟t want to be too 
much against them, because it‟s a fantastic university. But this dimension of 
the university - I think they‟ve gone the wrong way. (September 15, 2007) 
 
This respondent continued, 
At a certain point, the universities are told you‟ve got to define income 
generating projects. The leader in this, by far the leader, is JKUAT. And 
JKUAT begins to establish affiliations with other institutes, bringing them 
under its wing, charging very high amounts of money to those institutes – for 
internal examining and processing exams, because those exams have to be 
processed by the Senate of JKUAT. These are . . . you can argue it both 
ways . . . they are taking higher level education out to many parts of the 
country, many institutes that would never have it. They don‟t even have the 
educational integrity or system to do it . . . But I‟ve seen JKUAT over-expand 
beyond their capacity to monitor this properly. 
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Now, the JKUAT model provoked interest from other universities, because, 
who knows what‟s driving it, and I hesitate to judge. Is it being driven 
commercially? To a large extent it is. Is it driven academically? You can justify 
it academically, and no doubt it is bringing opportunities to people for 
education in areas where they wouldn‟t otherwise have it . . . So, they‟re 
spreading opportunity . . . Other universities start following suit. Whether it‟s 
KMU [Kenya Methodist University], or . . . (September 15, 2007) 
 
Mwiria and Ng‟ethe (2007) engage this point of expansion leading to over-
expansion leading eventually, if not inevitably, to reduced quality. They then connect 
these with the expressed need to increase revenues for the existing public 
universities. They write, 
Critics have questioned the standards of newer programmes, especially those 
mounted in centres outside the universities. For example, JKUAT‟s courses 
are offered in other centres, including commercial colleges. Since the major 
objective of these commercial colleges is to make a profit, there is a strong 
likelihood that quality will be compromised. In addition, the entry criteria to 
these self-sponsored programmes are less competitive than those for the 
regular programmes, which also raised doubts with regard to the quality of 
some of the graduates. (100) 
 
The Mwiria and Ng‟ethe quote above continues, mentioning medical training 
courses and the self-sponsored programs being offered by Egerton University, 
Maseno University and Kenyatta University specifically. The current standards by 
which students are accepted into “regular” medical studies programs means only 
students with aggregate scores of “A+” or “A” on their Kenya Certificate of 
Secondary Education (KCSE) exams are getting in. This leaves hundreds, if not 
thousands, of students at the “A-” and “B+” levels with only self-sponsored 
opportunities left to them if they want to pursue medical studies at a public 
university. But the question of how these self-sponsored programs are perceived led 
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one interview respondent, SS, to skip over these otherwise quite solid “A-“ and “B+” 
students and move right on to pose the following question, 
How do you advertise for medicine and you are asking for students of “C+”? 
Yet at the University of Nairobi, even there are some students of “A-” who 
have been rejected? Not only through regular, even Model Two. Because of 
facilities, the issue of facilities, they don‟t want to compromise on standards. 
So, if you have an “A-” sometimes if there are more people in front of you with 
a better grade, those are taken and you are left out. And how do you start 
medicine surely with a “C,” “C+”? What type of doctors are we going to 
produce? Expanding is [one] issue, but we should also look at what we are 
going to produce. Because I wouldn‟t want to put my life in the hands in 
someone who got a “C” in biology. (August 31, 2007) 
 
Clearly, then, the ways in which existing public universities are expanding 
leave open the question of how they are going to maintain quality levels. For years, 
expansion was the province of open learning, self-sponsored and distance learning-
type programs, where students who had not received the exam results necessary to 
enter university directly had the chance to work toward their degree – provided they 
had the funds to do so. But with university college expansion, and eventual 
university expansion, more slots open in so-called “regular” programs, and questions 
about quality arise. 
Yet the public universities are doing more than simply expanding the number 
of locations at which they offer their academic programs. As one interview 
respondent put it, 
The resources which are coming from the state are becoming fewer and 
fewer. So now we have been told, we are being told to look at the resources. 
You see the university role was initially . . . the amount of land, the amount of 
buildings, human resource capacities. Since you see, we cannot keep on 
teaching people to be strategic, if ourselves we are not strategic. It was ironic 
that for all those years the University of Nairobi has been in existence it is 
only about two or three years back that we started having strategic plans. Yet 
we teach strategic planning . . . I have seen in Nairobi [the university is] trying 
to have a very nice bookshop . . . and moving toward hostels [with] some 
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boarding facilities. Putting up hostels to rent to outside students or other 
people who are interested. Catering facilities, outside catering. That‟s what 
the university is going into. I mean those are things we teach our students, 
but we actually don‟t go ahead and implement them. That‟s where we are 
heading. (KJ, September 11, 2007) 
 
Interview respondent, IN, put this together with the political environment – the 
run-up to a tightly contested, and ultimately seriously troubled election – in which the 
Government of Kenya announced the new university colleges, noting that,  
This quick fix is a reaction to a political, a popular sentiment, what some times 
drains the energy out of our country. And [it] gets us to a lot of disillusionment 
after that . . . So if you need change, let it be done properly. If you need a new 
constitution, let it be done properly. If you need a university, let it be done 
properly. All of these universities that have been established have been 
established – even if they are organic – they had a period in which they were 
constituent colleges. So, they were getting used to be a university . . .  I would 
hope that we exercise a little more patience. I am not trying to be critical of 
the process that is there. If it works, I will support it to its fullest. I support this 
effort entirely. But the critical point is it must be done right. (July 29, 2007) 
 
The feeling that the new university colleges announced in Coast Province in 
August 2007 were keyed to the political needs of President Kibaki‟s reelection drive 
was expressed by several of the people with whom I spoke. In general, though, this 
was not taken in a negative light, as people were simply glad to learn that Coast 
Province would finally be graced by the presence of public universities. That these 
institutions will take years to rise to the position of being seen no longer as new, but 
as being of high quality, was understood by some. As IN put it, 
I keep telling some of my friends that I don't think the solution might 
necessarily or solely just lie in establishing a university. It might just be 
symbolic in advancing the cause of education in this country, in this region. 
But it will not mean that you lower your rate to allow entry of coastals. That 
will not work. That's not going to be practical. It's not going to be a high-
ranked university globally, and it's not going to be a high-ranked university 
nationally, and there are certain competitive standards that we must adhere 
to. (July 29, 2007) 
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And so, one question to keep an eye on is how much of what has begun to 
happen at the coast is entrepreneurial activity that will recede if economic or political 
tides turn? What might be done to the schedule announcing PUC‟s elevation to full 
university status in three years, if the political tides that brought the decision turn in 
other directions? And how much, too, will the new university colleges be beholden to 
enhance revenues such that their longstanding programs – offered in the coastal 
institutions‟ status as Kilifi Agricultural and Training Institute (now PUC) and 
Mombasa Polytechnic – were placed at risk of being changed or eliminated? Will 
they be given over to quick turn-around programs, rather than substantive, coast-
related academic programs (such as marine sciences or marine engineering)? 
These are the kinds of questions that I see as worthy of the benefits of further 
examination and additional research. 
Discourse: The Higher Education of Women and Girls 
One problem that has been at the coast is the issue of girls. Many local 
people here do not want their girls to go into the interior, away from their 
families to that. And therefore, to be able to help enable girls to learn, we 
need to bring education closer to the people. So, that you remove the ideas of 
traveling. You remove the fears. You remove the expenses. (FV, August 8, 
2008) 
 
I think that it would be very significant. First it would open up possibilities for 
the girl child on the coast to access higher education. The fact that 
universities are located outside of the coast makes it very difficult for parents 
to release their daughters to long distances. No extended family. Their 
cultural practices are different. They are still quite committed to the religiosity 
of their children. And that could be disrupted with movement. So I think it 
would open up a tremendous opportunity for the girl child. And if you look at 
the figures, the national figures in terms of the transition rates for higher 
education, the girl child at the coast is quite disadvantaged. And 
consequently, there are a lot of other issues, like early marriage, which we 
know for a fact are delayed for higher education, early onset of child bearing, 
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heavy mortality rates, which go side by side with lack of access education. So 
all these things would be addressed. (LM, July 23, 2007) 
 
I have a niece who did very well in “O levels.” She is going to [Mombasa] 
Polytechnic, doing a diploma in pharmaceutical technology. She qualified to 
go do pharmacy at the University of Nairobi . . . The last thing I was told, was 
if you were living and working in Nairobi, we would have allowed [her to go to 
university there]. (BG, December 25, 2006) 
 
These three quotes exemplify a perspective on the education of girls and 
young women that appeared to be common. I have previously cited a couple of 
examples of coastal parents who have worked to find higher education opportunities 
for their daughters, opportunities that, until 2007, would have taken them by 
necessity far from their family at the coast. And I have spoken with and been made 
aware of a number of women from the coast who have already pursued university 
education, some of whom are now teaching at the university level. Yet, the 
perception remains that girls will (and perhaps, in the minds of some, should) stay 
close to home, and if this means not pursuing higher education, then so be it. For 
many, then, the presence of newly minted university colleges augurs well for the 
higher education of women and girls. 
Others, though, took the issue a bit further. Here I cite IN, who is speaking 
about the impact that having more women and girls enter higher education 
institutions could have on Kenyan society, especially Kenyan coastal society: 
Would the situation for girls improve in education, or does improvement for 
girls have to be happening at earlier levels in the system? - I think both. It will 
serve as a catalyst, yes. It‟s happening at the very earlier stages of the girl-
child education. It will definitely have an impact on the higher education level. 
But when we have more girls in institutions of higher learning, then they are 
able to serve as the role models and trickle the benefits downwards. I think it 
is an up-down kind of process. 
 
And I think if we are able to have a coast university and enroll a sizable 
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number [of girls] . . . then those girls are able to serve in such a professional 
circles in society. They will definitely have a massive impact . . . There are 
young women, my age and slightly below who have had an active role in 
students‟ organizations or were at the universities. Muslim women. coastal 
women . . . We need avenues also of sustainability . . . I keep telling my 
friends, the women, who were in university together, schools together, and tell 
them unless they start coming out, and taking some of the issues head-on, 
we really won‟t be doing any of it . . . Unless they are also able to take on 
these challenges, I don‟t see anybody doing it on their own. (July 29, 2007) 
 
Others took up this perspective of role modeling, and the benefits from which 
coastal society in general, but girls most particularly, could benefit. As LM saw the 
issue, it may well start with 
The way people learn is if they can see reflections of themselves in the 
community. To the extent that we don‟t have high visibility of seeing coastal 
professors, coastal women engineers, coastal doctors, and so on teaching in 
the university, and so forth, makes it quite difficult for the younger people to 
see the potential in themselves. 
 
LM continues, 
I know for a fact that if such a university were set up, it would, within about 
five years, transform, in a sense, how education is perceived at the coast . . . I 
think the idea is to have a presence, create opportunities for those people, for 
students, and also create an opportunity for people with Masters degrees who 
are from the coast who would like to teach in that university as a matter of 
choice to do so. (July 23, 2007) 
 
I believe that this kind of transformation will be fascinating to observe and 
investigate. And so, as with the issue of quality, this matter of how coastal society 
will be impacted by the presence of the new university colleges now that the national 
government has seen fit to invest in establishing university colleges at the coast, 
makes for worthy ground upon which to develop further research. 
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Discourse: Global Markets in Higher Education 
In earlier chapters, I have described the historical pattern of exploration of 
international opportunities in education that has long connected the coast to the 
broader world. In Chapter Six, I specifically focused upon some the international 
university education options available to coastal students. Here, I will briefly situate 
the more locally-driven perspectives on this (individual students; UETF – the 
Mombasa-based foundation; university recruiters in Mombasa) in a more macro-
level discourse of globalization. In this brief segment, I will take this discourse in 
several directions, as a means to establish a baseline for further study rather than to 
treat the issue exhaustively here. 
In the specific regional context of East Africa and students from the region 
pursuing higher education in the region, there is an Inter-University Council on 
Higher Education (IUCHE) operating in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Funding for 
the IUCHE comes, in part, from the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
SIDA-SAREC (the Swedish international development agency), DAAD (the German 
international development agency), the East African Development Bank, and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. One issue the IUCHE is focused 
upon is easier student and staff transfer of credits between accredited regional 
institutions. As Sabaya (2004) focuses on, once regional bodies like the East African 
Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
establish full accreditation and regulatory standards within their regions, other cross-
regional efforts will see the advantage to adhering to these. Eventually, Sabaya 
says, as these regional efforts solidify, they will help in the durable construction of a 
continent-wide approach to these issues. As this giving way from region-based to 
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continent-wide agreements proceeds, a more empowered group of collaborating 
African states will have engaged the General Agreement of Trade in Services 
(GATS) principles for education, thus presumably strengthening the hand of the 
African states. 
But, as Mthembu tells us, this must be done carefully: 
We need to critically review why regional integration seems to work at some 
levels and not others.  What have the lessons of the SADC Protocol, 
specifically on Education and Training, been?  What are the merits and 
demerits of unilateral actions of our sovereign governments when they deal 
with global bodies like the WTO [World Trade Organization]? Are our 
governments united enough? Are all the signatories to NEPAD [New 
Economic Program for African Development] for instance, equally committing 
to its progress? . . . Will an organically evolving set of relationships within 
certain regions suit our continent better than starting with a continent wide 
agreement? (152) 
 
This focus on regional strengthening prior to fuller engagement at the 
continental and inter-continental levels shows a desire to attend to the questions 
about globalization asked by many scholars. As Ibrahim (2003) puts it, 
The main effect of the transformation engendered by globalisation is that 
certain parts of the world, the developing world in general and Africa in 
particular, are being increasingly marginalised and subjected to the 
hegemonic control of the major actors on the world scene. According to 
Joseph Stiglitz, the former Vice President and Chief Economist of the World 
Bank, the West has driven the globalisation agenda in a way to gain 
disproportionate share of the benefits at the expense of the developing world. 
(3) 
 
Schugurensky (1999) concurs, noting that, 
Globalization, a dynamic that has economic, political, social, and cultural 
ramifications, implies the intensification of transnational flows of information, 
commodities, and capital around the globe (eroding technical, political, or 
legal barriers), the development of new trading blocs, and the strengthening 
of supranational governing bodies and military powers. This increasingly 
globalized economy is largely controlled by a transnational elite composed of 
the G-7 countries, international financial institutions and multinational 
corporations. (28) 
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The question here thus becomes how will a country like Kenya make sure 
that its education-focused needs and desires stay in line with local circumstances 
and perspectives, and avoid giving way wholly to transnational pressures? 
Chachage (2001), speaking of the emphasis placed on certain views of higher 
education as pushed by the World Bank and IMF, initially in the 1980s, notes how 
the pressure by transnational actors can push out – to the point of denying – local 
perspectives. He tells us that 
Those who formulated the programmes took what is popularly known as a 
„human capital investment approach‟ à la World Bank, uncritically. This 
approach assumes that students enrol in courses that are in demand and are 
rewarded by the market. Therefore, students‟ choices should be the strategy 
for establishing programmes. At the same time, no research was conducted 
to determine what students wanted, or what the market needed or wanted . . .  
 
Production of graduates who are employable is certainly important, as one of 
the fundamental roles of any university in the world. Universities must impart 
skills, which are usable in the labour market. However, unlike in the 
vocational training schools or polytechnic tradition, which produce operatives, 
universities are primarily charged with the task of cultivating analytic skills and 
developing critical faculties/thinking in the students . . .  
 
Any formulation of programmes that responds to the so-called global dictates 
while ignoring issues of societal relevance signals academic exterminism. 
Transformation of programmes in this regard, must start from 
conceptualization of problems facing Africa . . . without any account losing 
sight of their global context. (pp. 6-7) 
 
Kenya‟s universities are trying to manage this tension between transnational 
pressures and local concerns. One example of this balancing act might be found in 
the origins of Kenyatta University‟s open learning program. The university, as I was 
told, undertook an investigation into ways in which to expand its open learning style 
programs, and found their examples in a multitude of places – not all of them in G-7 
countries. As interview respondent, FV, noted, 
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One idea that attracted us was from Indira Gandhi University in India . . . we 
asked ourselves, if Indira Gandhi University can have 200,000 [students], how 
can it manage? We were also attracted by the idea from the Open University 
of London. And combining these two, we said, there is a possibility. So, we 
went further and looked at the Open University of Zimbabwe. Similarly, there 
was an idea from Tanzania, the Open University of Tanzania, which was 
doing quite well. (August 8, 2007) 
 
Officials at Kenyatta University pursued higher education models in a global 
environment, but did so not solely by chasing down G-7 “transnational elite” 
perspectives, but also via a South-South route, believing that universities in socio-
economic, socio-political circumstances akin to Kenya‟s might provide worthwhile 
analogues to pursue. 
It is, in part, out of the multiple perspectives that Kenyatta University sought in 
delivering expanded open learning services that the university identified places in 
which to expand their operations. Only a few years after the university‟s open 
learning options were expanded, and in response to the success of their coast-
based open learning programs, Kenyatta University began looking for a site to locate 
a coast-based branch campus, which they opened in Mombasa in May of 2007. In 
this way, Kenyatta University used global models in a way akin to how the Universal 
Education Trust Fund (UETF) has negotiated with universities in a number of non-
Western countries to educate Kenyan students who were unable to gain entry to one 
of Kenya‟s public universities in an academic field of their choosing. 
There is a more pointed way in which globalized interests impact the 
provision of higher education in Kenya, and potentially influence, not to say limit, 
such provision at the coast. Several interview respondents saw coercive possibilities 
embedded in the foreign policy pronouncements of the United States and British, 
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and the reactions to same evinced by the Kenyan government. For a few of the 
people with whom I spoke, there is a solid resonance (though, interestingly, not 
necessarily agreement) between how these governments view Islam and how the 
coast is dealt with, and both what public investment is made there, and what kinds of 
private development are allowed to move forward. As interview respondent, BZ, 
notes,  
I think I should mention he [President Kibaki of Kenya] is with the US, and 
they are very close with maybe the Saudi government and the security within 
the Horn of Africa. They are giving him, they are aiding him with a lot of 
money and resources. So they could afford to either stop this so-called 
Islamic University by supporting him immediately with this so-called public or 
Pwani University. With maybe being scared that it could be something Islamic 
when - it shouldn‟t be so. And I think or believe that maybe they shouldn‟t call 
it Mombasa Islamic University. They can just call it Mombasa University. In 
order to remove the notion, especially now with what the media is spreading 
about Islam and Muslims and whatever, then anybody who is within the 
community can benefit. (August 7, 2007) 
 
Engaging with the latter aspect of the comment by BZ, one other respondent 
questioned whether the troubles faced in the registration process by Mombasa 
Islamic University, or the long period by those pushing for a public university at the 
coast. BA says, 
The idea of a university was strictly something that was under the control of 
the state. So, even if coastal people wanted their own university it would be 
seen as dangerous. I think at one point it was thought any university at the 
coast would be considered an Islamic, even if it was secular. And to have a 
Muslim university, with all the biases of upcountry . . . (August 30, 2007) 
 
In reference to the Kenyan government‟s regulation of higher education, the 
preponderance of private, registered Christian institutions, and the near-complete 
absence of registered, but non-Christian, private institutions, OM says, 
Islam has never been sufficiently integrated into the educational system of 
this country. I think there was always the unstated fear that a coast university 
201 
 
would take on an Islamic character. In other words, the policy makers didn‟t 
know what to make of a university without Muslim character. It‟s a foolish, 
unfounded fear, because we have all kinds of Muslim universities in the 
continent. (September 17, 2007) 
 
OM continues,  
I myself would strongly lobby for a university at the coast. For heaven sake, 
the place was the first entry of external civilization into this country. And I 
would lose no sleep if the university had a very, very strong faculty of Islamic 
Studies. Because Islamic civilization is to be found. It is a very rich civilization. 
But that is not the same as saying that the US would not be worried if, for 
example, such a university displayed a radical . . . So, the international aspect 
of this issue is an interesting one that you should examine. I think this 
government is sufficiently relaxed enough and it‟s not following the US. It‟s a 
difficult government for the US to deal with. It has not provided the [military] 
bases that the US would have liked. It has not passed the Anti-Terrorism law. 
And it‟s not going to pass the original . . . [and] the UK does not even like the 
current government. (September 17, 2007) 
 
I discussed the nature of this idea in Chapter Five, in the context of the 
marginalization of the coast, and the perception that some of this marginalization is 
keyed by some to issues of religion. In the quotes cited here, the discourse expands 
into the territory of global political debate. I have not explored this issue in greater 
depth here because it is not my intention to focus upon Islam at the coast, but the 
complex, cosmopolitan nature of the coast‟s people. Other interview respondents 
described this complexity and how the discourses of marginalization and response 
engaged domestic forces and pressures. As interview respondent, BS notes, 
Most of the communities you will find here, you can find a church, next to a 
church there is a mosque, and next to the church is a bar. You know, nobody 
really bothers about who does what. There‟s a temple maybe next to a 
mosque. There‟s a church next to a mosque. So, it‟s purely cosmopolitan, and 
its non-sectarian. And it‟s a very, very peaceful town. That is why, by virtue of 
the fact that it‟s cosmopolitan, it‟s peaceful, different administrations of Kenya 
totally ignored this, though it is the second biggest city. And its . . .they 
ignored it because it was a peaceful place. There is no problem at all. 
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Mombasa is a city of nearly one million people. Hundreds of thousands of 
them are Muslim. And hundreds of thousands are non-Muslim. People have been 
moving into and out of the coastal region for centuries. More specifically, people 
from upcountry Kenya have been moving to Mombasa and the coast in sizable 
numbers for decades. 
The contestation around education generally, and university education in 
particular, is richly enough engaged domestically, on enough discursive fields 
(religious, political, etc.) to merit being the focus of this work. That the contestation 
also is extended out in the broad global debate occurring around U.S. hegemony 
and U.S. efforts at controlling „terror‟ is important, and worthy of further research. 
Conclusion 
The establishment of university colleges at the coast of Kenya is an event that 
can be read as the closing of one dialectical cycle of engagement and change. The 
marginalization of the coast that had realized itself in the absence of a public 
university at the coast has transformed into a presence that generates its own 
questions and concerns. I have outlined a few of those concerns in this chapter. 
The discourse of quality in university education, and the focus on 
entrepreneurial efforts to expand opportunities in higher education – or at least to 
expand cash flows toward the bottom lines of existing universities – will be a vital 
part of emergent discourse about university education in Kenya as elsewhere. And 
these will certainly impact how the new university colleges at the coast in Kenya are 
perceived. And in a similar way, the societal changes wrought on how the higher 
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education of girls and women may come to be seen is a rich topic for future study 
and discussion. 
Regarding the globalization of higher education, when taken to the impacts 
felt at the local and regional level, this issue is far more than a matter of a GATS-
based function of the international trade in knowledge. As briefly outlined here, 
religion and politics – and the interplay between the two – are high impact concerns 
not only at the international level, but, as the discourses revealed in previous 
chapters show, they are very important issues at the local, regional and national 
levels within Kenya. 
These all play into the context within which questions about the new 
institutions at the coast will be examined. The ongoing examination and discursive 
turns will continue to involve the social, economic, and political elements that spoke 
to the absence of these institutions. By way of an attempt to encapsulate the sense 
in which I believe these forces continue to influence each other, I close with a pair of 
quotes from Schugurensky (1999), who is writing about the concept of the 
“heteronomous university,” a kind of one-size-fits-all model for the market-driven 
university. He writes that,  
[U]niversities are experiencing a transition (sometimes voluntarily, usually 
forced) toward a heteronomous model. Following Weber, an institution can be 
considered heteronomous when its mission, its agenda, and its outcomes are 
defined more by external controls and impositions than by its internal 
governing bodies. Thus, a heteronomous university is one increasingly unable 
to proactively design its itinerary, and whose success derives from its 
effective and rapid responses to external demands. Whereas autonomy 
implies self-government, heteronomy, by contrast, implies a subordination to 
the law or domination of another. The available evidence indicates that a 
significant number of universities throughout the world are increasingly forced 
to reduce their margin of autonomy by reacting both to market demands and 
state imperatives. (296) 
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A few pages later, Schugurensky continues, 
The heteronomous university is a Pandora‟s box. In the best-case scenario, 
government regulations can help monitor standards, avoid duplications, and 
improve efficiency and social responsibility; market practices and values can 
promote the adoption of better managerial procedures and a closer 
relationship with business in which both partners benefit equally. However, in 
a different scenario, the heteronomous model can also lead to the erosion of 
important values and traditions such as the social mission of the university, its 
institutional autonomy and academic freedom, its pursuit of equity and 
accessibility, or its disinterested search for the truth. (299) 
 
Kenya‟s public universities are certainly being impacted by the push to raise 
sufficient revenue to keep themselves financially solvent while state support is 
reduced. Thus, they are implicated in the bind Schugurensky outlines. And there is 
little certainty that any new university in Kenya will be able to avoid this bind – state 
sanctioned, market-influenced, cash-poor. 
So, the new university colleges at the coast begin the latest iterations of their 
existences in a tight political and economic space. In the end, though, if they are to 
avoid the bind of the heteronomous university that Schugurensky describes, it may 
because the perceptions of the coast as something of a “place apart” within Kenya 
are what help keep alive the notion that a coast-based public university can be a 
“university of its own.” As with each of the ideas I have outlined in this chapter, and 
in view of what I have presented elsewhere in this work, this final point would make 
for a topic worthy of ongoing study. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Nine: Conclusions from the Study 
 
The purpose of this work has been to explore the circumstances under which 
the coast of Kenya dealt with a longstanding absence of an independent public 
university, and how recent decisions to elevate existing tertiary (non-university) 
institutions to public university college status have changed the engagement with 
university education at the coast. I have utilized a grounded theory approach to 
reveal a dialectic arc in the discourses that exist around these matters. I have shown 
that the discourses of marginalization of the coast support a perception that the 
people of the coast have been left out of major decisions about university education 
in their region. I have shown how people constitute responses and create personal, 
institutional, and programmatic alternatives that permit some access to university 
education, both within and against this perception of being marginalized. And I have 
shown how this engagement, in the form of the push for „a university of our own,‟ 
has coincided with the elevation of existing institutions at the coast to university 
college status. Finally, I have shown how this elevation is seen as a partial 
realization of the „university of our own‟ conception, one that brings with it new 
questions about how these elevated institutions will work for coast people. 
One of the primary conclusions to be drawn from the study is the degree to 
which the determination of where public university institutions will be located remains 
connected in a primary way to discourses situated in a national political environment. 
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Several factors lead me to this conclusion. While I have offered some evidence that 
negotiations to elevate the coastal institutions to university or university college 
status had been going on for some time (see pages 164-165), it was not until the 
Presidential election campaign of 2007 that the incumbent government made the 
decision to elevate. At the same time as it elevated the coast institutions, a handful 
of other institutions around the country were similarly elevated. 
It seems clear that national level political and electoral machinations played a 
quite significant role in the decisions about all of these institutions. How the existing 
power-sharing agreement between President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga, 
neither of whom has a particularly firm base in Coast Province, will play out will say 
much about what resources are provided to Pwani University College and Mombasa 
Polytechnic University College. It will be a question worth posing whether the 
programs that had long been on offer at these institutions before there elevation will 
be continued. So, too, will be the question of how more profound changes to these 
institutions will be perceived by the people of the coast. 
As Kenya stretches out its higher education system, these questions will be 
asked not only at the coast, but in the other communities where university colleges 
have been legislated. This will introduce yet another level for potential analysis – the 
comparison between efforts taking place in these various communities. How will they 
be seen as comparable? And will they in some way come to be seen as sufficiently 
different so as to engender a perception of ongoing bias toward one community or 
away from another? 
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While the potential for some at the coast to believe that this political power 
play is another example of the marginalization of the coast – Mazrui‟s 
autocolonization – I believe that it also offers the potential for universities to become 
tied to the local community such that they hold a more-than-notional sense of 
belonging to the host community. I believe there will be an opportunity for the 
emerging university colleges to connect in substantive ways with their local 
communities, whether at the coast or elsewhere. Moi University is connected to the 
community of Eldoret in substantive programmatic and cultural ways, even as it 
enrolls students from all over Kenya. Maseno University is perceived as being a 
place at which faculty are overwhelmingly Luo, matching the ethnic composition of 
the university‟ location. Masinde Muliro University is named after a leading national 
political figure who hailed from the region where the eponymous university stands, 
and its links to the local community in Kakamega will grow. 
So, too, will the connection between Mombasa Polytechnic University 
College, Pwani University College, and their local communities. Mombasa and Kilifi 
(site of PUC) will each be changed by their engagement with the national 
universities (temporary?) management of the new university colleges. In what ways 
this change will occur is an open question. How the people in these two communities 
perceive the change is also an open question. But I feel that the local communities 
will have some influence over the university colleges. I believe that the sheer 
number of institutions now existing in Kenya will eventually spur a shift in the 
discourse on university education toward the kind of options that Mazrui defines in 
his editorial of August 26, 2007. 
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More pertinent to the coast‟s interest in influence in this regard, the 
connection between Mombasa Polytechnic University College and Jomo Kenyatta 
University of Agriculture and Technology is one that has been in development for a 
number of years. Yes, JKUAT is an upcountry university, but when the positioning of 
Ali Mazrui (Chancellor of JKUAT) is combined with the energy devoted to the 
longstanding efforts described in Chapter Six, I believe the chance that local 
communities will have some influence over the new institutions at the coast is greatly 
increased. 
Given this, I believe that one significant limitation of my study will be 
addressable with further research. It will be informative to pursue a comparative 
investigation of other communities throughout Kenya that will be dealing with the 
same issues as the communities of Mombasa and Kilifi. This kind of comparative 
study will uncover what the people of these other communities see as their 
motivating factors in pursuing university options. It will also permit a test of the 
validity of my grounded theory approach and dialectic use of discourses in a second 
environment. 
I do think that my approach has real rigor, but the opportunity to test it in what 
seems to be analogous circumstances will be useful. To offer an example: as I note 
in footnote 102 on page 165, Kisii University College was elevated to its current 
status at the same time as Mombasa Polytechnic and Pwani University College were 
elevated. Kisii is the name of both a district and a town located in Nyanza Province, 
the town being approximately 150 miles west of Nairobi. The town and district are 
both densely populated, a characteristic shared with Mombasa. Until the elevation of 
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Kisii University College, the town was at some distance from the nearest public 
university or university college (Egerton to the east; Maseno to the west), as was 
Mombasa.  
What I do not know at all is whether Kisii possesses anything like Mombasa‟s 
thousand year history as an international and multicultural crossroads. My suspicion 
is that it does not. Thus, the senses in which Mombasa‟s long history plays through 
the discourses of marginalization, and the responsive discourse of alternatives is a 
construct that may or may not apply in Kisii. While I believe the dialectic form would 
continue to be a useful way of structuring the data, I do not know if the data a 
grounded theory study would unveil could be analyzed as I have analyzed the data 
from Mombasa. 
This kind of comparative study will also be an addition to the literature on 
expansion of higher education opportunities in other countries in Africa. Kenya is 
hardly alone in the degree to which its pyramidal education system leaves many 
students without further education options as they move through the system. The 
pressures that these individual students face, and the financial and administrative 
pressures that are felt by those whose task is to manage higher education 
institutions in a crowded environment, combine to define the space within which 
much of my future research will take place. 
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Appendix A 
 
Interview protocol 
 
The research study will utilize open-ended interviews.  As such, the protocol 
provided here will serve as an outline of questions that may be asked. 
 
(1) What is your connection with Mombasa (or Kenya‟s coastal region, more 
broadly)? 
(2) Can you share with me your understanding of the history of public university 
development in Kenya? 
(3) In what ways have you been involved in public university education or in the 
development of public universities in Kenya? 
(3a) Follow-up: How did you become involved in this work? 
(3b) Follow-up: In what places have you undertaken this work in Kenya? 
(4) In your view, who are the people most responsible for developing 
universities in Kenya? 
(4a) Follow-up: what connection(s), if any, do these people have to 
Mombasa? 
(5) In your memory, when did you become aware that there were individuals 
working to establish a public university in Mombasa (or Kenya‟s coastal 
region, more broadly)? 
(6) In your view, what are the reasons for why Mombasa (and the coastal 
region, more broadly) does not yet have a public university? 
(7) What meaning(s) do you ascribe to the reasons Mombasa (and the 
coastal region, more broadly) remains without a public university? 
(8) In what ways do you believe the absence of a public university in the 
coastal region has impacted (positively or negatively) the people and 
communities of Mombasa (and the coastal region, more broadly)? 
(8a) Follow-up: In what ways would the establishment of a public university in 
Mombasa (or Kenya‟s coastal region, more broadly) impact economic, 
political, and social development(s) in the region? 
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(8b) Follow-up: In what ways do you think the relationship Mombasa (and the 
coastal region, more broadly) maintains with the rest of Kenya (and 
Kenya‟s government) has affected decisions about when and whether 
to establish a public university here? 
(9) What do you feel will need to occur in order for a university to be 
established in Mombasa? 
(10) Who do you believe will be the most important constituencies in the effort 
that eventually brings a university to Mombasa? 
(11) In what ways would the establishment of a public university in Mombasa 
(or Kenya‟s coastal region, more broadly) bring change to the region? 
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